Kapok: Macao in a Kiangwu cup

Anybody and everybody knows the Kiang Wu Hospital in Macao. Not for its ugly architecture that scars the whole area behind the façade of Saint Paul, but rather as one of the old and most respected institutions of the SAR.

The hospital started its operations in 1871 by providing Chinese medicine only, and opened its first Western medicine section in 1892 thanks to a brilliant fresh graduate from Hong Kong, Dr Sun Yat-Sen, who later on became a great revolutionary, the theoretician of The Three Principles of the People and the father of the Republic of China. But this is not the only patronage the hospital acknowledges. Of less international repute, Ke Lin, who had been trained at the Canton Pok Tsai Hospital, started teaching at Kiang Wu Hospital and in its nursing school back in the 1930s. He later became the first Dean of the hospital. Not only was Master Ke a great medical educator, but he was also known for being one of the master spies of the Chinese Communist Party based in Macao, even becoming the one responsible for the Party’s Macao affairs during the Second Chinese Civil War of 1945-49. Ke Lin’s brother was none other than Ke Zhengping, the founder of the Nam Kwong Trading Company representing the Communist regime interests in the Portuguese colony. The Nam Kwong branched out in the 1980s as the Xinhua News Agency Macao Branch and is still everywhere to be seen today in Macao as the Nam Kwong Group.

As many institutions in Macao that started catering for the Chinese population, a not-for-profit association exercises oversight over the operations of the whole organization. Originally, the rationale was for important Chinese businessmen to be on the board to run things professionally as well as contribute financially to the smooth operation of the enterprise. One of the best examples of such a venture is the Tung Sin Tong that started operating in 1892 and still provides financial help and medicine for the poor, free education and free child care for the socially disadvantaged, and support for necessitous elderly. The association is headed today by a triumvirate made of the brother of the Chief Executive, Chui Sai Cheong, the cousin of the Chief Executive, Chui Sai Peng, and the sister of the Chief Executive-elect, Ho Teng Iat.

Given its pedigree, the Kiang Wu Hospital Charitable Association was thus bound to push the limits of a get-together of powerful benefactors to the brink of absurdity. The Chairmen for life are none other than Edmund Ho, the first Chief Executive of the SAR, Ma You-li, the son of the great patriot Ma Man-kei, and Stanley Ho, the king of gambling who just retired as chairman of SJM Holdings. Second only to these, the Chief Executive-elect himself, Ho Iat Seng, appears as the Honorary Chairman for life.

Should we then be surprised to learn that out of MOP531.3 million in financial support provided by the Health Bureau from January to September, some 86.5 per cent have been channeled to the Kiang Wu Charitable Association? In the official gazette published at the end of October, one could also read that the Association had received in July some MOP$32.5 million from the Macau Foundation, on top of the MOP$25 million received earlier in the year.
The problem with this ever-growing financing of Kiang Wu is that the money is coming from the public coffers, and thus a privately-run business is being heavily subsidized by the government in order to supplement public institutions. And who decides on that? The same people who sit on the Executive Council, the Macau Foundation board and the boards of the beneficiaries. Meanwhile, the waiting-time at the emergencies at Conde de São Januário hospital worsens.

Published in Macau Daily Times, November 8, 2019.

Kapok: It's the politics, stupid!

The news on Wednesday that a parking bay had been snatched in Hong Kong for the modest amount of HK$7.6 million had me gaping at the newspaper for a few seconds. That went beyond cognitive dissonance: It was bewilderment mixed with incomprehension and a sudden surge of indignation. How on earth could someone pay more than HK$600,000 per square meter to park a car in a spot of roughly 12.5 square meters of bare concrete? This is three times the median price of a flat in Hong Kong, whereas the median price of a flat is in itself 21 times the median salary!

We are talking about parking a car here! Sure, the parking lot is situated in the very heart of the city, in a building aptly named The Center, which served as the main decor for Batman: The Dark Knight. The building was up to last year the property of Asia’s richest man, Li Ka-shing, before being sold to a group of tycoons including the richest lady in Hong Kong, Pollyanna Chu, and the owner of the parking bay that was just sold, Johnny Cheung. But then, the same amount of money would buy a nice 80 square meters flat in Paris, and even a 55 square meters 2-bedroom cozy retreat next to the iconic Jardin du Luxembourg, one of the most expensive area in the French capital city, or even 500 square feet in downtown Manhattan in New York City.

Yet, at the same time, we are being told that because of the protests, landlords “are getting desperate in their attempts to attract tenants” in their offices of Central Hong Kong, so much so that they are offering symbolic rents of HK$1 for the first three months of occupation! Some are even agreeing to leases starting after Chinese New Year, that is four months away!

Are we talking about the same landlords and real estate developers who stand accused by Beijing of being vastly responsible for the political turmoil that has engulfed the city for the past four months? Aren’t these the same people who keep the best economic opportunities to themselves and make it impossible for the younger generation to “own” a flat? And wasn’t the diagnostic confirmed by Carrie Lam when she announced in her policy address last week that credit would be made more easily accessible to Hongkongers and that 700 hectares of land would be seized to help build new housing programs addressing the current shortage?

