When conflicts of interests are too blatant, public debate can only be farcical, and yet it is revealing of the challenges confronting the new government. The recent exchanges between some legislators and the Secretary for Social Affairs and Culture, Alexis Tam are a remarkable case in point.
Ever since he took office in December 2014, Mr Tam has made no secret that his number one concern would be “public health” and shortly after a comprehensive survey on the “Regime for the prevention and control of smoking” was released at the end of January, he announced, supposedly “on his own” – or so are we led to believe by not so-friendly commentators – that the government would submit a revised piece of legislation within the first half of 2015 that would make way for a full ban on smoking inside casinos, thus implying that VIP rooms would be involved and smoking lounges on mass floors no longer allowed. Mr Tam reiterated that engagement in April during the policy address, and again this week, while reporting to the legislators.
On Mr Tam’s side, there is an ever-growing corpus of medical studies showing that second-hand smoking is in fact as bad as direct inhaling, recommendations made by the World Health Organisation (agreed to by China’s Ministry of Health since 2007) noting that there is no existing technical solution that will equate to non-smoking, and quite a significant number of business-minded pieces of scholarship attesting that smoking bans have not had an adverse impact on revenues in business sectors of direct concern, and essentially the hospitality sector. Clearly, full smoking bans in public places are the trend, so much so that even permissive New Orleans has banned smoking in bars, casinos and other public areas starting on April 22nd.
Mr Tam has also on his side the spirit of the law that was passed in 2011—the first aim of the law being “to protect [the citizens] from exposure to tobacco smoke”—, the fact that the main causes of death in Macao are aggravated by the exposure to tobacco smoke, and the wish expressed by the frontline workers of the industry to see a full ban on smoking being implemented—87.20% of those directly exposed, the croupiers and casino floor staff. Moreover, in the broader context of China—something far more prevalent these days—the National People’s Congress has committed the country to “full implementation of the smoking ban in public places” ever since it voted in the 12th Five-Year Plan in March 2011.
Adversely, Mr Tam is pitted by the gaming industry that has been relentless in trying to lobby every level of government—including Beijing in March during the double congress—in favour of airport-style smoking lounges, with separate ventilation systems and negative pressure in relation to adjacent areas, in accordance with the regulation published by the Chief Executive in June 2014. Several casino operators, including one with a seat in the legislature, have argued that voiding the previous (and rather recent) regulation would make limited (and costly) sense, and moreover that gambling revenues have been in shambles since June last year and thus a full smoking ban could translate into an additional loss estimated at 15%—no methodology given, but the figure is repeated over and over again.
The problem is that it took an extraordinary amount of time to pass the initial law (16 months, to be precise) back in 2011, and this in no small thanks to Mr Chan Chak Mo (a representative for culture!), one of the most vocal voices against Mr Tam today and the number one defender of the food and beverage industry—his group, Future Bright, is everywhere to be seen in all casinos and just lost 95.6% of its profits in the first quarter of 2015. The problem is then that casinos benefited from a three-year reprieve. The problem is that many casinos failed the health bureau tests and everybody was playing cat and mouse with the new regulations.
More compliance with the spirit of the law might have prevented a change in tune. Lobbying failed, now there is only room for embrace.
Published in Macau Daily Times, May 15th 2015
Friday, May 15, 2015
Olho mágico: Um líder intrigante / Peephole: The puzzling leader
Being midway through his first term as supreme leader of China, Xi Jinping became itself an object of study and question, as is another form of a "new normal", especially after having driven a break radical with the ancient Chinese leadership and the "lost decade" of Hu Jintao. But the governance Xi Jinping is also a "case study" by the depth and scope of what the Chinese leader designated as a priority in terms of policy orientation, with the fight against corruption to stand out clearly visible. [...]
