Kapok: Another tyranny of numbers

Back in August 2015, I remember musing about the irony that, on the one hand China was the place where the oldest census in the world had been conducted, back in 2 AD, and on the other hand that Macao, the cradle of the encounter between two great scientific traditions, was being run on the basis of extremely farfetched studies and vague figures — dubious in themselves and, far worse, rarely fully available or fully explained.

As I pointed out at the time, censuses constitute the backbone of any public policy, and thus head counts are crucial in determining what policies come first, with what kind of allocation of adequate means. All things being equal, if your population is getting younger, then you might consider building more schools, with roads leading to these and appropriate public transportation to cater to them. If on the contrary, your population is ageing, investing in retirement homes, day-care centres and the training of nurses to visit regularly senior citizens who are ever more physically impaired might prove a wise move. This is pretty straightforward.

At the time, I was aiming at the newly released — and fallacious — Study Report on the Population Policies of Macao, prepared by the government’s Policy Research Office. To my dismay (sort of), the report was actually an exercise in statistics sugarcoating and ex-post facto validation. Tough challenges got buried and recommendations were merely programmatic.

What got to be discussed at the time was the official press release on the report and the declarations made by Lao Pun Lap, the head of the Policy Research Office. To be honest, and even though I have strong reservations about the actual capacity of Mr Lao who has unfortunately been in the job since 2010 [was previously involved with the CEEDS, starting in 2006], the full report made available later in the year did provide interesting points for discussion, despite being overly descriptive rather than prescriptive — after all, the full report is 125 pages long [Please note that the official website is still not available in December 2016: http://www.ppmacau.gov.mo/].

Yet, the flaws of the two key findings that made the headlines in the summer last year — the conservative and optimistic acceptance that the Macao population would reach 710,000 by 2020 and the carrying capacity 22,000 people per sq. km by 2025 — just got manifestly confirmed.

With the publication of the partial results of the 2016 population by-census (the last full census was in 2011), we now know for a fact that the average annual growth rate of the population increased dramatically in the past five years, at 3.3%, compared to an annual 1.9% between 2006 and 2011.

Our population is now 651,000, and if we use this latest yearly average growth rate, that means that the Macao population should reach 741,000 by 2020 and could make it to 765,000 by the next full census of 2021… It is to be noted that the projections posted on the DSEC website actually envision 752,000 by 2021, so one really wonders where the Policy Research Office got its figures from!

With the diversification drive in the making, the planned opening of thousands of new hotel rooms and the services appended to an ageing population, it is difficult to imagine the dynamic of the past five years being curbed, even though one cannot exclude populist measures to be adopted at the approach of the 2017 legislative elections to severely limit the number of new non-resident workers—the bread and butter of the population growth in the past decade.

A more numerous population would thus translate into a more pressing population density, meaning 23,000 people per sq. km.— still “not saturated”? And then, the district of Areia Preta and Iao Hon remained the most populated of the territory, home to more than 75,000 dwellers or a staggering 12% of the population. What is then the actual density in this northern part of the territory? What kind of peculiar social issues does this entail?

The full results of the by-census will only be made public in April 2017: this might explain why population issues just benefitted from a passing comment on only two pages out of 100 in the five-year plan released last September…

Published in Macau Daily Times on December 30th, 2016

Kapok: Frustrating exhilaration

Against all odds, the democratic fervour that has engulfed Hong Kong in the past two years appears far from being abated—quite the contrary.

The clear-cut victory of the pro-democracy camp in the geographic constituencies in September and the advent of a young boisterous generation of self-determination-leaning legislators served as a proof that the spirit of the 2014 Occupy Central with Love and Peace and the subsequent Umbrella Movement had not waned but instead transformed into a fiery force able to rock the boat of institutional politics from within.