Interestingly enough, the announcement made by Mrs Lam boosted the shares’ value of property developers. And then, the land that is going to be “seized” had been purchased as cheap farmland by developers and will be paid at current market price by the government, allowing them to make comfy profits. It is also estimated that the four biggest developers alone in Hong Kong — Sun Hung Kai, Henderson Land, New World and Cheung Kong — sit on more than double the floor area of agricultural land that will be “taken” back by the government. Moreover, past governments bear the main responsibility of the shortage of land supply that led to a shortage of housing land and the dramatic drop in housing completion after 2003/2004, in the wake of the SARS crisis. For a decade, starting in 2006, the completion of housing, whether public or private, was more than halved compared to the previous ten years!

Because they make up a significant portion of the 1,200 people who elect the Chief Executive, it is thus clear that any measure taken by the government will give the developers the advantage over ordinary citizens. Should we then be surprised when people declare that they are far more dissatisfied with the political environment (more than 80%) than they are disgruntled by the present economic situation (less than 40%)?

At the end of the day, it makes the demand of true universal suffrage for returning both the Chief Executive and the legislators a very legitimate one if the intent is indeed for the government to be less dependent on a small coterie of ever more profiteering landlords.

Published in Macau Daily Times on October 25, 2019

Kapok: Too late and too little

When on September 4 Hong Kong’s Chief Executive Carrie Lam finally decided to officially “withdraw” the Extradition Bill, the overall reaction in the pro-democracy camp was to say that the move came “too late” and amounted to “too little”.

At the time I felt that the government’s announcement was rather a substantial achievement to be indeed credited to the ever-evolving “Be water” movement. At long last a political response of sort was somehow and somewhat addressing a political challenge that had been dragging for far too long. How could that not be an achievement, far beyond the “suspension” of the Bill on June 15 or any claim the Bill was “dead” on July 9? Neither the temporary shelving nor the burial of this piece of legislation had ever been on the list of demands formulated by the demonstrators — moderates and radicals alike — but the “withdrawal” had been the core, and until June 12 the only demand of the protestors. So yes, politics was back, especially after all the fantasies fueled by saber rattling moves across the border and ill-designed martial video clips hastily cooked up by Communist propaganda.

In my mind, the rebuttal was meant to be temporary, and after a period of adjustment during which things would turn worse before getting better — and how could it be otherwise after three months of resolute and unabated fight — the path for a more rational and possibly peaceful settlement would start to shine again. Things would take time and trust had to be rebuilt: a survey conducted by the Chinese University of Hong Kong in early September was showing that about 69% of the people did not trust either the government or the police, and if about the same proportion of people believed that the principle of non-violent action should be upheld, still 56% considered that violent action was understandable if the government failed to respond to large-scale peaceful demonstrations. Moreover, almost 71% still considered that the demand to set up an independent commission of enquiry looking into police violence and other incidents was a requirement.

More than one month after the announcement of the withdrawal which will be effective only when the LegCo reconvene next week, are we finally seeing a glimmer of light at the end of the tunnel? Clearly not. While professing to initiate a dialogue, Carrie Lam made it clear that there would be no other concession, and that contradictory move immediately gave rise to a new show of unity among the protesters, best encapsulated by the defiant slogan “Five demands, not one less”. A butchered 2-hour encounter with district councilors supposed to kickstart a dialogue on September 18 turned into disarray when only 98 out of 458 councilors decided to show up. A subsequent community dialogue with 130 citizens held at Queen Elizabeth Stadium on September 26 turned into a real agony for the Chief executive and her principal officials when participants mostly vented their frustration and anger at the inability of the government to resolve the crisis.

Following further defiance of infuriated and ever younger protesters on October 1, the “Chief Executive in council” decided to invoke the Emergency Regulations Ordinance on October 4 to ban masks at unauthorized protests. The problem is, supposedly because of security concerns, that most marches have not been authorized since August 18, meaning that people cannot even vote with their feet anymore, as marches are banned, the MTR closed at sensitive times and the police being given excessive leeway in the interpretation of the new ban. Things will get worse before they will worsen even more!

Meanwhile in Macao, a decision rendered by the Court of Final Appeal on September 27 states that the Macao police was right to forbid demonstrations in Praça do Tap Seac and da Amizade aimed at denouncing police violence in Hong Kong on the basis that publicly allowing these to happen would have amounted to interfering with the internal affairs of the Hong Kong SAR, and thus violating the Macao Basic Law. As clearly stated by lawyer Jorge Menezes, with this decision, freedom of assembly and freedom of expression are all but history in Macao, despite them also being entrenched in the Basic Law. Will freedom of conscience be next?

Published in Macau Daily Times on October 11, 2019

Kapok: Who does what?

The publication of the yearly report of the Legislative Assembly always provides an interesting snapshot of politics in Macao and a better understanding, albeit limited in depth, of who does what and why.

