Kapok: 22 out of the dirty 400

For a reason that escapes any logic primarily concerned with fairness, only 22 members of the Legislative Assembly will participate in the Election Committee responsible for the designation of the Chief Executive (CE) this year. It is at the very least an aberration. After all, in Hong Kong, all members of the LegCo — the 70 of them — participate in the Committee, so why not in Macao?

Are arithmetic and proportionality to be blamed? The Election Committee in Hong Kong is made up today of 1,200 members against 400 only in Macao. But then, why would “all” members representing the SAR at the National People’s Congress be included instead of a selected few: the whole lot, that is 12 of them, are entitled to participate, just like in Hong Kong — 36 altogether in the latter case. Does it mean that NPC members are more legitimate to elect the CE than members of the local legislature? Does it comply with the rationale of the “one country-two systems” formula?

What about the members of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference? Almost half of the delegates — 14 out of 29 in total, that is 48.3% — representing the Macao SAR in this toothless consultative body will participate in the Committee, proportionally more than in Hong Kong where the electoral law indicates 51 members out of a total of 124 (41.1%). Why would they be more “entitled” in Macao than in Hong Kong? And how does it reflect on the very idea of a “high degree of autonomy”?

The anomaly of the situation becomes even more obvious if one starts to look into Annex I of the Macao Basic Law, in which we are being told that “principles of democracy and openness” should prevail over the designation of the members of the Election Committee. How is it even possible to exclude the very few members of the community returned via universal suffrage in really competitive elections?

The Electoral Law for the Chief Executive only makes a passing reference to the way legislators should be designated to the Election Committee: an “internal vote” has to be organized (art. 14), but just like in the case of legislative elections for functional constituencies, an actual vote becomes optional if the number of candidates matches the number of seats.

At the very least, one could imagine that all legislators directly elected via universal suffrage — 14 out of 33 — should make the cut. However, only ten will participate. Three democrats — Au Kam Sam, Ng Kuok Cheong and Sulu Sou Ka Hou — abstained from even running for political reasons: they denounce what they have been calling for years the tragic embodiment of “small circle” elections — the “happy few” co-opting a single candidate — and advocate for really “democratic and open” elections in which the whole citizenry would be called to the voting booths.

But then, why is Si Ka Lon, a directly elected legislator and Mr Chan Meng Kam’s henchman, absent from the list of the 22? What does it say about his standing? Could it be a political statement? A deal for another to take his spot? Not quite: contrary to 2014, Mr Si Ka Lon is now entitled to a seat in the Election Committee because he is concurrently one of the twelve designated delegates representing Macao at the NPC! And talking about shrinking small circles, the same goes for Ho Iat Seng, Chui Sai Peng and Kou Hoi In, all NPC delegates as well.

Ultimately, indecency is really championed by the appointed members of the Legislative Assembly: the very people appointed by the CE will get to elect the CE by representing the one and only institution with a democratic component! True, they were appointed by Chui and will get to vote for Ho, but again, beyond a mere farce, what message does it convey? And will Wu Chou Kit and Fong Ka Chio (the only two appointed lawmakers left aside) prove better? Not exactly, as Mr Wu and Fong will most probably be among the 43 members representing the “professional sector” on the Committee. Clearly, the circle is tightening, almost to the size and shape of a single dot.

Published in Macau Daily Times on April 12, 2019

Kapok: Images speak louder than words

Upon return from Beijing, Macao’s political heavyweights staged a highly official debriefing conference highlighting key points from their study trip and their studious participation in what is commonly referred as the “two sessions”. Interestingly enough, this was done in front of the very same people who, for the most part, had also attended these sessions – delegates to the assemblies, high officials, important businessmen and patriotic smooth operators from Macao.