Published in Ponto Final, May 15 2015
And the text original in English with web links:
Published in Ponto Final, May 15 2015
And the text original in English with web links:
Being
now halfway into his first mandate as China’s supremo, Xi Jinping has become
the object of many probes—another form of “new normal”—, mainly because of his apparent
clean break with the previous leadership—the so-called “lost decade” of Hu
Jintao—as well as the depth and reach of everything he has undertaken or
designated as a priority in terms of policy-making, among which the fight
against corruption stands a distant first. Assertiveness at home and abroad has
become his trademark and his self-confident and earthily personal style has
made his ultimate goal to salvage the perennial rule of the Communist Party of
China (CPC) very convincing for many.
In
a recent “educated poll” run by Foreign
Affairs flashily entitled “Will China Crumble? ,” some 32 experts and
scholars from various sectors and background were asked whether or not they
agreed with the assertion that “The current Chinese regime will not survive
the next decade without major reform” and quite surprisingly 19 of them
disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement, 6 stayed neutral and only 7
agreed or strongly agreed. Despite the relative vagueness and ambiguity of the
question—are we talking exclusively about political reform? Does it necessarily
mean a breakthrough towards liberal democracy? Is it “reform” versus
“revolution?—this is a clear indication that beyond the two major dangers of soul-searching
anti-graft purges and declining economic growth—the backbone of the Party’s
legitimacy—there is a significant level of confidence regarding the ability of
the Party-state under Xi’s helmsmanship to overcome the seemingly inconsistence
of having economic reforms without ultimately engaging into far-reaching
political reforms. In the enduring contest between the idea of “authoritarian
resilience” coined by Andrew Nathan in the early 2000s and
the one of inescapable “collapse” because of inherent internal contradictions
popularized by Gordon Chang, Pei Minxin or
more recently David Shambaugh, resilience
appears to have the upper hand. Yet, all these experts do not see China as an
alternative model to liberal democracy and none for sure agree with Daniel
Bell’s latest claim that
“Chinese-style political meritocracy can help to remedy the key flaws of
electoral democracy”.
The resolve of Xi’s action has thus translated into a perceived renewed
capacity of the Chinese state to deliver on its promise of modernity, but Xi
the “Born Red”
leader is still pretty much a puzzle, despite his impeccable princeling
credentials and being the most “advertised” Chinese ruler since Mao Zedong—several
books of his selected works have already been published, including a “Study China” (xuexi
zhongguo) smartphone App providing his complete writings, favorite poems and travel agenda,
and “Xi Dada”,
“Big Uncle Xi” as he was nicknamed by the state news agency, can be found on
stickers, pins, as a statuette and even comics and animated cartoons. Many an
observers have highlighted that this could amount to a revamped form of cult of
the personality, and yet Xi Jinping is portrayed as being genuinely
“accessible” to the people—in one of these cartoons, the presidential Chinese
dream becomes the one of winning the World
Cup! Despite the many references to the Maoist era and the heavy crackdown
on civil society and any form of dissenting view—more so if it is suspected to
be under a “Western influence”—most of the reforms in the economic and social
realms appear to be guided by pragmatism. If the wish for a Chinese rejuvenation
or renaissance, as argued by Willy Wo-Lap Lam in his Chinese Politics in the Era of Xi Jinping, is
hard to refute and has been part of the political master narrative since the
humiliation of the First Opium War, other ulterior motives are less
ascertained.
In a somewhat traditional neo-authoritarianism perspective, the
concentration of power in the hands of a single enlightened leader is made necessary
to keep stirring the boat in the right direction, and clearly the cape to avoid
at all cost is the one that has presided over the demise of the Soviet
Communist Party, precisely because of a lack of confidence and
resolution—obviously quite an obsessive thought. For Willy Lam, the excessive monopolization
of power that forces even Premier Li Keqiang to play second fiddle, the ad hoc
creation of leading groups and committees that somehow circumvent the collegial
power of the Politburo Standing Committee, the lack of promotion of the
so-called 7th generation of leaders, together with the admiration
that Mr Xi holds for Vladimir Putin and his 15 years of uninterrupted exercise
of power in Russia are an indication that the design might go beyond the
salvation of the CPC and suggest a wish for Mr Xi to stay in power at
least up to 2027. For a liberal thinker like Wu Jiaxiang, this tight grip over
power and the fending off of rival factions and vested interests within the
party correspond to a consolidating stage that necessarily precedes further
reforms. The puzzle remains though: depending on the tightness of the grip, one
always risks choking off
the potential for innovation and reform.