The report in itself has been trimmed this year — 38 pages for the 2018/19 session versus 48 pages for the previous one — and really pales when compared to the document issued by the Hong Kong Legislative Council — 175 pages in the latest file available in our sister SAR.

Moreover, starting in 2014/15 with the first report put together under the efficient-minded presidency of Ho Iat Seng, these reports have shied away from making any comparison with previous sessions when examining the number of laws passed.

Up to 2014, a simple graphic with a timeline would serve as a benchmarking for the current session: that year, only 9 laws had been passed, against 15 in 2012/13, and a multi-year bar chart reminded the casual reader that the most active legislative session ever had been the 2008/09 one, with a record 27 laws adopted. That session corresponded with the last year of Edmund Ho as Chief Executive: the vast majority of the bills are introduced by the government in Macao, and thus the idea was clearly to start with a clean slate for the next government after years of backlogging.

The year 2018/19 is no exception — although I had to go back to previous reports to establish that fact — as a total of 25 laws were adopted last year (almost on par with Hong Kong!), making it the most active legislative session of the Chui Sai On era. Almost three times more laws passed than in the least active year — only 9 laws approved in 2015/16. But Mr Chui should not feel mortified as only 6 laws were ratified in the very troubled session of 2006/07 at the time of Edmund Ho — the year of the downfall of Ao Man Long and the largest May Day protest.

Clearing the way for the upcoming Ho Iat Seng era was therefore the priority, and that was done quite efficiently: 28 laws were introduced in 2018/19, and 25 passed, that is a successful ratio of 89%… quite an improvement on the 48% of 2017/18! Yet, when one looks carefully, a good third of the 25 laws adopted are actually amendments of existing laws, even though, again, that is an improvement on the previous session when half the laws were mere revisions.

The report also provides insight into the commitment of individual legislators to their job. Again, there was a time when independent associations in Macao would survey the citizens regarding the performance of their legislators. There was also a time when a website — http://almacau.net/ — would feed us with extremely detailed information about each and every lawmaker, allowing us to connect the way they voted with their political stance and vested interests in society. But these times have been gone for years and we are left with an ever-shrinking and rather unsurprising report.

The least active legislators in raising questions to the government are the ones appointed by the CE or small-time businessmen-turned-politicians with dubious background and limited abilities, such as Cheung Lup Kwan and Chan Chak Mo, who spent the whole year formulating exactly ZERO oral or written interpellation addressed to the government. Cheung Lup Kwan together with President Ho Iat Seng, who resigned in July and was too busy preparing for his solo candidacy to the CE position, are the two legislators with the worst attendance for plenary meetings: respectively 35 and 34 recorded attendances out of 52 meetings altogether! Mr Cheung, who has been the least committed legislator ever since he was first elected in 2001, pushed the contempt for the function to a new height this year by showing up only ONCE in 65 meetings of the third permanent commission of the Assembly, despite that commission examining eleven laws!

Self-induced ignorance and inaction can indeed be rewarding!

Published in Macau Daily Times on September 27, 2019

Kapok: The failure of success

Of course it was meant to be all praise for the Chief Executive-elect, Ho Iat Seng, as he was being anointed by the central authorities this week. After receiving his decree of appointment from the very hands of Premier Li, Mr Ho was hosted by President Xi Jinping to give his trip to Beijing the gravitas a “successful practice of ‘one country, two systems’ with Macao characteristics” commends.

In Macao, people are ‘united’, “one country, two systems” is fully ‘understood’, the Basic Law is ‘upheld’, the love for the country has been ‘passed on’, and the livelihood of the people, social harmony and stability have ‘improved’ for good. This really reads like a reverse image of Hong Kong, that now stands deeply divided, doubtful about the motherland, its intentions and the reality of its “high degree of autonomy,” and where gross inequalities have created an overwhelming sense of social distress, especially among young people.

Of course, one could challenge the rosy picture painted by Mr Xi. Macao stands only second to Qatar as the richest place in the world for GDP per capita, but the median salary is stuck at MOP16,000 per month. And then the government still derives more than 80 per cent of its revenues from gambling: what happened to the promise of economic diversification? When it comes to infrastructure, the quality and diversity are simply appalling for such a “rich” place, and this is true for healthcare, transportation and even education.

Politics is simply oligopolistic: the same three families have been dominating political life ever since they kicked-out the Kuomintang’s influence in the 1960s. Election mechanisms are so biased that they forbid any hint of competition. Business interests ban all notions of “social progress” — they do charity, at best — and traditional pro-establishment associations keep the society in check thanks to the lavish endowment provided by the losses of mainlanders on Blackjacks tables. And not everybody is happy about corruption at the highest echelon — think Prosecutor General Ho Chio Meng — or the sheer incompetence of the administration — think 20,000 Macao people demonstrating in May 2014 and forcing the Chief executive to ‘withdraw’ the so-called Perks’ bill.