Then came the so-called “oath-taking controversy” triggered by legislators-elect Baggio Leung and Yau Wai-ching, that ultimately led to them being unseated by Hong Kong’s High Court on November 15. In the meantime, the pro-establishment camp had ridiculed itself by engaging in self-deprecating bickering and absenteeism and the central authorities had been somehow convinced that a heavy-handed intervention in the form of a secretly sought interpretation of the Basic Law would “scare the chickens by killing the monkeys”.

Up to 15 legislators could fall victim of the ruling, if Wang Zhenmin, the legal advisor of the Hong Kong Liaison Office, was to be trusted. Ultimately, “only” four others are being submitted to a new judicial review instigated by CY Leung and his Secretary for Justice on December 2, including veteran activist “Long Hair” Leung Kwok-hung and Edward Yiu Chung-yim, the newly elected assistant professor representing the Architectural, Surveying, Planning and Landscape (ASPL) functional constituency.

Yet the whole process had but two consequences: on the one hand, the pro-democracy camp has regrouped and is now displaying a resolute unity in denouncing the illegitimacy of Beijing’s ruling: by equating the provocative independence drive of a few with the self-determination-leaning stance of the many, what was originally a discordant aggregate had been turned into a united bloc; on the other hand, the public is becoming ever more wary of the situation, and the public sentiment index released by Hong Kong University on December 15 indicates a plunge of 7.1 points compared to November—Government Appraisal faring the worst—with a level that is becoming dangerously close to the low tide of January 2016 when the disappearance of the Causeway Bay booksellers started to unravel.

No doubt that the announcement, on December 9, by CY Leung himself that he would not run—allegedly for “family reasons”—for a second term in the coming March Chief Executive election was intended as a gesture of conciliation or even a disguised admission of failure: the long-term dislike of and distrust in “689” (the number of votes he received in 2012) aka “the wolf” was yet again underscored on December 13, when another HKU survey revealed that Leung is now the least appreciated Chief Executive since the handover, at only 35 points, beating even the dwindling approval rate of Tung Chee-hwa at the time of the combined SARS and Article 23 crisis!

But if there is one thing that the Hong Kong electorate has learnt from these troubling times it is that their voice will only be faithfully defended by a handful few, whatever the context and the venue, and even though these few cannot be the majority by institutional design they have to become more numerous: on December 11, the pro-democracy camp thus won more than a quarter of the seats on the Election Committee that will designate the next Chief Executive in March 2017. 325 seats out of 1,200! In the election committee subsectors of Social Welfare, Information Technology, Health Services, Legal, Education and Higher Education, the pro-democrats won all the seats and they won a majority in accountancy, ASPL, medical and engineering—all of these knowledge-based!

Out of curiosity I checked if this could ever happen in Macao—thus allowing some form of competition—but unfortunately, even in the more spirited social or education sectors, pro-establishment figures rule and command the votes, including present-day Secretaries and soon-to-be recipients of the Golden and Silver Lotus(es). In Macao, nothing short of universal suffrage can change the system.

Published in Macau Daily Times, December 16, 2016

Kapok: Between Scylla and Charybdis

It is again that time of the year when the executive power in Macao is trying very hard to look accountable to the people: the Chief Executive (CE) solemnly and rather painfully delivers his policy address to the Assembly for the year to come, then takes questions, and subsequently the five secretaries, who make up his high-powered government, take the stage consecutively to further detail the action plan in their respective area.

This year, as usual, the exercise starts on November 15 and concludes on December 6—that is three full weeks! Now add the three to four months of preparation for that ordeal—at least on the side of the civil servants asked to work out the details that will allow their revered superior to address any possible Q&A—and you have a real measure of the supposed importance of the whole operation that has all the apparent characteristics of a government’s programme.

In pure theory, the CE should not have to do this: after all, he is elected neither by the people nor by the legislature. Given the actual structure of government, he is only accountable to the 400 members of the election committee that designates him—although on both occasions Mr Chui was “running” unopposed—and to the Central People’s Government that appoints him—in that respect, a much more demanding patron. But article 65 of the Macao Basic Law states that “the Government of the Macao Special Administrative Region” is “accountable to the Legislative Assembly of the Region” and that “it shall present regular policy addresses to the Assembly” and “answer questions raised by members of the Assembly”.