Labels:
china,
leader,
PRC,
Willy Wo Lap Lam,
Xi Jinping
Friday, May 01, 2015
Kapok: Groundhog Day
In the 1993 comedy “Groundhog Day”, Bill Murray plays a weatherman who falls victim of some form of never ending time loop while reluctantly covering a seemingly dull and repetitive story about a rodent able to forecast the weather: each and every morning, the very same day starts all over again, and the weatherman is stuck on February 2nd. What appears as an opportunity at first, providing endless occasions to influence the same situations for both worst and best, soon turns into a nightmare, as the now much wiser character discovers the limits of his newly-found omnipotence. Ultimately, only the discovery of his true benevolent self will allow him to break free from this doom—this is after all a Hollywood movie.
Beyond the growing annoyance, this feeling of everlasting repetition made pointless by the powerlessness of the protagonists is obviously what resonates most in the hearts and minds of many people in Macao when it comes to “traffic issues”. The problem is: Macao is no Hollywood!
While on the trail to win an election for which he was running unopposed last August, Mr Chui went the extra step of gathering people’s “opinions and suggestions”—let’s say grievances. Quite unexpectedly it seems—we had been told time and time again that “housing” was the No. 1 problem—it was reported in November that the most pressing concern for Macao residents was actually the one concerning traffic. At the time, a very inspired Lao Pun Lap, the head of the government think-tank, revealed that even though he did not have the “exact figure” for the breakdown of these 87,425 “opinions” (out of a total of 111,246) exclusively troubled by “traffic issues”, a majority of citizens expected the government to give high-priority to public transportation, and that the number of vehicles on the road should be limited, the number of parking spots increased, the LRT construction work sped up and the overall management of traffic flow improved.
This is pretty much in line with observations and suggestions—clearly I cannot use the word “commitments”—that were developed back in 2009 in the “General Policy on Traffic and Land Transportation in Macao (2010-2020)” issued by the Transport Bureau (DSAT): the future in terms of “mobility” was bleak if projections from 2010 were to be trusted (too many private cars, too slow a traffic, lengthened commuting time and too much pollution) and thus a duly identified impending disaster required swift actions and long term planning. According to that document, by 2012, the priority was to be the reorganization of “public transports” and “the safeguarding of commuting”, and by 2015, the “metro” would have started operating and “tangible results in every area supporting the ‘primacy of public transports’” would have been achieved. Let’s face it: every aspect of the four step action plan of that 2009 blueprint—improving public transport, reasonably managing private vehicles, creating a sense of flawless mobility and pursuing the construction of infrastructures and a better education regarding road safety—are utter failures.
The new Secretary for transport and public works, Raimundo do Rosário, is absolutely right when he hints at the fact that the issue of traffic congestion and the ways to solve it are a matter of collective responsibility. When newspapers are filled with full-page ads of cars whose speed and size are simply insane for a 30 sq. kilometer territory, they bear a responsibility. When people pressure the government to keep the price of petrol and the tax on vehicles low, they share part of the blame—and the same goes for legislators who speak on behalf of the said people. When the government fails to organize sensible tenders for big infrastructure projects, or when it proves unable to supervise the realization of these projects, or when it makes a mistake in the type of contract it issues for the concessionary exploitation of the city’s bus lanes, it does indeed bear another significant part of the responsibility.
The failure to address the challenges of fast deteriorating mobility in Macao has already had a great impact on our mind—peace of mind—, lungs and purse, and clearly breaking free from that apparently inevitable trap will require far more than good intentions and benevolence.
Published in Macau Daily Times, May 1st 2015
Beyond the growing annoyance, this feeling of everlasting repetition made pointless by the powerlessness of the protagonists is obviously what resonates most in the hearts and minds of many people in Macao when it comes to “traffic issues”. The problem is: Macao is no Hollywood!