Beyond the irony, one should worry slightly when President Xi tells Mr Ho: “Your nomination and election with overwhelming support fully show that you have won broad endorsement in Macao.” Endorsement of who? Even with 98% of the votes in a non-competitive process, that leaves Mr Ho with a meagre 392 staunch supporters. Is it irony? Could there be a threat: we are giving you full support, so you’d better not disappoint us?

And then when Mr Xi adds that in Macao, “‘One country, two systems’ has proven to be a workable solution welcomed by the people,” what does it mean? It is for now being irremediably questioned in Hong Kong and rejected with despise by Taiwan, so it most probably says something about Macao and the way the territory accommodates anything and anyone rather than prove anything about the soundness of this unique dual-sovereignty arrangement.

There is no doubt that some Macao people will always be there to serve, especially when this serves their own interests. Such is the case of Pansy Ho who was chosen, along with Annie Wu from the Maxim group, to attend the latest session of the UN Human Rights Council and take a stand “to offer a fact-based perspective of many Hong Kongers on what is really happening in Hong Kong.” She was there as the Chairlady of the Hong Kong Federation of Women, a NGO with consultative status with the UN; she was there as a “regular person,” and because she herself “feels repressed and lives in fear.” She was not there as a billionaire. She was not there as a Macao casino mogul whose gaming license is up for renewal in 2022. And she was not there as the very unhappy businesswoman whose Turbojet’s results have dwindled by 32 per cent in the latest interim report of Shun Tak.

If anything happens in Macao, it will stay in the family: the Chairlady of the Macao Women General Association is none other than Ho Teng Iat, the sister of the new Chief Executive!

Published in Macau Daily Times on September 13, 2019

Kapok: For the people?

The contrast could not be more striking: while in Hong Kong two million residents were taking to the streets to express their dissatisfaction at Chief Executive Carry Lam, in Macao, slightly more than 5,000 happy few were taking part in an exercise of total perversion of democracy by choosing the electoral college that will select the next Macao Chief Executive on August 25.

On one side of the delta, a quarter of the population of the former British colony was marching and telling Mrs Lam that she had failed them and that the suspension of a much-derided extradition bill was too little and too late. Beyond the five precise demands — total withdrawal, retraction of the “riot” characterization, independent enquiry, charges being dropped and resignation of the CE — lies the idea of accountability, that one has to shoulder responsibility for his or her acts and that ultimately, if government could not be by and of the people, it had to be at least for the people.

On the other side of the delta, it was business as usual and the mockery of competition — 350 candidates for 344 positions — acted as a striking illustration of the political deadlock Macao has had to endure for the past twenty years. Same faces, or almost; same associations, or almost; same self-congratulations, always. All this for what? For Mr Ho Iat Seng to confirm the next day something everybody had already known for the past two years: that he would be the next CE. Only a handful of protesters led by legislator Sulu Sou, soon rounded up by policemen filming them from multiple angles at close range, dared disrupt the velvety process, denouncing the “small circle election” and the disenfranchisement of the vast majority.

On the next day, the cover page of the main Chinese daily in Macao, the Macao Daily News, was splashed with multiple photos of the successful voting exercise held the day before. The biggest ever peaceful demonstration in Hong Kong had no place on that first page. On June 10, only the “attack” on the LegCo had been reported on the cover of the same newspapers after one million people had taken to the streets the previous day. And on June 13, the full cover was dedicated to tear gas pictures and clashes between youngsters dressed in black and police in full battle gear, with a huge title splattered in the middle indicating that the “riot” (baoluan) had caused 72 people to be injured! Clearly, only a twisted, unfavorable and partial outlook gets reported.

What about these elections then? Why would they deserve the full cover the next day?

The 5,001 voters who turned out to the booths on June 17 actually represent very limited interests. Behind these voters, there are only 633 legal persons — associations — registered and authorized to vote. Each of these associations is entitled to a maximum of 22 votes, all of these votes entrusted in the members of the board of directors or managing bodies — regular members are excluded.

It is no secret that these associations vote as “blocks” and that voting instructions are discussed beforehand so as to make sure important figures of the community get the highest scores. Chui Sai Cheong, the brother of the present CE, made it first in the “professional” college, with 77% of the votes. He is also a member of the board in several dozens associations in Macao, even though not all of them are in the professional sector. Instructions are also made to exclude the very few who dare challenge the status quo, as Mrs Rita Santos just experienced in the “labor” college together with three others.

It is moreover clear that not all associations of a given sector are registered. If one simply looks at the “education” college, it is only made of 20 associations that select a total of 29 members of the Electoral Committee. And out of these 20, none of them has a connexion with catholicism, whereas there are 27 registered Catholic schools in Macao comprising about 37% of the non-tertiary educational service delivery in Macao!

Some are prevented from getting into the fray, others just renounced beforehand.

Hong Kong, standing for freedom and justice once more

On June 9, the march against the government sponsored extradition bill felt like a recast of the protest held on July 1 2003 against the enactment of a state security legislation that ultimately ended up with the bill being shelved indefinitely, the Secretary for Security resigning and the Chief Executive not being able to finish his second mandate for “personal reasons”.