That this was redundant or even overly repetitive for most of the audience is beyond the point: what matters is that the message gets hammered. The world gets BuzzFeed-like reports candidly spelled out by Xinhua “reporters” Katie Capstick and Roisin Timmins, or even a rap video about the two sessions, and we get ineloquent speeches listing the “four tasks” and the “four supports”, with threatening undertones of dire consequences if stability and social harmony are put to the test.

Ironically, it shows that beyond the catchy nickname of the “two sessions” lies the fact that these eminent figures just wasted more than two weeks attending a rubber-stamp assembly for some (the National People’s Congress) and a toothless advisory body for others (the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference). Premier Li Keqiang’s report was approved by 2,945 members of the NPC, with only three abstentions and no disapproval, so one could even argue that the rubber-stamping has worsened as Mr Li’s first work report back in 2014 was disavowed by 378 delegates!

On the task side, Chui Sai On insisted, first, on maintaining Macao’s overall stability, especially by organizing “legal, impartial, equitable, honest and smooth” elections for the next Chief Executive (far too many adjectives for an uncompetitive selection process), while successfully celebrating the 20th anniversary of the handover (can you see the millions flowing from the Macau Foundation to these patriotic communal associations?). Secondly, he insisted on ensuring the healthy and sustainable economic development of Macao, with the people’s livelihood at heart (Ouh la la, gaming concessionaires might be asked to dedicate more than 10% of their operations to non-gaming activities and then divert part of their war chest to open more casinos in Portuguese-speaking countries!). Thirdly, he focused on promoting the development of the Greater Bay Area (the insistence on the 49 points that concern Macao in the master plan are chilling as it will be unpatriotic not to implement them!); and finally, on making sure the youth of Macao, whose future will necessarily depend on their “love for the nation and love for Macao” (anything scarier than that?), is properly trained and educated.

The “four supports” articulated by Fu Ziying, the director of the Liaison Office, strictly echoed the four tasks delineated by Chui, as if one should not go without the other if the “superiority and vitality” of the “one country, two systems” formula is to be fully demonstrated. Even more anaemic were the speeches of Ma Iao Lai, a standing committee member of the CPPCC for Macao, whose main contribution was to praise the united front work of the Conference to efficiently promote “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era”, whereas Ho Iat Seng, the only standing committee member of the NPC for Macao, self-congratulated himself and fellow Macao delegates for having introduced no less than 78 recommendations in the NPC, supposedly all highly appreciated by the staff of the General Office of the Assembly. Former CE Edmund Ho tried to steal the show by warning that all acts committed against “unity and stability” should be banned, but his position also contradicted his earlier claim that he believed “the people of Macao had the wisdom and ability to elect” the right person as the new Chief Executive: since when are the “Macao people” voting in that election?

Ultimately, the real takeaway lies in this family photo, in which the only ones talking are the representatives of the three families that have run Macao since the 1960s, anointing the future CE in front of the central authorities’ representative. The race is on!

Published in Macau Daily Times on March 22, 2019

Kapok: What has been will be again

Not everything is about arithmetic, far from it, as Macao’s Chief Executive election clearly shows.

If numbers were all that matters, elections in Macao would seem fairer than in Hong Kong: in the case of our SAR, the CE is elected by an electoral college of 400 electors, that is to say there is one elector for every 776 registered voters (total of 310,400 registered voters at the end of 2018), whereas there is only 1 for 3,178 in Hong Kong (1,200-member strong electoral college for the CE election and 3,814,318 registered voters).

And then, even with only one candidate in Macao against three candidates in 2017 in Hong Kong, our SAR gets the upper-hand, even though the margin is less striking—basically twofold against the Fragrant Harbour. Macao has a non-competitive selection process with a single candidate and still, somehow, the ratio of electors to voters is in Macao’s favour.

In a recent piece, I made the assumption that there would be close to no change in the composition of the electoral college that is going to elect our next Chief Executive.

First, I have to admit to a slight mistake as the structure of the college will accommodate two newcomers, in terms of functions: representatives of the newly revamped Municipal Affairs Bureau will replace two Macao delegates to the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC).