While on the trail to win an election for which he was running unopposed last August, Mr Chui went the extra step of gathering people’s “opinions and suggestions”—let’s say grievances. Quite unexpectedly it seems—we had been told time and time again that “housing” was the No. 1 problem—it was reported in November that the most pressing concern for Macao residents was actually the one concerning traffic. At the time, a very inspired Lao Pun Lap, the head of the government think-tank, revealed that even though he did not have the “exact figure” for the breakdown of these 87,425 “opinions” (out of a total of 111,246) exclusively troubled by “traffic issues”, a majority of citizens expected the government to give high-priority to public transportation, and that the number of vehicles on the road should be limited, the number of parking spots increased, the LRT construction work sped up and the overall management of traffic flow improved.
This is pretty much in line with observations and suggestions—clearly I cannot use the word “commitments”—that were developed back in 2009 in the “General Policy on Traffic and Land Transportation in Macao (2010-2020)” issued by the Transport Bureau (DSAT): the future in terms of “mobility” was bleak if projections from 2010 were to be trusted (too many private cars, too slow a traffic, lengthened commuting time and too much pollution) and thus a duly identified impending disaster required swift actions and long term planning. According to that document, by 2012, the priority was to be the reorganization of “public transports” and “the safeguarding of commuting”, and by 2015, the “metro” would have started operating and “tangible results in every area supporting the ‘primacy of public transports’” would have been achieved. Let’s face it: every aspect of the four step action plan of that 2009 blueprint—improving public transport, reasonably managing private vehicles, creating a sense of flawless mobility and pursuing the construction of infrastructures and a better education regarding road safety—are utter failures.
The new Secretary for transport and public works, Raimundo do Rosário, is absolutely right when he hints at the fact that the issue of traffic congestion and the ways to solve it are a matter of collective responsibility. When newspapers are filled with full-page ads of cars whose speed and size are simply insane for a 30 sq. kilometer territory, they bear a responsibility. When people pressure the government to keep the price of petrol and the tax on vehicles low, they share part of the blame—and the same goes for legislators who speak on behalf of the said people. When the government fails to organize sensible tenders for big infrastructure projects, or when it proves unable to supervise the realization of these projects, or when it makes a mistake in the type of contract it issues for the concessionary exploitation of the city’s bus lanes, it does indeed bear another significant part of the responsibility.
The failure to address the challenges of fast deteriorating mobility in Macao has already had a great impact on our mind—peace of mind—, lungs and purse, and clearly breaking free from that apparently inevitable trap will require far more than good intentions and benevolence.
Published in Macau Daily Times, May 1st 2015
Labels:
Macao,
Macau,
Raimundo Arrais do Rosário,
traffic,
transportation,
澳門
Friday, April 17, 2015
Kapok: The way ahead is long
Thanks to Linkedin, I sometimes get to read articles about management in general and human relations at work, in particular, that I would otherwise simply brush aside for lack of substance and meaning. Many a time, scholars who specialise in the management of people in a working setting are failed businessmen, lack the broadness of mind to embrace economics, miss the point of power politics and are too short in scientific rigour to engage in psychology. When they focus on cross-cultural interactions, it often gets worse: culture gets reified and learning how to communicate gets truncated into imperfect lists of dos and don’ts.
Linkedin describes itself as a “business-oriented social networking service”, so it cannot really be blamed for endlessly publishing postings, papers and quotes about what to expect from a manager. Clearly, this is a network for people who think of themselves as decision-makers, and are always eager to grab a new opportunity—“losers find excuses, winners find solutions” reads one, “you create your own opportunity” reads another.Yet, listening to the new team of secretaries in Macao addressing for the first time the legislature in the past few weeks has made me reconsider a classic dilemma that scholars in the field of human resources never fail to examine and cross-examine: the one of leadership versus management. The artificiality of the boundary between one and the other is obvious, and depending on the scale of the operation, it is often impossible to make a distinction. The head of a small organization usually has to be a leader as well as a manager as there is no way things can be delegated. Also, competing characteristics can be complementary even though the idea that one set of features cannot exist without the other is fallacious: a so-called manager can continue to operate even though the leader has no vision and an institution can continue to strive even though the vision of its leader is completely distorted—absurd visions being only bearable as long as they are not instantly lethal, especially when it comes to public administration.