Same main organizer: the Civil Human Rights Front gathering some 50 pro-democratic organizations. Same hot and clear-sky summer day. Same white t-shirts. Same mixed crowd of families and middle-class residents. Same upbeat mood with a different and yet echoing slogan: “Oppose extradition to China.”

Only this time was bigger, double the size actually, with more than one million Hongkongers taking to the streets in an uninterrupted human flow stretching from as far as Fortress Hill up to the government headquarters in Tamar and lasting for more than seven hours.

Only this time the loud and clear demand expressed by one out of seven residents fell on a deaf ear. Speaking only on the next day, Hong Kong’s Chief Executive Carrie Lam pledged to press ahead with the bill and insisted that further delays would only instill “more anxiety and divisiveness in society.” As calls for a second rally opposing the bill were starting to be heard, the LegCo president announced on June 11 that the bill would have to be adopted by June 20, tabling some 66 hours for debate with extraordinary sessions to be held on every single day of the week whereas the LegCo ordinarily convene only on Tuesdays and Wednesdays.

Rather than being delayed the legislative process was thus being sped up! All this while the proposed amendments to the Fugitive Offenders Ordinance and the Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Ordinances had been heavily challenged right from the start in February.

The Hong Kong Bar Association had published as early as April 2 a comprehensive review of the amendment bill that had been gazetted on March 29. Many voices from all corners of society soon joined — democrats of course, journalists, NGOs, foreign governments and politicians, businessmen with interests in China, and the many professional associations who felt threatened by the law. The same two main objections were repeated again and again, with various degrees of subtlety: why the rush? And why the absence of effective judicial and/or legislative safeguards? The Hong Kong judiciary would only be entrusted with checking the adequacy of formalities and ultimately, only the Chief Executive, himself or herself nominated by the central authorities, would be left to refuse case-by-case demands formulated by China’s courts.

On June 12, the mood of the crowd converging towards the LegCo had changed. This time around, the objective was not anymore to voice out a disagreement and quietly address it to the government but rather to forbid the convening of the second reading of the bill.

The power struggle had shifted from being symbolic and argumentative to meddling with the ugly reality of decision making. Inspiration thus came from the Umbrella Movement of 2014. Organizers were many, and, even though all progressive in essence, from every segment of society. The Hong Kong Confederation of Trade Union had called for a general strike. The Diocese of Hong Kong had implored the government to withdraw the bill. Even small businesses were closed, in different parts of the territory, with some leaving cardboards on their metal curtain reading “Busy being heroes.” And the crowd was young, very young, all dressed in black and geared-up to sustain a siege.

Contrary to September 2014, young people knew that the government would not hesitate to use tear gas, rubber bullets and pepper spray against them. If the effective withdrawal of the bill was to be achieved, nothing could be left to improvisation. Mistakes from 2014 would not be repeated if the success of 2003 was to be achieved.

Out of practicality — the LegCo being inaccessible — the second reading of the bill was officially postponed. But as the crowd refused to disperse and evacuate Harcourt Road, tear gas was fired and pepper spray splashed all over. This is unfortunately just the beginning.

Published in Macau Daily Times on June 13, 2019

Kapok: The politics of memory

Remembering and commemorating June 4, 1989 is not an easy task.

First and foremost as the government that sits in Beijing forbids and effectively prevents any attempt at commemorating what happened in Tiananmen Square and around that day. The official press is silent. People who were at the forefront of the movement are tightly monitored, if not under house arrest or gone for forced holidays. Sensitive places are not freely accessible, be it the Square itself, adjoining streets where most of the bloodshed took place or cemeteries where the ones who have killed that night rest forever. And even virtual candles cannot be posted online.   

Equally important is the fact that the regime has been systemically and thoroughly wiping off all traces of memory in connection with the events, and has refused to revise its judgement regarding those, even though what was once characterized as “a counter-revolutionary rebellion” has become mere “political turmoil” in official lingo. Actually, additional blurriness serves a purpose as it is one step further towards the completion of the erasing process.

And then, in places where it is actually possible to publicly pay tribute to June 4, what is it that we commemorate? The “massacre” so that unarmed students, workers and ordinary beijingers killed by the bullets of the People’s Liberation Army or crushed by its tanks do not fall into the oblivion of a mere “incident”?

But, in commemorating the tragedy and rightfully requesting a long-overdue vindication, aren’t we ourselves relegating to the background the hope and joy that existed beyond injustice and sadness? After all, the occupation of Tiananmen Square was the main stage of a social movement that initially started with a gathering of students from elite universities on April 15. That day they had come to the Monument to the People’s Heroes to mourn the passing away of a former general secretary of the very same Party that would ultimately order to fire on unarmed civilians on June 4.