And then, there should be new faces among the Macao delegates to both the National People’s Congress (NPC) and the CPPCC as both assemblies were “elected” in 2017/2018.

On the side of the NPC, we have 12 Macao representatives, but only four are actually new: Dominic Sio Chi Wai, Ng Sio Lai, Lai Sai Kei and Si Ka Lon. But these people can hardly be characterized as unfamiliar: Sio is a businessman, close associate of the present CE and a former legislator; Ng is the president of the Macau General Union of Neighbourhood Associations (Kai Fong); Lai is a vice-chairman of the Macau Chinese Educators Association; and Si is a Fujian-community leader, close associate of Mr Chan Meng Kam and currently a two-term legislator. And then, the four of them participated in the election of Chui Sai On back in 2014: Sio and Si as legislators, Lai in the education constituency and Ng in the social services constituency. Zero changes after all.

Now, looking at the CPPCC delegates, things get a bit tricky. For sure, Ng Lap Seng who got four years in a US jail for bribing UN officials and Or Wai Shuen, the chairman of Polytec Asset Holdings Limited involved in a trial over a land plot dispute with the Macao government will not be present as they have not been re-appointed to the august assembly. But out of 29 delegates for Macao, 18 are new, including O Lam, the chief of cabinet of the Chief Executive; Cheong U, the former Secretary for Social Affairs and Culture; Vong Hin Fai and Chan Hong, both sitting legislators non-competitively elected in functional constituencies; Wu Zhiliang, the president of the Macao Foundation; Leong Lai, the director of Education and Youth Affairs Bureau and; Ho Ion Sang, a directly elected legislator. A few might actually make the cut to the electoral committee (possibly 4 or 5 among 14 out of 29 in total) even though they were not among the happy few in 2014. But again, none of these people are really novel, to say the least.

The functional constituencies, returning some 350 electors to the election committee, are another game altogether that deserves more detailed scrutiny—to be continued!—especially because some of these electors extend their reach across the Delta. If Pansy Ho, the chairlady of Shun Tak Holding, elects the Macao CE, her sister, Daisy Ho, the chairlady of SJM Holding Limited, elects the Hong Kong one. But nobody can beat Francis Lui Yiu-tung, the deputy chairman of Galaxy Entertainment Group, who himself elects both the CE in Hong Kong (as a delegate to the CPPCC) and the CE of Macao (as one of the 120 electors representing business and industry). Showing the way for further integration? 

Published in Macau Daily Times on March 1, 2019

Kapok: There can be only one

Elections are in the air — it has become palpable.

Just a few days ago, Judge Song Man Lei was for the second time appointed as the president of the electoral affairs committee for the election of the Chief Executive (CE). She is joined by Victor Chi Ping Chan, the Director of the Macau SAR Government Information Bureau and the government spokesperson, who is himself sitting for the fourth time on the committee. Gone is José Chu, the former director of the Administration and Public Administration Services who retired in 2014, but in is his successor Kou Peng Kuan as well as Assistant Prosecutor-General of the Public Prosecution Office Chan Tsz King and Court of Second Instance Judge Tong Hio Fong.

Elections are about law, due administrative processes, order and timely communication in Macao, and clearly about continuity as well.

During the taking of her oath, judge Song Man Lei pledged that the election of the CE would be “open, fair and honest,” and refused to make any assumption regarding a candidate in particular. Even though the exact date of the election is not yet decided, we now know that the 400-member strong electoral college that will ultimately select the new CE will itself be “elected” — for 344 of them — on June 16.

Votes are cast, but in effect the end result is highly predictable as this college is made of seven very stable functional constituencies representatives to which are added six religious figures (whose stability depends on unearthly powers), 22 of our legislators (not all of them, why would that be?), the 12 representatives of Macao to the National People’s Congress and the 16 representatives of the SAR to the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference.