So here we are, without clear rational justification, listening to programmatic declarations that, for the most part, will either fail to materialise on time, fail to materialise properly or fail to materialise at all. Examples are numerous: social and economic housing, bridges, light rail transport, Coloane hospital, diversification of the economy, reform of the judicial system,  “scientific policy-making” and “sunshine government”, and of course a “gradual” establishment of “a democratic decision-making process” that was conceived, back in November 2010, as the pivotal condition to making fewer blunders and being resolutely less corrupt.

The show follows a very predictable script in which, among other things, business-oriented legislators lambast the unjustifiable increase in the number of civil servants, decried as contradicting the professed drive to streamline and rationalise public administration. Maybe so, but does anybody provide elements of comparison? The ratio of civil servants to the population or to the labour force is actually double what we find in Hong Kong and Singapore, respectively… And a good 34% of the civil servants are employed by the security forces in Macao!

Turning to the budget, vociferous critics denounce the prospective 12.6% increase in expenditure for the coming year at a time of economic slowdown, targeting again the ever expanding costs in personnel. Maybe, or maybe not—actually there should be more investments given the vast public reserves—but who cares? The very same legislators will vote the budget without any amendment; the very same legislators never request mid-term reports on the budget, and it is rather ironic that while the First permanent commission examines the 2017 law on public finance, it is the Third commission that reviews the execution of the past budget (2015). The left hand is not exactly aware of what the right one is doing, and what indeed matters for most lawmakers is whether or not they will get their fair share of uncompetitive public procurement—something not discussed openly in plenary sessions!

When Ng Kuok Cheong walks out of the chamber to protest against the response of the CE who considers that political development and universal suffrage are solely decided and initiated by Beijing, he is actually putting in crude light the very fact that neither the government nor most of the legislators can be trusted for things to really change. Small circles are ultimately vicious ones.

Published in Macau Daily Times, November 25, 2016

Kapok: The king is naked

Until the jaw-dropping election of Donald Trump on November 9, all the feverish political discussions I have had on and off-line for almost a month somehow revolved around the controversial oath-taking and its ensuing rejection of the Youngspiration pair of newly elected Hong Kong legislators, Yau Wai-ching and Baggio Leung. That was the talk of the day (and night), and even those who professed to be “bored” or simply annoyed could not help commenting, discussing, and arguing. On my own Facebook page, that gave rise to the longest exchange of comments and responses I had ever had—and mainly with two “Friends”!

The bigger the stake, the higher the level of engagement. The saga aspect of the whole story, with its almost perfectly choreographed traumatic scene—visible and audible—on October 12 and its ensuing twists and turns for almost a month, largely explains the riveting effect it has produced. Moreover, the responsibility of the sudden changes of wind has been rather evenly shared: if the young radicals were the trigger, the pro-establishment forces “voluntarily” chose an unusually buoyant counter-attack to prevent the retaking of the oath, regarding which pan-democrats, old and new, objected vehemently, both vocally and physically.

The atmosphere was not subdued anymore in the LegCo chamber, and fingers were pointed at one another. Furthermore, all three sources of power were embroiled in the situation: the legislature, with its somewhat democratic legitimacy, entrenched the controversy, challenged in less than a week by the executive, requesting a judicial review from the High Court to not only prevent the Youngspiration legislators to retake their oath but to do it for good and thus unseat them.