In between these two dates, a tribute to a reformist communist cadre who had unjustly been sacked two years earlier had transformed over the course of almost two months into a resolute denunciation of rampant corruption and demands for greater political participation as well as democratic reforms, and spread to some 400 cities in China.

This year, as we were commemorating the thirtieth anniversary of the massacre, a lot of the commentaries focused on whether or not the official attempt at wiping out the memory of the events among Chinese citizens and especially the younger generations had actually been successful.

Foreign journalists going around the streets of Beijing with an image of the Tank Man, the most iconic picture in the West of the Chinese people’s heroic resistance to savage repression, and asking passers-by whether they had recognized the image verged on indecency as it produced mainly bewilderment and embarrassment, and clearly did not prove much given the general political environment of the capital city at this sensitive time.

Much more convincing was what Louisa Lim, a journalist turned scholar, has characterized as the “People’s Republic of Amnesia” and her more recent essay in which she remarked that “indoctrinating China’s young people with a utilitarian view of history is an even more powerful tool than censorship itself.”

But then, are these really certainties, even though documentation goes beyond the incidental? Another scholar working on Chinese millennials is now stressing that most of his interviewees were indeed the ones who had brought up the subject of the Tiananmen repression during the lengthy conversations he had with them. Another journalist-scholar emphasizes that a significant number of unabated writers, filmmakers, poets, artists, songwriters and public intellectuals have turned into amateur historians to preserve the memories of the country’s many upheavals. And then, what about the many private photos taken at the time?

In Hong Kong, there is no doubt that record numbers of participants turned up for the vigil this year also because of the ongoing debate over the extradition law. Ultimately, memories resurfaced when they resonate with the present. Sooner or later, they never fail to do so.

Published in Macau Daily Times on June 7, 2019

Kapok: Aiming higher

Reference documents and generic resolutions adopted by the United Nations are usually dismissed by critics as either too broad, too generous or too normative, and sometimes the three together. Then they are often simultaneously considered rather weak when it comes to binding effects and even weaker when considering enforcement. Of course, there are exceptions, especially when peace, security, trade and sometimes international justice are concerned, but more often than not timing and whether or not powerful states get involved remain crucial and can prove either incapacitating or, on the contrary, expediting.

Yet, when it comes to global concerns — in particular the protection of the environment, but not only! — there are no better institutions than UN agencies to come up with eloquent and insightful perspectives. Such is the case with the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) that succeeded the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in 2015. MDGs were broader and less numerous — 8 goals with 21 targets, whereas SDGs comprise 17 goals to be achieved by 2030 — but marked a turning point in the UN drive to be more results-oriented and multi-dimensional as well as inter-related in its approach to development — the United Nations Development Programme stresses that “often the key to success on one will involve tackling issues more commonly associated with another.”

Reviewing whether or not the claim that MDGs had been the “most successful anti-poverty movement in history”, analysts concluded in 2015 that even though it was quite an overstretch to proclaim “mission accomplished”, crucial progresses had indeed been made: the number of people living on less than $1.25 had been more than halved even though the same ambition for people suffering from hunger was not fully realized; net enrolment rate in primary school had reached 91% (not fully universal, but pretty close); two-thirds of developing countries had achieved gender parity in primary education; child mortality rate as well as global maternal mortality had dropped by about 50% but had failed to drop by two-thirds; number of new HIV carriers had fallen by 40%, even though the spread had not been reversed as promised; but then halving the proportion of people without access to clean water had been achieved five years in advance and overseas development aid to developing countries had increased drastically by about two-thirds over the period.

There is thus hope for the SDGs, and reading reports from numerous Non-Governmental Organizations and International Organizations on a regular basis, I can testify to the fact that the renewed and more ambitious goals for the next decade have permeated all kinds of institutions, and help create a new consensus on what needs to be done.

Labor conditions and employment — a subject dear to my heart — are now covered by the standalone Goal No. 8 in the SDGs whereas they use to be minimalistically embedded and split inside the goals to eradicate poverty and achieve gender parity under the MDGs. The full name of the new goal actually resonates like a program in itself as the ambition is to “promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all.” Under one goal stand some 10 targets, to which are appended 17 indicators that will allow policy-makers and citizens to assess the progress made towards the goal. And besides the usual GDP growth or unemployment rate, one finds the latest concerns related to the worrying spread of urban informal employment, all forms of discrimination affecting hourly earnings, fatal and non-fatal occupational injuries with a breakdown by gender and place of origin (migrants), and even the level of national compliance with labor rights (freedom of association and collective bargaining) based on the International Labor Organization conventions.

Quite interestingly, this goal also comprises a recommendation to “devise and implement policies to promote sustainable tourism that creates jobs and promotes local culture and products,” an objective that the Macao Government Tourism Office could easily make a requirement — why not even for the renewal of casino licenses — in order to make the ambition to become a “World Centre of Tourism and Leisure” slightly more meaningful for the good people of our SAR.

