Olho mágico: A Idade da Seclusão? / Peephole: The Age of Seclusion?

É bastante constrangedor reparar que o recente (segundo) rascunho da “Lei de Gestão de ONG’s Ultramarinas” da República Popular da China (中华人民共和国境外非政府组织 管理法) quase não suscitou discussão na nossa Região Administrativa Especial. Ao fim e ao cabo, trata-se de uma lei que vai não só aplicar-se a ONG’s (Organização Não Governamentais) “estrangeiras” mas também a um vasto número de organizações, instituições e associações sediadas em Hong Kong, Macau e Taiwan, como se sugere pelo uso da expressão 境外 (jingwai, literalmente fora das fronteiras de um país). O segundo esboço da lei foi apresentado no final de Abril no Comité Permanente da Assembleia Popular Nacional e o articulado da segunda proposta publicado a 5 de Maio com a possibilidade dos cidadãos se pronunciarem sobre a questão até 4 de Junho.  [...]

Published in Ponto Final, June 29 2015

And the text original in English with web links:

It is quite dismaying that the recent (second) draft of the “Overseas NGO Management Law” of the People’s Republic of China (中华人民共和国境外非政府组织 管理法) has triggered so little discussion in our SAR. After all, it is not only a law that will apply to “foreign” NGOs (Non Governmental Organisations) but also to a very wide number of organisations, institutions and associations also based in Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan, as implied by the word 境外 (jingwai, literally outside a country’s borders). The second reading of the law was introduced in late April in the National People’s Congress Standing Committee, and the text of this second draft released on May 5^th with the possibility for citizens to provide comments until June 4^th.

If the original intent of the law was geared at “regulating and guiding the activities of overseas NGOs in China, guaranteeing their legal rights and benefits, and promoting exchange and cooperation”—that’s reasonable enough—the text that was unveiled in early May tells quite a different story, because of its scope and letter, and has sent a chill along the spine of many, both domestically and internationally.

Looking at the scope of the law first, and as previously noted, it concerns organisations beyond the PRC’s de facto boundaries, truly foreign ones but also those separating it from the two SARs and the Republic of China, and these organisations are defined broadly as “non-profit, non-government social organisations” that engage “in fields such as economic, education, science and technology, health, culture, sports, environmental protection and charity”. As pointed out by many observers, it is therefore not only the “usual suspects” that are being targeted—those engaging actively in legal, environmental or social issues—but in effect any non-profit actor: a school or hospital as well as a business association or a cultural institution, a non-profit college alumni organisation or international scientific association as well as a foreign high school band or volunteer medical group wishing to organise or participate in any kind of activity on Chinese soil. And to do so, they would need to either find a sponsor to legally register a representative office (and only one for the whole of China) or find a partner willing to help them through the labyrinth of obtaining a temporary activity permit. Registration, in both cases, would have to be done with the Public Security authorities, contrary to domestic NGOs that register with the Ministry of Civil Affairs.

This very last detail is pretty indicative of the letter itself: registration with the public security apparatus implies that the engagement of overseas NGOs in China is thus perceived from a national security perspective, as pointed out by a law professor from Tsinghua. This becomes even clearer when one reads art. 59 that states that an overseas organisation will be banned from operating on Chinese soil and its representatives suffer serious consequences should it conduct very loosely defined actions originating both inside AND outside China: subverting state power; undermining ethnic solidarity and engaging in separatism; inciting resistance against enforcement of state laws and administrative regulations; collecting state secrets or intelligence; spreading rumours, defamation, or publishing and disseminating other harmful information that undermine state security or harm national interests; carrying out or funding political activities or illegally carrying out or funding religious activities and other activities that undermine state security and harm national interests or societal public interests. As Ira Belkin and Jerome Cohen remark: “if a student group on an American campus protests against Chinese government treatment of Tibetans, the university could be barred from activities in China, and its representatives in China could be detained and prosecuted.”

Many identify the filiation of that draft law with the “seven speak-nots” of Document No. 9 released in April 2013 (that includes “civil society” among the seven values, mostly Western, to be thoroughly rejected) or the more recent pumped-up National Security Law under discussion, and yet many, both within and outside China, believe that this draft law only reflects the very conservative view of a faction within the party, therefore many stakeholders have decided to take the opportunity of the public consultation designed by the NPC to provide their comments and suggestions. A group of 30 Chinese lawyers have thus characterised the bill as arbitrary, in violation of the fundamental national policy of “reform and opening-up” as well as the State Council’s reform spirit of “streamlining administration and power delegation, and as having much negative impact to its purpose of public security protection. Chinese NGO practitioners have sent to the NPC point-by-point comments and suggestions for revision. Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have shared their concerns about five aspects of the law: the broad and vague limitations on foreign NGOS operating temporarily or permanently in China; the onerous supervisory framework for NGOs; the expansive role for the police in approving and monitoring NGOs’ work; the restrictions on staffing and operations; and the punishments for vaguely defined activities. Even foreign chambers of commerce as well as western embassies and the European delegation in China have made their concerns public.