A quick check at the college members back in 2009 and 2014 indicates pretty identical lists of people — I would say at least 80% alike. Then, the college is vastly dominated by businessmen, and not only in the first constituency made of 120 heavyweights from the industrial, commercial and financial sector. Obviously, people whose idea of competition is quite narrowly defined too: in this first constituency, everybody was elected in 2014 with support varying between 74.11% and 89.55% of the mere 689 valid votes.

And then, ultimately, who will they (s)elect?

In 2004, 2009 and 2014, there was only one contestant for the position — quite a heavy machinery for a non-competitive election with a process extending over more than six months! Why would the 2019 edition be any different?

Yet, the talk of the town is again of two candidates. In a recent article discussing the latest decline in casino revenues, an international news agency noted that “the two likely contenders are Ho Iat Seng, president of Macao’s Legislative Assembly, and Lionel Leong, the secretary for economy and finance, which oversees the gaming industry.” Why two and not three or four, coming from security or culture?

Scarcity might have to do with the risk of being a contender: the former Secretary for Transport and Public Works — in jail for 29 years on corruption charges — was once dubbed “Mr 10%” for the score he could potentially commend in such an election. And then the most serious challenger to the sitting CE back in 2009 was Prosecutor General Ho Chio Meng — once viewed as Mr Clean — who was later convicted of hundreds counts of diverse forms of corruption and traffic of influence and then thrown in prison for 21 years.

Now, Mr Ho has openly declared that he is “prudently considering” being a candidate. Mr Ho is from an old Macao family — his father started their business empire and his sister, Ho Teng Iat is also in politics. He is the president of the Legislative Assembly. He has been a member of the National People’s Congress since 1998 and is today the only one among the 12 representatives from Macao to the standing committee of that Congress. Moreover, Mr Ho is also one of the vice-presidents of the Macao Chinese Chamber of Commerce — the true king-maker institution of the SAR. So, let’s not kid ourselves: there can be only one.

Published in Macau Daily Times on February 15, 2019

Kapok: Detrimental ignorance

The results of the latest yearly survey regarding the trust Macao people place in their government is truly appalling. Not only has Mr Chui Sai On never been so unpopular, but 2017 marks also the first time his approval rating has dipped below the highly symbolic 50% bar. A low(est) score of 49.5% might not seem much, and yet it also corresponds to the largest yearly drop since Mr Chui stepped into the shoes of Mr Edmund Ho: between 2016 and 2017, he lost more than 10 percentage points! In a territory in which people do not get to elect their enlightened leader and the menu is adorned with a unique dish when selection time comes, this is quite a feat: why one would bother when one has no choice?

In 2009, when it was still possible and meaningful to administer political surveys in a Macao-based university, our questionnaire on “civic culture” had actually revealed that far from being politically apathetic the good citizens of Macao simply felt disenfranchised — they had no power over things. Given the opportunity, they indicated that they would actually vouch for a radically different institutional design in order to become at long last the masters of their own destiny: 51% of the people interrogated believed that the best way to designate the Chief Executive (CE) was through universal suffrage, whereas only 14% were satisfied with the way it was, almost 28% thought that the electoral commission electing the CE should be expanded and a mere 7% trusted Beijing to designate their leader directly.

Thus, the 2017 survey indicating such a lamentable popular support for the CE does not come as a surprise, and becomes even more humiliating when hypothetical vote intentions are being gauged: if the CE was this year returned via universal suffrage, only 20% of the Macao citizens would vote for Mr Chui! Again, the worst result ever. And the list goes on: greatest ever overall dissatisfaction (since 1999 moreover!) with the Macao government as a whole (44.3%; for the first time satisfaction has plunged below dissatisfaction); greatest ever dissatisfaction with the capacity of the government to improve the people’s livelihood (53.2%); greatest ever dissatisfaction with the capacity of the government to push for democratic development (39.2%); greatest ever dissatisfaction in the capacity of the government to protect human rights and freedom (28.3%); highest ever distrust in the Macao government (31.2%); highest ever lack of confidence in Macao’s future (26%); and the final blow comes from the question addressing the “people’s satisfaction in the Macao government’s performance after the typhoon”: 54.3% are voicing out their dissatisfaction!

