Olho mágico: A Idade da Seclusão? / Peephole: The Age of Seclusion?

É bastante constrangedor reparar que o recente (segundo) rascunho da “Lei de Gestão de ONG’s Ultramarinas” da República Popular da China (中华人民共和国境外非政府组织 管理法) quase não suscitou discussão na nossa Região Administrativa Especial. Ao fim e ao cabo, trata-se de uma lei que vai não só aplicar-se a ONG’s (Organização Não Governamentais) “estrangeiras” mas também a um vasto número de organizações, instituições e associações sediadas em Hong Kong, Macau e Taiwan, como se sugere pelo uso da expressão 境外 (jingwai, literalmente fora das fronteiras de um país). O segundo esboço da lei foi apresentado no final de Abril no Comité Permanente da Assembleia Popular Nacional e o articulado da segunda proposta publicado a 5 de Maio com a possibilidade dos cidadãos se pronunciarem sobre a questão até 4 de Junho.  [...]

Published in Ponto Final, June 29 2015

And the text original in English with web links:

It is quite dismaying that the recent (second) draft of the “Overseas NGO Management Law” of the People’s Republic of China (中华人民共和国境外非政府组织 管理法) has triggered so little discussion in our SAR. After all, it is not only a law that will apply to “foreign” NGOs (Non Governmental Organisations) but also to a very wide number of organisations, institutions and associations also based in Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan, as implied by the word 境外 (jingwai, literally outside a country’s borders). The second reading of the law was introduced in late April in the National People’s Congress Standing Committee, and the text of this second draft released on May 5^th with the possibility for citizens to provide comments until June 4^th.

If the original intent of the law was geared at “regulating and guiding the activities of overseas NGOs in China, guaranteeing their legal rights and benefits, and promoting exchange and cooperation”—that’s reasonable enough—the text that was unveiled in early May tells quite a different story, because of its scope and letter, and has sent a chill along the spine of many, both domestically and internationally.

Looking at the scope of the law first, and as previously noted, it concerns organisations beyond the PRC’s de facto boundaries, truly foreign ones but also those separating it from the two SARs and the Republic of China, and these organisations are defined broadly as “non-profit, non-government social organisations” that engage “in fields such as economic, education, science and technology, health, culture, sports, environmental protection and charity”. As pointed out by many observers, it is therefore not only the “usual suspects” that are being targeted—those engaging actively in legal, environmental or social issues—but in effect any non-profit actor: a school or hospital as well as a business association or a cultural institution, a non-profit college alumni organisation or international scientific association as well as a foreign high school band or volunteer medical group wishing to organise or participate in any kind of activity on Chinese soil. And to do so, they would need to either find a sponsor to legally register a representative office (and only one for the whole of China) or find a partner willing to help them through the labyrinth of obtaining a temporary activity permit. Registration, in both cases, would have to be done with the Public Security authorities, contrary to domestic NGOs that register with the Ministry of Civil Affairs.

This very last detail is pretty indicative of the letter itself: registration with the public security apparatus implies that the engagement of overseas NGOs in China is thus perceived from a national security perspective, as pointed out by a law professor from Tsinghua. This becomes even clearer when one reads art. 59 that states that an overseas organisation will be banned from operating on Chinese soil and its representatives suffer serious consequences should it conduct very loosely defined actions originating both inside AND outside China: subverting state power; undermining ethnic solidarity and engaging in separatism; inciting resistance against enforcement of state laws and administrative regulations; collecting state secrets or intelligence; spreading rumours, defamation, or publishing and disseminating other harmful information that undermine state security or harm national interests; carrying out or funding political activities or illegally carrying out or funding religious activities and other activities that undermine state security and harm national interests or societal public interests. As Ira Belkin and Jerome Cohen remark: “if a student group on an American campus protests against Chinese government treatment of Tibetans, the university could be barred from activities in China, and its representatives in China could be detained and prosecuted.”

Many identify the filiation of that draft law with the “seven speak-nots” of Document No. 9 released in April 2013 (that includes “civil society” among the seven values, mostly Western, to be thoroughly rejected) or the more recent pumped-up National Security Law under discussion, and yet many, both within and outside China, believe that this draft law only reflects the very conservative view of a faction within the party, therefore many stakeholders have decided to take the opportunity of the public consultation designed by the NPC to provide their comments and suggestions. A group of 30 Chinese lawyers have thus characterised the bill as arbitrary, in violation of the fundamental national policy of “reform and opening-up” as well as the State Council’s reform spirit of “streamlining administration and power delegation, and as having much negative impact to its purpose of public security protection. Chinese NGO practitioners have sent to the NPC point-by-point comments and suggestions for revision. Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have shared their concerns about five aspects of the law: the broad and vague limitations on foreign NGOS operating temporarily or permanently in China; the onerous supervisory framework for NGOs; the expansive role for the police in approving and monitoring NGOs’ work; the restrictions on staffing and operations; and the punishments for vaguely defined activities. Even foreign chambers of commerce as well as western embassies and the European delegation in China have made their concerns public.

Ultimately, what seems to be at stake is the future of China’s relations with the outside world, and whether the “opening up” that has tremendously benefitted the country in the past 35 years is somehow coming to an end, at least when it comes to ideas—capitalism is welcome, liberalism far less. No doubt that the first one to suffer though if the law was to pass as is would be the thousands of domestic NGOs that have relied on 1000 to 6000 foreign organisations and foundations for funding, training, and expertise to serve millions of Chinese citizens.