In the case of Macao, I would argue that what inspired the clean slate approach of a brand new government last December after 15 years of more or less the same was having too many insulated managers and no leader. Contrary to what I believed for a long time, the absence of leadership was more consequential than essential: the burdening legacy of the previous leadership appears to have acted almost right from the start as some kind of tantalizing, paralyzing and lurking influence. Social disgruntlement coupled with a looming economic recession and a wider political shift in the mainland precipitated the need for change.Because of Easter and Qingming, the addresses by the secretaries have been dragging far too long. So as to give an even greater sense of efficiency – the one virtue that had been lacking in Chui I – everything should have been wrapped up in a week or so instead of starting March 23 and finishing April 16! Yet, with maybe the notable exception of Sonia Chan who has yet to prove herself, the secretaries have displayed a remarkable sense of commitment in restituting the daily operations of their portfolio together with the challenges—being true managers—and a commendable capacity to project their work and priorities into the future—being true leaders. They have done so with an amount of resoluteness and power of conviction not often seen in this polity. Sometimes even with humour, as when Alexis Tam Chon Weng retorted to legislator Fong Chi Keong who had quoted the most famous poem of Qu Yuan (“The way ahead is long, and I do not see any ending, yet high and low I’ll search with determination”) that he hoped he would not have to drown himself if he failed to implement his “Glorious five years’” policy! With an additional promise of accountability, let’s hope that they will be able to now work as a team to confront the many vested interests that have marred the city far too long.
Published in Macau Daily Times, April 17 2015
Linkedin describes itself as a “business-oriented social networking service”, so it cannot really be blamed for endlessly publishing postings, papers and quotes about what to expect from a manager. Clearly, this is a network for people who think of themselves as decision-makers, and are always eager to grab a new opportunity—“losers find excuses, winners find solutions” reads one, “you create your own opportunity” reads another.Yet, listening to the new team of secretaries in Macao addressing for the first time the legislature in the past few weeks has made me reconsider a classic dilemma that scholars in the field of human resources never fail to examine and cross-examine: the one of leadership versus management. The artificiality of the boundary between one and the other is obvious, and depending on the scale of the operation, it is often impossible to make a distinction. The head of a small organization usually has to be a leader as well as a manager as there is no way things can be delegated. Also, competing characteristics can be complementary even though the idea that one set of features cannot exist without the other is fallacious: a so-called manager can continue to operate even though the leader has no vision and an institution can continue to strive even though the vision of its leader is completely distorted—absurd visions being only bearable as long as they are not instantly lethal, especially when it comes to public administration.
In the case of Macao, I would argue that what inspired the clean slate approach of a brand new government last December after 15 years of more or less the same was having too many insulated managers and no leader. Contrary to what I believed for a long time, the absence of leadership was more consequential than essential: the burdening legacy of the previous leadership appears to have acted almost right from the start as some kind of tantalizing, paralyzing and lurking influence. Social disgruntlement coupled with a looming economic recession and a wider political shift in the mainland precipitated the need for change.Because of Easter and Qingming, the addresses by the secretaries have been dragging far too long. So as to give an even greater sense of efficiency – the one virtue that had been lacking in Chui I – everything should have been wrapped up in a week or so instead of starting March 23 and finishing April 16! Yet, with maybe the notable exception of Sonia Chan who has yet to prove herself, the secretaries have displayed a remarkable sense of commitment in restituting the daily operations of their portfolio together with the challenges—being true managers—and a commendable capacity to project their work and priorities into the future—being true leaders. They have done so with an amount of resoluteness and power of conviction not often seen in this polity. Sometimes even with humour, as when Alexis Tam Chon Weng retorted to legislator Fong Chi Keong who had quoted the most famous poem of Qu Yuan (“The way ahead is long, and I do not see any ending, yet high and low I’ll search with determination”) that he hoped he would not have to drown himself if he failed to implement his “Glorious five years’” policy! With an additional promise of accountability, let’s hope that they will be able to now work as a team to confront the many vested interests that have marred the city far too long.