To be fair, a few indicators (a minority) indicate little change: people are still okay with the performance of the government in maintaining economic prosperity (can they really be credited for that?); they are still quite confident in the capacity of the government to handle the relation with Beijing, about the policies coming from up north affecting the SAR, about the “one country, two systems” formula, about China’s own future and even pretty trustful of the central government. But then, isn’t it weird to see this disjunction? Isn’t the CE pre-screened by Beijing prior to even thinking of filling the position and isn’t he appointed by the central government? And the same goes for the secretaries. Shouldn’t Beijing be worried that its loyal executants perform so badly? How long before the level of incompetence starts affecting the people’s perception of the benevolent intentions of the capital?

Now, all the blame seems to come from the catastrophic mishandling of the murderous crisis brought forth by a devastating typhoon. Is that for sure? Will the passing of time mend the gaping distrust thus created? For us to be certain, we would need to run such surveys in Macao (this one is done by the University of Hong Kong) on a monthly basis, to better understand the fluctuations. Interestingly enough, I personally applied for such a monthly endeavour back in 2014, only to be turned down by the Macao Foundation. Time for a change? But with which independent tertiary institution?

Published in Macau Daily Times on December 22, 2017

Kapok: Choice matters

Despite all the loathing at the pre-screening of candidates for the 2017 Chief Executive election in Hong Kong, having a somewhat contested selection process, with a few candidates vying for the top job, does make a difference and bring healthy civic benefits. And this, even though Beijing’s “preferred candidate”, Carrie Lam, qualified with 580 nominations (only 21 short of the majority she will need on March 26), against a mere 180 for Woo Kwok-hing and 165 for John Tsang.

This not to say that the reform package proposed by the Hong Kong government in 2014-2015 and derived from Beijing’s August 31, 2014 ruling on the limit imposed as to whom could run is not a travesty of universal suffrage: it is, from every angle and by any criteria, and it does ridicule the core idea of free choice made by the whole body of citizens.

Moreover, it makes the 2007 Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress ruling on universal suffrage by 2017 for the CE election look like a mockery, even more so after the successful so-called civil referendum of June 2014, with a turnout of close to 800,000 voters, that resulted in 42 percent of the participants backing up the proposal allowing the public, a nominating committee, and political parties to endorse candidates for the top position.

Hence, the frustration, that translated first in the truly unexpected period of occupation of Hong Kong landmarks for almost three months — the “Umbrella Movement” — in late 2014 and then the electoral victories of self-determination-leaning young democrats in the legislative elections of September 2016 as well as the record win of 326 seats by pan-democrats for the Election Committee sub-sector elections of last December.

If the pressure put on Beijing and the establishment has changed in nature, it is still very much present and pervasive, and the very fact that C.Y. Leung was not allowed to stand for a second mandate suggests that the central authorities are well aware of the present state of mind of society — an honorary united-front title hardly compensates.

One could argue that Long Hair’s failed attempt at gathering 38,000 popular nominations (1 percent of the eligible voters, in line with the winning motion of the 2014 civil referendum) for an alternative “shadow election” indicates a serious drop in pressure. Even the unofficial referendum on the chief executive election that ended on March 20 resulted in only 63,076 people participating, and yet the final result was pretty telling: 96.1 percent opposed Lam, and Tsang prevailed. The former financial secretary had started to show his predominance in the polls as early as January, and in the most recent rolling poll administered by Hong Kong University, his overwhelming superiority had grown in strength over the whole month of March, whereas Lam had suffered an equally steady decline.