Unity in both camps was initially far from absolute: not everybody agreed with the rather provocative stance of Yau and Leung among the pan-democrats and some pro-establishment voices were not acting outraged yet and believed things could be settled with a slap on the wrist. The just sworn-in president of the LegCo, Andrew Leung, was himself originally in favour of giving the troublemakers a second chance. When the first whispers of a possible intervention by the central authorities started to be heard, Secretary for Justice Rimsky Yuen indicated that “the dispute […] should be resolved within the Hong Kong judicial system”. After much denial and confusing signs, the admission that an interpretation by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPC) regarding oath-taking was in the tubes came from a long-time representative for Hong Kong in the NPC (herself already in Beijing), Maria Tam. And the government’s face was somehow salvaged by the revelation that the interpretation had been requested by the Chairman of the NPC, Zhang Dejiang.

When the interpretation was ultimately made public, what the Central authorities consider acceptable or not became more forceful, to the point where the “one country-two systems” principle was irremediably breached: not only does the interpretation venture into law-making by defining the penalties incurred by the “offenders”—thus going farther than the interpretation power—but also provides ample room for political manipulation (define “a manner which is not sincere or not solemn”…). Hence the 13,000-strong participants in the preventive demonstration organised on November 6 to expose a possible abuse of power and the silent march by the legal profession gathering 2,000 people on November 8 to denounce what Democratic Party founder Martin Lee has called “a tank crashing into the legal system”.

What is truly unacceptable for Beijing is thus the self-determination agenda of some radical young democrats, even though the irony is that there was no significant independence-leaning claim in Hong Kong until two years ago—the PRC under the leadership of Xi Jinping has therefore managed to accomplish in less than three years what the British could not do in 155! And to make matters worse, insult was added to injury, although one could debate the actual insulting load of the “People’s Refucking of Chee-na”. The target is a regime, and Chee-na or Shina is not derogative per se, but rather a challenge to the centrality of the “Middle Kingdom”. But in the end, patriots only deal with absolutes! 

Published in Macau Daily Times on November 11, 2016

Kapok: Being Ill-equipped

A few weeks ago, I was contacted by a freshly arrived European journalist in Hong Kong who had been told that I was closely following current affairs in Macao and, more importantly, that I was willing to discuss certain topics considered by some—too many actually—as taboo. When I asked about the topic she wanted to cover, I was pretty astonished to discover that the issue at hand was the one of “money laundering”: the workings, the amount, the relationship to the casino industry, the regulations and law enforcement policies put in place by the government to combat the situation, and of course the outcome, whether money laundering was still galloping or if it had been reined in.
My initial reaction was one of dismay: how come a newcomer could choose that as a first topic? How can one imagine shedding a corner of novel and bright light—the ethical intention of the investigative newsperson being beyond doubt—on such a sensitive topic without having built a web of connexions over the years that would allow for some form of insider take? And then, with such high stakes, people who are actually in the know will usually keep their lips sealed, and thus the only ones talking are the ignorants or the bragging fools. I was thus pretty dismissive. And then…
If “everybody” knows money laundering happens on a vast scale in the gambling Mecca of the East, one would be hard-pressed to come up with reliable and up-to-date amounts. Numbers in that respect go beyond the imagination of a normally equipped human brain: when a single junket employee can disappear with US$1.3 billion of creditors money, as it happened with Huang Shan back in April 2014, it is not impossible to conceive that the money involved in dubious dealings must be somehow proportionate to this incredible extension of credit by junket operators that goes completely unmonitored by the gaming regulator. And this is one—a big one, and clearly the biggest one that ever came to the attention of the public—of many.
In English, an inquisitive mind often stumbles on the US$200 billion roundish amount of yearly money laundering in Macao. This impressive figure derives from the 2013 annual report of the US Congressional Executive Commission on China, in which one can read that “[t]he gambling industry in Macao is reportedly tied to widespread corruption and the laundering of large amounts of money out of mainland China. […] One Macao academic estimates that US$202 billion in ill-gotten funds are channeled through Macao each year.”
If one looks at the source, the Macao academic is none other than Camoes Tam Chi Keung, from MUST, a well-known liberal personality in Macao specialising in journalism and communication, who had confided to a journalist from the Hong Kong-based Oriental Daily that money laundering could be estimated between 1.57 billion yuan a year, on the conservative side (the figure quoted in the US report) and as much as 10 trillion yuan per year—a staggering and far less conservative US$1,250 billion! As far as methodology is concerned, no question was asked.
Now, if one checks on Wisers how many stories have appeared in the Chinese press regarding “black money laundering” 洗黑錢 in Macao in the past six months, a meagre 144 articles are returned, and even the tightening of monitoring measures by the DICJ in May-June 2016—we finally got rid of aliases for junket stakeholders!—gets only a passing mention. An equivalent search for Hong Kong comes up with 957 stories: should we conclude that logistics, finance and tourism are far more prone to money laundering than gaming?
For Prosecutor General Ip Son Sang, who publicly reported recently that out of 364 cases of money laundering opened in Macao over the past two years only 2 were successfully prosecuted, the problem lies in the lack of proper legal tools. I would add: lack of proper reporting takes a toll too!