Published in Macau Daily Times on May 24, 2019

Kapok: Killing them not so softly

True: United Nations agencies or “bodies” can be confusing, especially when their names are long — the more specialized they are the longer the name — and the way they are designated in the mainstream press only refers to their acronym. There is the IPCC on the one hand, and the IPBES on the other, with the latter sometimes being characterized as the former “on biodiversity”—how helpful is that?!? Indeed, the IPCC is the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, and this is the one organization we most often heard about as the unprecedented warming of planet earth is seen as the root cause of all our environmental challenges, present and future.

The IPCC’s work provides scientific evidence about and policy recommendations on how to deal with these challenges to its 195 member states. It is the IPCC, which was founded in 1988, that warned us last October that efforts to limit global warming “well below 2ºC” above pre-industrial levels over the century would not be enough, contrary to what we thought in 2015, and that the new threshold not to cross was 1.5º C in order to prevent a grilling amplification of heat-waves, a sudden destabilization of the marine ice sheet in Antarctica, the irreversible loss of the Greenland ice sheet, and an alarming rise of mean sea level across the globe. 

The consequences would be dreadful for human societies and the urgency is here and now: CO2 emissions have to be reduced by about 45% at the horizon of 2030 and reach net zero — carbon neutrality — by 2050!

The Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services is more recent — it was created only in 2012 — and, as the name indicates, is focused on the footprint human activities have on biodiversity and ecosystems across the world. Governments — 130 member states altogether — support the action of the IPBES, but just like the IPCC, its different roles are grounded in expertise bringing together scientists, NGOs as well as businesses and industries. It is well-known for its “assessments”, among which certainly the most influential to date has been its report on “Pollinators, Pollination and Food Production” and ground-breaking trend it triggers in the global fight against pesticides since it was published in 2016.

Now, the plenary session of the IPBES just convened for two weeks in Paris in the UNESCO building and released on May 4th a short version of its huge report on the unprecedented and dangerous decline of nature because of human activities. The most quoted and conscience-striking fact highlighted in that “summary for policymakers” being that 1 million species of plants and animals — out of a total of 8 million, including 5.5 million insects — are “threatened with extinction, many within decades, more than ever before in human history.”

The report also indicates, just like the IPCC report from October, that “global goals for conserving and sustainably using nature […] cannot be met by current trajectories, and goals for 2030 and beyond may only be achieved through transformative changes across economic, social, political and technological factors.” The constant reminder of the 2030 horizon deriving from the 17 Sustainable Development Goals set by the United Nations General Assembly in 2015.

What is meant by “transformative changes” is pretty complex, although the executive summary makes it very clear that these should follow four key principles of governance: ‘integrative’ governance to ensure policy coherence and effectiveness; ‘inclusive’ governance approaches through stakeholder engagement and the inclusion of indigenous peoples and local communities; ‘informed’ governance for nature and nature’s contributions to people; and finally ‘adaptive’ governance and management. Any piece of policymaking should thus be implementable and implemented across the board, by all and for the benefit of all, based on facts and assessments and enabling locally tailored choices that can then be erected as guidelines for best practices by all.

But then, the report concludes distressingly that a “transformative change can expect opposition from those with interests vested in the status quo,” a disheartening warning not quite mitigated by the somewhat naive assertion that “such opposition can be overcome for the broader public good.” Reminds you of anywhere?

Published in Macau Daily Times on May 10, 2019

Kapok: The spire hiding the temple

While presiding over a regular meeting of the Cultural Heritage Council last week, Alexis Tam, the secretary for Social Affairs and Culture, grabbed the opportunity of the genuine emotion he had felt at seeing part of the Notre-Dame Cathedral engulfed by flames to reflect on the measures needed to ensure that such a dramatic incident would be prevented in Macao. His emphasis, as reported by the press, was three-fold: strengthen communication with the people or organizations managing heritage buildings, continue to educate the public on the safeguarding of cultural heritage, and keep carrying out inspections under the supervision of the Cultural Affairs Bureau while enrolling the public at large on the matter by allowing citizens to easily notify the Bureau on the actual state of preservation of these buildings.

As a Parisian, I had always assumed that the Notre-Dame Cathedral was indestructible. After all, it had been erected in the mid-12th century and survived several invasions and civil wars. Beside the shocking images and the realization that what once was would be no more or at least will be different, it came as a relief that for the world over, Notre-Dame de Paris somehow represented part of this universal heritage going beyond the category of the most visited places in the French capital city.

A loss for the Parisians became a loss for humanity, far beyond France’s borders. The erection of such an edifice had a political dimension though: medieval historian Patrick Boucheron reminded us that the Cathedral was “a field of force, a metaphor for reason” which power was derived from its “proximity with the King of France”. Reconstruction was thus bound to be political as well: French President Emmanuel Macron immediately pledged to restore the Cathedral within five years and solemnly declared that it would be a collective effort. Without the scars? Or are scars and failures not part of history too? As Boucheron remarked, “if we were in medieval France, we would consider the latest techniques, the most modern ones so as to build the Cathedral again, only better”.