Quite ironically, the discrepancy between the popularity of one — John Tsang — and the certainty of the victory of the other — Carrie Lam — is in itself proving more stimulating than disheartening. First, because despite the election being decided by so-called “small circles”, the campaign has been all about showing that each and everyone was in tune with the people’s concerns — hence the campaign posters in the MTR and the TV debates. Second, because if this is also working in Beijing’s interest by suggesting that the acceptance of the 2015 electoral reform package could have yielded a more congruent ultimate outcome (with universal suffrage, Tsang would probably win), it is also putting in crude light the exhaustion of the present system, to the point where even though issues get debated, alternative proposals barely look more than cosmetically contentious. The triumph of style over substance.

The campaign was indeed less audacious than in 2007, as well as less farcical and gripping than in 2012, but by giving debate a chance, accountability will be easier to assert. No wonder then that democrats in Macao would have accepted a Beijing-sponsored version of universal suffrage: the one candidate-one seat formula in our SAR is not only grotesque but also totally obsolete!

Published in Macau Daily Times, March 24, 2017

Kapok: The uniqueness of being only one

Elections get me excited, even when one has no real choice and the predictability of the outcome is no less than 100%. This is uncommon, I admit, as what fills people with enthusiasm during electoral events is the thrill of the contest, the uncertainty of the ultimate result despite the polls and the predictions, and of course the fact that any election is an exercise in power, the power of the one dropping her or his ballot in the box in order to decide upon her or his community’s future for the next four or five years. Elections in essence need to be contested; they suppose competition. In order for this competition to take place, differences have to be carved up, contrasts revealed, ideological stances spelled out, contradictory options openly expressed, alternative proposals debated, etc. More often than not, the infighting and bickering have more to do with ego and personal postures than with platforms, and yet this is a moment when the whole body of citizens gets hooked by the “affairs of the city”, the etymological meaning of politics. Macao people still remember very vividly the 2012 elections of the Chief Executive (CE) in Hong Kong: images of Henry Tang, often caricatured as a pig in the satirical press, blasting live on TV Leung Chun-ying, nicknamed the wolf by the same press, over his tough stand on civil liberties were gripping—and indeed the original front-runner ultimately lost the race to the challenger. The pro-democratic camp candidate, Albert Ho, who stood no chance of winning right from the start, was ultimately relegated to an even fainter secondary role, despite his many attempts to corner both pro-establishment candidates over their (lack of) commitment regarding universal suffrage. And the ultimate irony is that there was no real power of the people either, as the “election committee” was only made up of 1,200 members.
So, what can get me so excited about the present CE elections in Macao? Of course not the program of the unique candidate, which remarkably resembles its 2009 previous incarnation. Of course not the campaign itself, which consists of touring the ever supportive corporations aka traditional interests-associations and hearing patiently their very segmented grievances and proposals, as if they had not have ample time to express these during the past five legislative sessions, again missing the big picture of the overall interest of the community. No, what really fascinates me is the acquiescent abjuration of the most basic democratic values voiced out by some commentators. The argument goes like this: There is no alternative, this is the nature of the “other” system in Macao, and a contested CE election is the exception in our SAR, as it only happened once, back in 1999.
It is true that Hong Kong, in that respect, is quite the opposite as it experienced only two “exceptions” in 2002 and 2005, when Tung Chee Hwa and Donald Tsang respectively ran unopposed—a contested electoral process is thus the rule on the other side of the Pearl River. But what should be added is that these exceptions occurred at a time when our sister SAR went through its worst crisis of confidence ever—Tung indeed resigned before the end of his term, supposedly for health reasons. If we broaden the perspective to the world and google “elections with only one candidate”, what are the instances that we get? Yemen, Zimbabwe and North Korea… Let’s be honest, even “old democracies” fall victims of uncontested elections: in 2012, for example, some 40% of candidates ran uncontested in the state legislature elections in the United States, the highest percentage in 10 years. What kind of commentaries did that situation attract though? Acquiescence and fatalism or a genuine worry about the balance of power and the democratic outlook? Back in 2009 in Macao, there were talks of a possible challenger, the quite popular Prosecutor general Ho Chio-meng. 2009 was also a year during which many politically sensitive surveys and polls were conducted, thus giving the impression that public opinion was much more directly probed.
I partially agree with the idea that this time around what will really matter is foreseeably the new appointments and possibly the new structure of government that will be revealed at the end of December. Yet, with the challenge of the civic referendum looming, I guess it would have been a good idea for Mr Chui to at least bring the novelty of a live TV show, some kind of hybrid between a debate and a forum. Courage is indeed a component of political legitimacy.