Published in Macau Daily Times on October 28th 2016

Kapok: Plus ça change…

When then Premier Wen Jiabao visited Macao in November 2010, he reminded the SAR government that “power [had] to operate under the sun” and that it was duty-bound “to spend more money on livelihood issues”.
Those words sounded like a warning at a time when the discrepancy between public revenue and public spending was gaping: the government was getting richer by the day, and not much was being done in terms of infrastructure, urban development and meaningful public policies for the benefit of the population – think education, healthcare, retirement schemes, transport, lodging, sport facilities, greening of the city, etc.
In the second quarter of 2010, the government had spent only a quarter of what it had pocketed, and piling up resources while designing half-baked policies was the latest fad. “Scientific governance” had just started to bubble up in official speeches, and everybody was thus longing for things to change. Mr Wen had come to Macao to attend the third Ministerial Conference of the Forum for Economic and Trade Cooperation between China and Portuguese-speaking Countries (PSCs), that had concluded on an upbeat note with the announcement of the establishment of a US$1 billion fund to help Asian and African PSCs in their development drive.
As often happens, high expectations are usually met with disappointment.
In Macao proper, things have barely improved, and we still don’t know whether this is due to the appalling mess left by Mr Ho’s tarnished second mandate or Mr Chui’s ineffective first mandate, but clearly livelihood issues have not been addressed properly: traffic is worse than ever, air pollution has aggravated, economic housing plans and healthcare facilities are still simmering on the back burner, smoking is still allowed in casinos, etc.
And that was not for lack of resources: in 2013, the record year for gambling revenues, the government spent less than 30% of what it had “earned”, and even if the “imbalance” in public finance significantly decreased with the decline in gambling revenue, the government spent a mere 41% of its fiscal revenue in 2014 and despite an adverse situation in 2015, spending only amounted to 70% of the revenue last year and surplus still equated to almost 45% of ordinary spending! No wonder we are in need of a new law on public finance for legislators to be able to more closely monitor the situation.
And yet, one can wonder: are most of the legislators part of the solution or actually part of the problem? Why is it that all these businessmen-turned-public-figures are so much against R&D and innovative investments when it comes to public spending? Could it be because they control land usage, public services and the maintenance of these services? Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose: Mr Li Keqiang, now Prime minister and visiting Macao for the fifth Ministerial Forum is talking about “people-oriented governance, scientific decision-making and giving priority to the people’s livelihood”…
Diversification, meaning gambling refitted with tourism, entertainment, culture and creative industries, is now the way to go, thanks to the admonition aired by President Xi Jinping when he visited Macao in December 2014, and the cooperation with PSCs appears to be one of the two key pillars, together with the integration of the Pearl River Delta, for this ambition to become a reality. The 19 measures to further cooperation between China and PSCs are thus worthy of careful consideration.
But facts are stubborn things: trade between China and these countries peaked in 2013, and the aim was for these exchanges to reach USD160 billion by 2016, whereas they declined by 26% last year, amounting to less than $100 billion. The $1 billion fund announced by Mr Wen six years ago has received a limited $125 million in capital, and only two projects, one in Angola, the other in Mozambique, have been approved for partial funding.
Having the Fund for Development moved from Beijing to Macao might help, and yet for what purpose and to whose benefit? In Macao, the house always wins!