Published in Macau Daily Times, April 17 2015
Labels:
Alexis Tam Chon Weng,
Fong Chi Keong,
Macao,
Macau,
policy address,
澳門
Wednesday, April 15, 2015
Olho mágico: Verdificação / Peephole: Greenisation
A 24 de Março, o Politburo do Partido Comunista da China (PCC) abraçou oficialmente, e pela primeira vez, o conceito de “verdificação” (绿色化). Com um empurrão decidido, e sem que nada o fizesse anunciar, os escalões mais elevados da estrutura orgânica do Partido, entronizaram a necessidade de adicionar uma “cultura de conservação” às “quatro novas modernizações” (a industrialização, a urbanização, a informatização e a modernização da agricultura), política que constituiu o alfa e omega do PCC tal como foi definido pelo 18º Congresso do Partido em 2012. A medida constitui uma decisão de monta, ainda que a ausência de pormenores mais pragmáticos e de políticas concretas tenham contribuído para que passasse quase despercebida. [...]
For the rest, see Ponto Final, April 15 2015 & Ponto Final, April 19 2015
My original text in English:
On March 24th, the Politburo of the Communist Party of China (CPC) espoused the concept of “greenisation” (绿色化) for the first time ever. In a powerful push, at the highest echelon of Party politics, all of a sudden, the need to develop a “conservation culture” is being embedded in the “new four modernisations” (industrialisation, urbanisation, informatisation and modernisation of the agriculture), the alpha and omega of the CPC as defined by the 18th Party Congress of 2012. This is no small feat even though we are still short of pragmatic details and policy-making, and yet it has gone fairly unnoticed.
The very fact that greenisation appears to be meant to cut through the “new four modernisations” should have raised a few eyebrows.
First of all because these revamped magic four are a direct reference to Deng Xiaoping’s own “four modernisations” that launched the “opening up and reform” era back in November 1978. They are thus symbolically powerful and meaningful. For the present leadership, both the ambition and the imperative are of the same magnitude as it was at the end of the 1970s: the survival of China’s model depends on its ability to adapt and several indicators have already shown that the economic drivers of the past three reformist decades are dwindling, hence the need for a vast overhaul that will put both (shrinking) human resources and capital investment (with diminishing returns) to a better use.
Secondly, the crucial need to develop a “conservation culture” is supposed to infuse a new momentum to some of the priorities already defined and appears to be taking overall precedence: the greenisation of China is to be the one of its “production, economy and lifestyles” as a whole. “Green development” implies to go beyond the mere “promotion of sustainable development” as one of the eight tasks for the “deepening of economic reform” as defined by the Third Plenum of the Congress in November 2013. And “green development” is not only being embedded in the general program that ambitions to fix the engine of growth, stabilise the economy and better the quality of life of the citizens, but is also seen as being “part of national soft power and a new advantage in international competition”.
Finally, a decision made by the Politburo itself regarding a shift of that nature should not be downplayed, especially because Xi Jinping’s “strong leadership” style follows a pattern we could ourselves characterise as a shrivelled version of democratic centralism. Mr Xi’s interpretation of Lenin’s “freedom of discussion, unity of action” is quite restrictive and, as already noted by several perceptive observers of Chinese politics, in the two crucial areas of security and economic reforms the Politburo itself is dominated by two “super organs” created in late 2013 and both of them are chaired by President Xi himself: the Central National Security Commission and the Central Leading Group for Comprehensively Deepening Reforms.