Ultimately, what seems to be at stake is the future of China’s relations with the outside world, and whether the “opening up” that has tremendously benefitted the country in the past 35 years is somehow coming to an end, at least when it comes to ideas—capitalism is welcome, liberalism far less. No doubt that the first one to suffer though if the law was to pass as is would be the thousands of domestic NGOs that have relied on 1000 to 6000 foreign organisations and foundations for funding, training, and expertise to serve millions of Chinese citizens.

Kapok: Social Responsibility

The summary of the 2014 Chief Executive policy address included a small box, oddly entitled “Tips for the Elderly”, in which we were told that elderly citizens were entitled to a significant subsidy of MOP62,000 per year “or approximately MOP5,166 per month”.  This supposedly included the wealth partaking scheme, to which the healthcare vouchers of MOP600 should be added. For the 2015 fiscal year, this subsidy increased slightly, inching towards MOP70,000 a year, and then there are also many other subventions for “disadvantaged people” and citizens with disabilities, including a one-year waver for public housing, a daily food aid budget or a disability pension of up to MOP15,000 per year. All of these measures are real and substantial, even though I do not know anybody around me who could live on that kind of budget, except of course for Filipino, Indonesian or Vietnamese domestic helpers, who as full-time employees working six-days a week—and often more—are entitled to a meager minimum of MOP3,000 per month, including their lodging allowance.
The video of a middle-aged lady slapping an elderly woman in a wheelchair that went viral on social media earlier this week is a clear reminder that poverty, disability or ageing issues cannot be quantified, whatever the amount of money granted. True, the “slapping incident” almost immediately prompted a swift reaction from authorities: the Public Security Police quickly referred the case to the Social Welfare Bureau, resulting in the perpetrator being deferred to the Public Prosecutions Office—for having harmed the physical integrity of another person—and the abused lady being transferred to an elderly residential care home. But even though this family was clearly identified by social services and had already benefited from government-sponsored financial aid as well as counseling, this “incident” has also triggered a community-wide soul-searching campaign onto the how and why this kind of situation transpired. As Cecilia Ho, a social worker, pointed out, “in this case, the result is suspected domestic violence, but the cause is social responsibility.”
Beyond financial aid and legal dispositions, many issues are at stake: the fact that Macao is a rapidly ageing society; the availability and quality of welfare infrastructure and the general quality of life of citizens.
The ageing ratio (the elderly to the youth population) has dramatically increased between the two censuses from 33.6 in 2001 to 60.7% in 2011, and even stood at 73.8 in 2014! The elderly now account for 8.4% of the total population. Facilities for elderly or mentally-challenged people are limited and not sufficiently staffed, be them run by NGOs or private entities, and Paul Pun, the director of Caritas, has stressed that the occurrence of such a dramatic and “shocking” situation might actually be “the tip of the iceberg” and not really the exception.
One of the big ideas proposed by the government is to develop additional facilities on Hengqin Island, as stated again in April by Alexis Tam. But then, what will be the terms and with what kind of consequences for the cohesiveness of the community and inter-generational relations? If Secretary Tam is right to urge his services to do more and better, the head of the Family and Community Service department, Au Chi Keung, is equally right when he explains that beyond the widely-shared revulsion, there was an extraordinary amount of “stress” affecting the perpetrator that led to that horrific occurrence: the scene took place in one of the most densely populated districts of Macao, Fai Chi Kei, and it was confirmed later that the old lady was the mother of the one slapping her, and had suffered a stroke. Reports by the media and social workers then indicated that the middle-aged lady was the only breadwinner in the family and that besides her handicapped mother—who was smacked because she refused to activate the break on her wheelchair—she also had to take care of an unemployed father and a mentally-challenged brother. When one has to work 48 hours a week to ensure the mere survival of a family, with no prospects of improving her situation and almost no holidays, along with deficient social services and degraded neighborhoods, what are the conditions ripe for?

Published in Macau Daily Times, June 26th 2015

Kapok: The difference is Macao... or is it?