Published in Macau Daily Times, October 14th 2016

Kapok: The Crux of the Matter

A week ago, HK01, a Hong Kong-based Chinese online newspaper cooperating with The International Consortium of Investigative Journalists revealed that our Chief Executive, Fernando Chui Sai On, and his legislator elder brother, Chui Sai Cheong, had been closely connected to an offshore company, Yee Shing International Limited, registered in the British Virgin Islands, for about two decades. As a subsidiary of Hopewell Holdings Limited, a major infrastructure and property firm listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange since 1972 (with revenues of HKD6.64 billion in 2015), this offshore had in effect been co-founded by Chui Sai Cheong together with a long-term executive of Hopewell.
The Chief Executive was only director of the tax-free company for two short years, starting in 1997, and resigned from his directorship on July 30th 1999, shortly before it was announced that he would become, after the December 19 handover, the new Secretary for social affairs and culture. His brother, on the contrary, was only out of Yee Shing for a short spell in 1994 and was still listed as a director in 2010 when Mossack Fonseca, the now rather infamous Panamanian law firm, lost the custody contract for the offshore. HK01 consequently wondered why this function had never been enclosed in Chui Sai Cheong’s declaration of assets, the one all senior officials are supposed to divulge since a more stringent law on such matters was passed in January 2013—more than six years after the arrest of Ao Man Long, better late than never…
Interestingly enough, both brothers came up with a public explanation, and of course these were in line with the responses aired back in April when the so-called Panama papers, of which 29 percent of offshore firms were incorporated either in Hong Kong or China, started to unravel: why the big fuss, when all this is legal?! Chui Sai Cheong gave an interview to the ever-zealous and pro-establishment Chinese newspaper Macao Daily revealing that he had actually resigned from the director position in July 2012 (spoiler!), and that he, therefore, acted in accordance with the new asset declaration law. And then, Chui Sai On’s Spokesperson’s Office made it publicly known that by resigning from all business-related positions prior to his nomination to senior public posts he had been “strictly following the Basic Law of the MSAR”. And things simply went back to normal: silence!
I already argued earlier this year that governing is not only a matter of legality, and that responsibility in politics requires slightly more than being law abiding in grey areas—and the Panama papers are raw diamonds in that respect. The time when traditional paternalistic elites could profess “do as I say and not as I do” is coming to an end, and unfortunately not necessarily pointing to a reassuring future, whatever the setting, democratic or less so—think US, the Philippines, China, etc.
What these offshore leaks have revealed for Macao is well established: paragons of virtue and patriotism, even the ones representing Macao at the CPPCC or the NPC, are the ones practising “tax evasion” on an industrial scale while holding dual nationality. But for the Chui, dysfunctions are of another nature: what is the exact purpose of holding an official position? The younger Chui resigned 12 days before being nominated Secretary and the elder Chui resigned  from Yee Shing right in the middle of the revision of the new asset declaration law (passed in 2013, but introduced in December 2011)? In finance, that would be called “insider trading”! And then what about the separation of powers: the two brothers played musical chairs in the very same business! Moreover, Chui Sai On was supposed to champion social and economic housing, both as a legislator starting in 1992 and as a Secretary afterwards, while his brother, now a legislator, was helping Hopewell ripe the full benefits of luxury real-estate programs such as Nova Taipa and then Nova City?
Promiscuity is a powerful excuse on a tiny territory that has a multi-secular tradition of opacity, but still, this is too big to go unnoticed.