Published in Macau Daily Times, August 22nd 2014

Kapok: What happens in Macao… doesn’t stay in Macao

The newly revised bill soon to be introduced for a plenary vote at the Legislative Assembly that deals with the benefits granted to the Chief Executive (CE) and the principal officials (the five secretaries, the two commissioners, and the heads of the police and customs) upon leaving their office is creating quite a stir in the community and beyond. The main arguments of the opponents of the bill revolve around three sets of questions: its adequacy with the Basic Law; the amount of these benefits; and issues pertaining to procedural decision-making—in plain English, the absence of a public consultation regarding the matter. But the dispute has now spread beyond the legislative hemicycle: a petition asking for citizens to express their disagreement is claiming several thousand signatures; a Facebook page adorned with a picture of a pig and entitled “Greedy officials’ severance benefits are really excessive” has attracted hundreds of postings, close to 1,500 Likes and been shared more than 1,100 times; and the news has appeared and even made the front page, on May 21st, of the most widely-read Chinese newspaper in Hong Kong, the reputedly pro-Beijing leftist and yet grassroots-oriented Oriental Daily News—one of the titles raising the question whether Macao legislators had paved the way for the creation of a “third system”.
As far as the Basic Law is concerned, the main squabble has to do with the article related to the criminal immunity of the CE, also encapsulated in the bill, and the fact that this would contradict the principle of equality among citizens enshrined in our mini-constitution, especially because the “presidential immunity” that exists in many a place precisely concerns heads of state or prime ministers, whereas the CE can merely be considered has a “super province governor”. Yet, I beg to disagree: one cannot advocate the uniqueness of the second system all year long, and nevertheless diminish the status of the CE: our CE acts and symbolizes our whole political community, and the Basic Law is our constitution. What is missing though are possible derogations in order to waive this immunity, especially vested in the legislature, in case the CE commits acts that can be construed as incompatible with his responsibilities.
In principle, I personally believe and this is the case in many polities around the world, that the highest authority of a community should be entitled to life-long benefits upon retirement from official duty, at least for the sake of integrity and independence of the person who has embodied the whole community, and ultimately because he or she will never cease to represent this community. All benefits in nature (a car with a driver, a guard and an office) seem logical, and of course a revenue has to be included. What has now been decided, retroactively up to the year 2000, is to provide a revenue equivalent to 70% of the CE's monthly remuneration, and this for as long as he or she does not receive a salary from private employment. This corresponds to about MOP189,000 per month—a pretty comfy retirement scheme (a former French president, by comparison, makes MOP57,000 a month). Principal officials would get a one-time lump sum as severance benefit equivalent to 30% of a monthly salary times the number of months in service if not returning to the public sector and only 14% if returning to the public sector. Therefore, a secretary who has served ten years would receive MOP6,743,000 upon leaving office if not returning to the public sector—this is equivalent to 3 years of full salary, whereas, again in France, a former minister will only collect his full salary for 6 months. The amounts are thus pretty impressive, and the timing of the law quite tactless, as the salaries of the CE and principal officials have just increased by 10% in January and the whole administration is lined-up for an important reshuffle at the end of the year.
Would a public consultation help quiet down a growing public anxiety, as advocated by opposition legislators? Possibly, as the matter would at least be opened for discussion. But most surely, what would make a difference is if the president of the legislative commission responsible for the bill could come up with a better explanation than the one openly admitting that amounts and percentages were decided in a “non-scientific” way and because they seemed right. What would also help is if a CE-picked legislator would refrain from declaring that the principal officials even deserve “50%”, instead of the 30% already bumped up from the original 14%. Small circle politics has to be played with sophistication if it vies to elude embarrassment.