While coming back from Hong Kong yesterday, I stumbled upon an old acquaintance of mine, a man of venerable age, a man of the robe—a clerical one—and busy, still, with intellectual matters. After a brief personal recounting, he engaged me on the subject of recent events in Macao. Having to closely follow the nitty-gritty of our SAR’s buoyant political arena, I started painting a contrasting and yet lamentable picture of open-book conflicts of interests, blatant attacks on key principles of the Basic Law—especially when it comes to the separation of powers and the independence of justice—and gross irresponsibility regarding the greater good in a city that is endowed with first world revenues but flawed with third-rated services.
Having made a remark on the SAR’s problem of a lack of spine and principles, my friend observed that this was unfortunately “the reality of Macao,” and that despite all my energy and enthusiasm (not as fast eroding as some would like), not much would change, or at least not in the foreseeable future. I strongly disagree with that, and although I am a pragmatic (meaning not a dreamer) and certainly not pretentious enough to believe I can make a difference on my own—graveyards are full of indispensable men… and women—I sincerely believe that things can and should improve, whatever the context and culture. This is the human condition. When one of our dignified legislators states boisterously that patients cannot reasonably expect all to be cured when going to the hospital, he is basically saying that we cannot hope for better and that there should be no accountability system. Things are what they are because this is how they have always been: Doctor Sun Yat Sen, who was invited by Kiang Wu Hospital to practice Western medicine at the end of the nineteenth century, must be rolling over in his grave!
So no, “the difference is Macao” meaning “why bother?” is simply not for me, and I am truly convinced that those who have made this adage theirs have got their priorities wrong: survival—what kind of legacy is that?—is only a travesty of life. When a majority of politicians are businessmen, pragmatism always prevails over principles—this is true everywhere. The recent interview given by legislator Chan Chak Mo to newspaper Ponto Final is instructive in that respect. Asked why he didn’t pursue his drive to become a directly elected legislator, he simply replied that after an unsuccessful try, he could not resign himself to buying votes, and so he went for a functional seat as it was easier “to control supporting associations”—I would add: it’s even easier when there is only one candidate for one seat! Basically, for Mr Chan, the choice was between “corruption” and “co-optation”. And then, he admits seeing no problem in defending the interests of his constituents (a few dozens associations only): “I represent a sector, I speak for it, and of course speak for myself too.” This is something one can easily agree with, especially when the second standing committee over which he presides manages to delay stringent measures over smoking in public or the minimum wage. Mr Chan is an entrepreneur, the mind behind a big food and beverage consortium. The problem is that he is not backed by the business sector: he represents culture and sports! Does chasing away shops that promote Macau’s creative industries from a heritage building, only to replace them with a Forever 21 outlet, really qualify him? Or is it the horrid Food Festival?
As it is written in the Analects: “At fifteen my heart was set on learning; at thirty I stood firm; at forty I had no more doubts; at fifty I knew the will of heaven; at sixty my ear was obedient; at seventy I could follow my heart’s desire without overstepping the boundaries of what was right.” My old acquaintance is now 83, and thus what is valid for him is not necessarily so for me—a fact he fully acknowledged. And what is valid for politicians in their 60s is not necessarily so for citizens in their 30s. Maybe it is time to accept that fact!

Published in Macau Daily Times, June 12 2015

Kapok: Collective empowerment

José Pereira Coutinho’s arguments are pretty straightforward: Macao needs a long overdue Trade Union Law for three sets of reasons. First, because this is enshrined in Article 27 of the Macao Basic Law—Macao citizens shall have “the right and freedom to form and join trade unions.” Second, because Macao is a signatory to several international conventions that make it mandatory to recognize such a right, namely the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as well as the Convention concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize (1948), one of the 36 conventions of the International Labor Organization (ILO) applicable to Macao. On several occasions, the ILO as well as the International Trade Union Confederation have exposed the many legal loopholes that translate into “insufficient protection” for all when it comes to joining a workers’ organization or having the right to collective bargaining in Macao. And third, because most of the countries in the area are equipped with such a law: not only Korea, Singapore or Taiwan, but even Hong Kong with the Trade Unions Ordinance or the People’s Republic of China that has had its Trade Union Law since 1992.
A trade union law provides a legal framework for unions to be organized, clarifies their process of formation and defines their responsibilities, and this in order to effectively protect the rights of the workers — a key to the protection of human dignity. It is also thanks to unions that employees engage with society at large and more importantly exercise their right to collective bargaining conducive to co-decided — meaning more harmonious — and improved work conditions.
As of now, only the Macao Federation of Trade Unions (FAOM), one of the three main so-called grassroots “traditional associations” along with the General Union of Neighborhood Associations (“Kaifong”) and the Women’s General Association, has an obvious claim to being a union, although it is somehow in competition with the “Kaifong” when it comes to representing the interests of the working class. However, over the years, and more so since the mid-2000s, its “representative” role has come into question — it has lost a directly elected seat in the 2013 legislative election — and it itself, despite its 56 affiliates and 80,000 members, does not actually operate as a “federation of unions” but rather as a collective of associations, with a somewhat exclusive right to recognition by the government and employers because of its “pro-establishment” status.
Yet, the last time Mr Coutinho submitted a Trade Union Law proposal in April 2014 — for the fifth time! — it got defeated by 14 votes to 9, and among the supporters were the three representatives from the FAOM, the two representatives from the “Kaifong”, the two democrats and Mr Coutinho together with his partner Leong Veng Chai. Among the naysayers one finds all the government-appointed lawmakers — the whole seven of them — and mainly pro-business legislators — including Angela Leong. In fact, if we only consider directly-elected MPs — as suggested by almacau.net — the law would have been accepted by 7 vs. 3, and this in no small thanks to the abstention of Chan Meng Kam’s “group” as well as the rather populist Zheng Anting.
There is no doubt that this absurd and backward deadlock played a significant role in encouraging some seven groups representing casino workers to meet at the Fisherman’s Wharf last week to collectively push for another go at a trade union bill championed by Mr Coutinho. Featuring prominently among these were Power of the Macau Gaming Association, formed in May 2014 by local gaming employees in managerial positions working for Sands and chaired by Stephen Lau Ka Weng, the convener of the meeting, and the Macau Gaming Industry Frontline Workers, headed by Ieong Man Teng, that became famous after it organized very visible marches around several casino properties last year, ultimately leading to salary hikes. In effect it was the first such gathering of different “independent” associations and a promise was made to meet on a quarterly basis. Clearly, the month of May in Macao has become one of collective empowerment!