Published in Macau Daily Times, September 30th 2016

Kapok: Political Maturity

As Kenneth Chan, a former Civic Party legislator, puts it with a sarcastic bitter-sweet smile: advocating “universal suffrage” and “greater democracy” is not “sexy” anymore in Hong Kong, people want more, and they made their voice heard, loud and clear, via the ballot box, in what some dub an act of “resistance” to Beijing’s encroachment over glorified liberal values. The democratic camp has once again prevailed in the geographical constituencies of the Legco election, and even comforted its precious veto power over bills that require a two-third majority to be made into law.
Should we be surprised? As also acknowledged by Mr Chan, what we used to call the pan-democrats had been talking about and pushing for universal suffrage for more than 20 years with very limited results, quite the contrary. Beijing’s stiffening position regarding the degree of openness it would tolerate for the 2017 Chief Executive election, the growing estrangement of CY Leung, the present Chief Executive, from a politically savvy middle class and the rise of a youth-led protest movement that culminated with the Autumn 2014 Umbrella Movement were bound to have consequences. The signs of change had already become visible in the November 2015 district councils election and again in the February 2016 legislative by-election in the New Territories East constituency: so-called localist groups 本土派 had made a strong showing, thus vindicating the umbrella movement heritage.
But then, a general election was something of a different scale and the context had been changing fast: frustration and humiliation had triggered very adverse and boisterous reactions, but fear was creeping in, even more so with the booksellers disappearance of October 2015.
The scope of data available regarding the election is still limited, but as pointed out by political scientist Edmund Cheng, several observations can already be made.
As far as turnout is concerned — more than 58%; the highest ever — there is obviously a close correlation between street protests and high turnout: the previous record high was in 2004 in the wake of the massive protests against article 23.
The support for the pro-democracy camp (55%) and the pro-regime camp (around 40%) is steady, and the great novelty thus lies in the fragmentation of and the reshuffling of personnel within the pro-democracy camp, in favour of radicals, localists and supporters of self-determination — with the latter concept being fuzzy enough to allow for many interpretations, including a more neutral “community engagement”.
Clearly, there is a convergence between street politics and electoral politics: only two veteran pan-democrats who held their seats before 1997 made it this time and as many as 6 “umbrella generation” activists were elected in geographical constituencies. Is that enough to say with CY Leung that “a large number of voters were dissatisfied with the performance of the pro-democracy lawmakers in the past, and they didn’t formerly vote for the pro-establishment camp”?
For Edmund Cheng, in order to explain why the pro self-determination camp has been able to become a catch-all party in just one stroke, one has to look into structural changes and conjectural forms of mobilisation.
There were indeed transformative effects of the umbrella movement, both regarding the high level of turnout and the registration of new voters. Then the political-identity claim overrode socio-economic issues, although one could argue that the overall highest vote-getter, Eddie Chu Hoi-dick, actually ran a campaign with a comprehensive perspective underpinned by social justice and sustainability. And lastly, polarisation of the vote increased, with a generation gap translating into very differentiated voting reserves.
As far as context was concerned, the disqualification of pro-independence or localist candidates over the summer paved the way for “strategic voting” to become significant — thus uniting the “idealists” — and the influence of social media has become a distinctive and potent feature of electoral politics in this part of the world.
When and if rationality is concerned, vote allocation and strategic voting become crucial points, and social media can obviously compensate for the lack of resources. Points not to be forgotten for our own legislative elections in 2017.