Published in Macau Daily Times, May 26th 2014

Kapok: Unsophisticated Liberal Autocracy

While recently participating in a seminar on the possibility for universal suffrage to become meaningful in Hong Kong—that is to say, truly representative of the people’s will without forfeiting both stability and efficiency— I was reminded that our sister SAR has been for quite some time characterized as a “liberal autocracy”. This formulation was popularized by Fareed Zakaria back in 1997 in a now famous article announcing “The Rise of Illiberal Democracy”. Singapore was then considered the epitome of “illiberal democracy”, consenting to elections but curtailing individual freedoms to the point that the electoral aspect of democracy had become a plebiscite exercise in favor of the People's Action Party—in power since 1959. The paradox is then that Hong Kong is (almost) everything a liberal society can wish for when it comes to individual freedoms, and yet these civil and political rights enshrined in the Basic Law, and vividly and constantly exercised by the citizenry, stop short of letting the people of Hong Kong choose their own government.
Universal suffrage for 2017, especially because it concerns the Chief Executive, is thus perceived with radically different perspectives whether you are a democrat or in government, yet the promise that the entire population of Hong Kong will get to choose its top leader was made as early as December 2007. For the pan-democratic camp, the issue of who will be allowed to run is crucial: if any candidate can compete, then this is one step closer towards democracy, and therefore liberal autocracy’s days are counted. For the pro-Beijing/pro-establishment technocratic camp, if only a limited few reasonably representative candidates can run, it undoubtedly means that individual freedoms have been expanded once more, thus upholding the core principles of the Basic Law without antagonizing the central authorities—who will ultimately “appoint” the Chief Executive regardless and are to whom he or she is accountable. On the side of the democrats, accepting a restrictive interpretation as to what constitutes “democratic procedures” in an “actual situation” that cannot contravene the “principle of gradual and orderly progress”, as stated in article 45 of the Basic Law, could very much amount to a missed opportunity and make “liberal autocracy” a potentially inescapable trap. As far as the government is concerned, making too many concessions could very much entail having to learn more from Singapore, thus tilting the balance towards illiberalism and the capacity to subvert electoral outcomes the unyielding soft way—isn’t the appointment of a communist-leaning new editor in chief at the very influential Chinese Mingpao newspaper quite ominous? Ultimately, the question is twofold: what is society ready to accept or fight for, and on whose side is time? China or Hong Kong? And what about Macao?
Far less than being a liberal autocracy, Macao has grown into an ever-unsophisticated gambling plutocracy, one in which traditional families take turns in ripping the dividends of land grants, and concession or simple operation of community services. Able commissioners in government get fired. Those exposed for their shortcomings get promoted, unless caught blatantly cheating the people. Corporatist leaders run unopposed in legislative elections. Much needed public policies are constantly delayed and always make private corporations look better than public entities. That’s a shame, really, but then, where are the new corporation heads from? Hong Kong, the United States, China, etc. I am a democrat at heart, but what hurts most is not the autocratic part of our government (legislature included), it is its lack of sophistication and the inability for elites to be renewed—not only rejuvenated. In 2017, 5 members out of 7 will have to leave the Politburo Standing Committee of the Communist Party of China. In 2014, as we celebrate the 15th anniversary of our SAR, how many new faces will we count in our government?

Published in Macau Daily Times on January 16 2014.