Although Mr Tam is thus to be praised for making the connection between what had just happened in France and what could occur in Macao — and try to put in place prevention measures rather than costly and traumatic cures — one can also suspect a pretty blunt political usage behind his take: if it can happen in a city like Paris and for a building like Notre-Dame, then everything is possible.

The irony is that it is under Mr Tam’s watch that the Buddhist pavilion of the A-Ma Temple caught fire in February 2016 — a previous fire had gutted the same pavilion back in 1988. At the time, a short circuit in the electrical installations was blamed, but the damage caused was considered not “irreversible” even though what was supposed to take just a few weeks to restore ultimately became more than a year. Also, it was revealed that a member of the association managing the temple had first tried to take care of the issue by himself instead of immediately calling the fire services, that eventually intervened promptly and successfully.

Moreover, it is in this very Cultural Heritage Council that the opacity of the measures designed by the government to protect historical buildings has been denounced time and time again. More recently regarding the Lai Chi Vun shipyards, and before that precisely regarding the overall policies supposed to be in place to protect Macao’s unique heritage. In 2017, a decision by the UNESCO World Heritage Committee read like this: “[the committee] regrets the lack of progress with the completion of the Management Plan [a plan to safeguard and manage the Historic Center of Macao], which was due for submission by 1 February 2015”. A new deadline was fixed for December 1, 2018 and thus in early 2018 a two-month public consultation was organized, results were compiled (but not disclosed), transmitted to the central authorities by September and supposedly sent to the UNESCO.

What has become of the Plan Mr Tam? Let’s not forget that the Ruins of Saint Paul’s became Macao’s main landmark precisely because of fire… and negligence!

Published in Macau Daily Times on April 26, 2019

Kapok: 22 out of the dirty 400

For a reason that escapes any logic primarily concerned with fairness, only 22 members of the Legislative Assembly will participate in the Election Committee responsible for the designation of the Chief Executive (CE) this year. It is at the very least an aberration. After all, in Hong Kong, all members of the LegCo — the 70 of them — participate in the Committee, so why not in Macao?

Are arithmetic and proportionality to be blamed? The Election Committee in Hong Kong is made up today of 1,200 members against 400 only in Macao. But then, why would “all” members representing the SAR at the National People’s Congress be included instead of a selected few: the whole lot, that is 12 of them, are entitled to participate, just like in Hong Kong — 36 altogether in the latter case. Does it mean that NPC members are more legitimate to elect the CE than members of the local legislature? Does it comply with the rationale of the “one country-two systems” formula?

What about the members of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference? Almost half of the delegates — 14 out of 29 in total, that is 48.3% — representing the Macao SAR in this toothless consultative body will participate in the Committee, proportionally more than in Hong Kong where the electoral law indicates 51 members out of a total of 124 (41.1%). Why would they be more “entitled” in Macao than in Hong Kong? And how does it reflect on the very idea of a “high degree of autonomy”?

The anomaly of the situation becomes even more obvious if one starts to look into Annex I of the Macao Basic Law, in which we are being told that “principles of democracy and openness” should prevail over the designation of the members of the Election Committee. How is it even possible to exclude the very few members of the community returned via universal suffrage in really competitive elections?

The Electoral Law for the Chief Executive only makes a passing reference to the way legislators should be designated to the Election Committee: an “internal vote” has to be organized (art. 14), but just like in the case of legislative elections for functional constituencies, an actual vote becomes optional if the number of candidates matches the number of seats.

At the very least, one could imagine that all legislators directly elected via universal suffrage — 14 out of 33 — should make the cut. However, only ten will participate. Three democrats — Au Kam Sam, Ng Kuok Cheong and Sulu Sou Ka Hou — abstained from even running for political reasons: they denounce what they have been calling for years the tragic embodiment of “small circle” elections — the “happy few” co-opting a single candidate — and advocate for really “democratic and open” elections in which the whole citizenry would be called to the voting booths.

But then, why is Si Ka Lon, a directly elected legislator and Mr Chan Meng Kam’s henchman, absent from the list of the 22? What does it say about his standing? Could it be a political statement? A deal for another to take his spot? Not quite: contrary to 2014, Mr Si Ka Lon is now entitled to a seat in the Election Committee because he is concurrently one of the twelve designated delegates representing Macao at the NPC! And talking about shrinking small circles, the same goes for Ho Iat Seng, Chui Sai Peng and Kou Hoi In, all NPC delegates as well.

Ultimately, indecency is really championed by the appointed members of the Legislative Assembly: the very people appointed by the CE will get to elect the CE by representing the one and only institution with a democratic component! True, they were appointed by Chui and will get to vote for Ho, but again, beyond a mere farce, what message does it convey? And will Wu Chou Kit and Fong Ka Chio (the only two appointed lawmakers left aside) prove better? Not exactly, as Mr Wu and Fong will most probably be among the 43 members representing the “professional sector” on the Committee. Clearly, the circle is tightening, almost to the size and shape of a single dot.

Published in Macau Daily Times on April 12, 2019