The seriousness of China’s environmental upheavals is now widely acknowledged, both inside and outside of the country, and is proving to be quite challenging as well as extremely sensitive. The success of Chai Qing’s “Under the Dome” documentary at the time of the convening of the National People’s Congress is more than telling. This often very personal 103-minute video detailing the appalling air pollution problem faced by China produced by a renowned investigative journalist and financed out of her own purse had been seen 100 million times in just 48 hours before it was removed from the popular video-hosting website Youku. No doubt that this Ted-talk style report nourished by dreary statistics à la Al Gore’s An Inconvenient Truth and jaw-dropping interviews with admittedly powerless local officials might have proved a (too) perfect enthusing illustration of Premier that Li Keqiang’s own characterisation of pollution as being “a blight on people's lives”.
A World Bank study indicates that the overall cost of China’s degraded environment corresponds to 9% of its Gross Domestic Product, and a recent Tsinghua University study concludes that tiny particulate pollutants were linked to 670,000 premature deaths from strokes, lung cancer, coronary heart disease and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease in 2012 alone! ! No wonder then that the reforming of the “ecological systems” in China appeared in the first sentence of the broad-sweeping economic reform plan of November 2013 issued during the Third Plenum! In one of the few studies that have looked precisely and comprehensively into the substance of all the reforms publicised by the new leadership, Daniel Rosen goes to great lengths in showing that indeed the authorities have been busy making these announcements a reality by setting in motion “populist campaigns against polluting facilities, energy and coal policy reforms, a revamped environmental protection law and [stepping-up] regulatory activism”. But, partly thanks to often self-imposed greater transparency in actual reporting, the fact remains that the situation has worsened, that extremely polluting coal remains king and environmental protection comes a distant second behind the constraints to deliver GDP growth and economic performance, especially at local level.
Since January 1st 2015, China is equipped with regulatory standards widely recognized as being both extremely progressive and stringent. And yet, watchful observers Bo Zhang and Cong Cao warn us in the journal Nature that the brand new Environmental Protection Law could easily be confronted by four kinds of adverse “gaps”: first, being outclassed by other pieces of specific legislation dealing with agriculture, forestry, grassland and water; second, being “hampered by the fragmented and overlapping structure of environmental governance”; third, being crippled by the lack of acknowledgment of “citizens’ basic right to an environment fit for life”; and fourth, because enforcement could easily be contravened “by a lack of capacity and by conflicts of interest”. In conclusion, they argue that this very promising law thus now “requires robust implementation mechanisms, accountability regimes and institutional arrangements”, and they concur with Alex Wang from the University of California (Los Angeles) that environmental protection needs to be raised to “a level of priority previously reserved only for the most important party-state mandates, such as economic growth, social stability, and the one-child policy.” Could the “greenisation” concept vouched by the Politburo be it?
For the rest, see Ponto Final, April 15 2015 & Ponto Final, April 19 2015
My original text in English:
On March 24th, the Politburo of the Communist Party of China (CPC) espoused the concept of “greenisation” (绿色化) for the first time ever. In a powerful push, at the highest echelon of Party politics, all of a sudden, the need to develop a “conservation culture” is being embedded in the “new four modernisations” (industrialisation, urbanisation, informatisation and modernisation of the agriculture), the alpha and omega of the CPC as defined by the 18th Party Congress of 2012. This is no small feat even though we are still short of pragmatic details and policy-making, and yet it has gone fairly unnoticed.
The very fact that greenisation appears to be meant to cut through the “new four modernisations” should have raised a few eyebrows.
First of all because these revamped magic four are a direct reference to Deng Xiaoping’s own “four modernisations” that launched the “opening up and reform” era back in November 1978. They are thus symbolically powerful and meaningful. For the present leadership, both the ambition and the imperative are of the same magnitude as it was at the end of the 1970s: the survival of China’s model depends on its ability to adapt and several indicators have already shown that the economic drivers of the past three reformist decades are dwindling, hence the need for a vast overhaul that will put both (shrinking) human resources and capital investment (with diminishing returns) to a better use.