Published in Macau Daily Times, May 29 2015

Kapok: Embrace a Full Ban!

When conflicts of interests are too blatant, public debate can only be farcical, and yet it is revealing of the challenges confronting the new government. The recent exchanges between some legislators and the Secretary for Social Affairs and Culture, Alexis Tam are a remarkable case in point.
Ever since he took office in December 2014, Mr Tam has made no secret that his number one concern would be “public health” and shortly after a comprehensive survey on the “Regime for the prevention and control of smoking” was released at the end of January, he announced, supposedly “on his own” – or so are we led to believe by not so-friendly commentators – that the government would submit a revised piece of legislation within the first half of 2015 that would make way for a full ban on smoking inside casinos, thus implying that VIP rooms would be involved and smoking lounges on mass floors no longer allowed. Mr Tam reiterated that engagement in April during the policy address, and again this week, while reporting to the legislators.
On Mr Tam’s side, there is an ever-growing corpus of medical studies showing that second-hand smoking is in fact as bad as direct inhaling, recommendations made by the World Health Organisation (agreed to by China’s Ministry of Health since 2007) noting that there is no existing technical solution that will equate to non-smoking, and quite a significant number of business-minded pieces of scholarship attesting that smoking bans have not had an adverse impact on revenues in business sectors of direct concern, and essentially the hospitality sector. Clearly, full smoking bans in public places are the trend, so much so that even permissive New Orleans has banned smoking in bars, casinos and other public areas starting on April 22nd.
Mr Tam has also on his side the spirit of the law that was passed in 2011—the first aim of the law being “to protect [the citizens] from exposure to tobacco smoke”—, the fact that the main causes of death in Macao are aggravated by the exposure to tobacco smoke, and the wish expressed by the frontline workers of the industry to see a full ban on smoking being implemented—87.20% of those directly exposed, the croupiers and casino floor staff. Moreover, in the broader context of China—something far more prevalent these days—the National People’s Congress has committed the country to “full implementation of the smoking ban in public places” ever since it voted in the 12th Five-Year Plan in March 2011.
Adversely, Mr Tam is pitted by the gaming industry that has been relentless in trying to lobby every level of government—including Beijing in March during the double congress—in favour of airport-style smoking lounges, with separate ventilation systems and negative pressure in relation to adjacent areas, in accordance with the regulation published by the Chief Executive in June 2014. Several casino operators, including one with a seat in the legislature, have argued that voiding the previous (and rather recent) regulation would make limited (and costly) sense, and moreover that gambling revenues have been in shambles since June last year and thus a full smoking ban could translate into an additional loss estimated at 15%—no methodology given, but the figure is repeated over and over again.
The problem is that it took an extraordinary amount of time to pass the initial law (16 months, to be precise) back in 2011, and this in no small thanks to Mr Chan Chak Mo (a representative for culture!), one of the most vocal voices against Mr Tam today and the number one defender of the food and beverage industry—his group, Future Bright, is everywhere to be seen in all casinos and just lost 95.6% of its profits in the first quarter of 2015. The problem is then that casinos benefited from a three-year reprieve. The problem is that many casinos failed the health bureau tests and everybody was playing cat and mouse with the new regulations.
More compliance with the spirit of the law might have prevented a change in tune. Lobbying failed, now there is only room for embrace.

Published in Macau Daily Times, May 15th 2015