Secondly, the crucial need to develop a “conservation culture” is supposed to infuse a new momentum to some of the priorities already defined and appears to be taking overall precedence: the greenisation of China is to be the one of its “production, economy and lifestyles” as a whole. “Green development” implies to go beyond the mere “promotion of sustainable development” as one of the eight tasks for the “deepening of economic reform” as defined by the Third Plenum of the Congress in November 2013. And “green development” is not only being embedded in the general program that ambitions to fix the engine of growth, stabilise the economy and better the quality of life of the citizens, but is also seen as being “part of national soft power and a new advantage in international competition”.
Finally, a decision made by the Politburo itself regarding a shift of that nature should not be downplayed, especially because Xi Jinping’s “strong leadership” style follows a pattern we could ourselves characterise as a shrivelled version of democratic centralism. Mr Xi’s interpretation of Lenin’s “freedom of discussion, unity of action” is quite restrictive and, as already noted by several perceptive observers of Chinese politics, in the two crucial areas of security and economic reforms the Politburo itself is dominated by two “super organs” created in late 2013 and both of them are chaired by President Xi himself: the Central National Security Commission and the Central Leading Group for Comprehensively Deepening Reforms.
The seriousness of China’s environmental upheavals is now widely acknowledged, both inside and outside of the country, and is proving to be quite challenging as well as extremely sensitive. The success of Chai Qing’s “Under the Dome” documentary at the time of the convening of the National People’s Congress is more than telling. This often very personal 103-minute video detailing the appalling air pollution problem faced by China produced by a renowned investigative journalist and financed out of her own purse had been seen 100 million times in just 48 hours before it was removed from the popular video-hosting website Youku. No doubt that this Ted-talk style report nourished by dreary statistics à la Al Gore’s An Inconvenient Truth and jaw-dropping interviews with admittedly powerless local officials might have proved a (too) perfect enthusing illustration of Premier that Li Keqiang’s own characterisation of pollution as being “a blight on people's lives”.
A World Bank study indicates that the overall cost of China’s degraded environment corresponds to 9% of its Gross Domestic Product, and a recent Tsinghua University study concludes that tiny particulate pollutants were linked to 670,000 premature deaths from strokes, lung cancer, coronary heart disease and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease in 2012 alone! ! No wonder then that the reforming of the “ecological systems” in China appeared in the first sentence of the broad-sweeping economic reform plan of November 2013 issued during the Third Plenum! In one of the few studies that have looked precisely and comprehensively into the substance of all the reforms publicised by the new leadership, Daniel Rosen goes to great lengths in showing that indeed the authorities have been busy making these announcements a reality by setting in motion “populist campaigns against polluting facilities, energy and coal policy reforms, a revamped environmental protection law and [stepping-up] regulatory activism”. But, partly thanks to often self-imposed greater transparency in actual reporting, the fact remains that the situation has worsened, that extremely polluting coal remains king and environmental protection comes a distant second behind the constraints to deliver GDP growth and economic performance, especially at local level.
Since January 1st 2015, China is equipped with regulatory standards widely recognized as being both extremely progressive and stringent. And yet, watchful observers Bo Zhang and Cong Cao warn us in the journal Nature that the brand new Environmental Protection Law could easily be confronted by four kinds of adverse “gaps”: first, being outclassed by other pieces of specific legislation dealing with agriculture, forestry, grassland and water; second, being “hampered by the fragmented and overlapping structure of environmental governance”; third, being crippled by the lack of acknowledgment of “citizens’ basic right to an environment fit for life”; and fourth, because enforcement could easily be contravened “by a lack of capacity and by conflicts of interest”. In conclusion, they argue that this very promising law thus now “requires robust implementation mechanisms, accountability regimes and institutional arrangements”, and they concur with Alex Wang from the University of California (Los Angeles) that environmental protection needs to be raised to “a level of priority previously reserved only for the most important party-state mandates, such as economic growth, social stability, and the one-child policy.” Could the “greenisation” concept vouched by the Politburo be it?
Labels:
china,
environmental protection,
greenisation,
greenization
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