Published in Macau Daily Times, September 16 2016

Kapok: Quarrel of the Ancients and the Moderns

Being once again more in tune, on a daily basis, with politics in Hong Kong, I can now better appreciate how different things are on this side of the Delta. With the ongoing campaign for the legislative elections that will be held this coming Sunday, the contrast is truly striking.
Not that the extent of the debates make things necessarily more enthralling in the former British colony: after all, the independence issue does catalyze a soul-searching discourse while it somehow hijacks the party — with and without a capital ‘P’. Important topics pertaining to social fairness or sustainable development thus play second fiddle.
Or do they? In the end, these are not mere technicalities, and one could argue that they actually necessitate a sense of certainty regarding the future if one is to find solutions that bind the whole community, and for several generations to come. Maybe the order of priorities is not that foolish after all.
But then come the ‘whys’? Why is Hong Kong so modern and Macao so traditional?
Language is not at stake: Cantonese, its plasticity and wealth of diverse and colloquial expressions, is striving in both SARs. Neither is the openness to the latest fads, be them Japanese, Korean or American: Pokémon GO is equally played on a Galaxy Hedge or an iPhone on both banks of the Pearl River.
Structure of population does play a role: only a minority of the population is born in Macao proper, and thus identification with one’s place is less of a contentious point while finding a ‘home’ within the Motherland.
And then, colonial heritage matters too: if “open” elections together with universal suffrage were in effect held sooner in Macao (early 1970s, versus early 1990s for Hong Kong), meaningful ones (with an extended registration of voters) actually started only in the mid-1980s (with a drastic recounting of the voters in 1992) in the barely lusophone city, and then the Portuguese colonial administration was very reluctant to co-opt the local Chinese elite in its higher echelons, a stark contrast with the localization drive of the British — and here I will refrain from comparing Rocha Vieira with Chris Patten, mainly out of respect for the latter.
The nature and organization of two very, very, very (where do I stop?) different economies are essential to understanding the divergence: financial capitalism can be murky, but it can never reach the degree of opacity of a gambling monopoly (now turned oligopoly) essentially resting on “gambling promoters” (the famous junkets) that are held accountable to no one but themselves. And in the context of Macao, outside influences bring tacky sophistication, but certainly not transparency. Laws and regulations in Nevada do — up to a certain point.
And then you have the press — freedom of the press, not only in name, but with independent titles able to finance themselves and run stories unimpaired. Sure, the environment is stifling in Hong Kong, but in Macao, Ou Mun Iat Pou and its propaganda-like content rules, while All About Macau, the most important liberal title in Chinese, still struggles to pay for a server based outside of the SAR…
When election time comes in Macao, there are no lawyers, no university professors, no journalists and no students with a real chance of winning the day. When a CUHK poll published in July indicates that 17% of the population supports independence in Hong Kong — 39% among the ones aged 15 to 24! — it does say something about the condition of the society. In Macao, no such poll exists and we are left to speculate on the state of the society thanks to the grassroots petitions that are mushrooming in support of the soon-to-withdraw UBER. Do people remember what happened with Viva Macau, Macao Dragon Company and Reolian? And then, who owns the taxis in Macao?
Macao, traditional? Yes, but in whose interests?

Published in Macau Daily Times, September 2nd 2016

Kapok: The age of submission

It is unsurprising that the proposal of a law reviewing the Electoral Law of the Legislative Assembly, put forward by the government in that very same Assembly and approved in first reading on August 9 by all legislators but four — the ones we can easily brand our own pan-democrats: Ng Kuok Cheong, Au Kam San, José Pereira Coutinho and Leong Veng Chai — is limited in scope and falls short of the ambition that our less than two-year-old government was supposed to entertain in all matters of governance. Should we be surprised?
Admittedly back in December 2014, serious doubts were raised regarding the capacity of the new secretary for Administration and Justice, Sonia Chan, to carry both a far-reaching reform of the administrative (aka political) system and a much-needed revamping of the judicial institutions — recent outspoken complaints coming from traditionally soft-spoken quarters of society, lawyers and legal advisers leading the charge, aptly testify to that sorry state of judicial affairs.
The main merits of Sonia Chan appear to be that she is untainted — with the indictment of the former Prosecutor General, this is proving precious — and a keen supporter of the Chief Executive (CE). Her previous position at the Office for Personal Data Protection had allowed her to shine as the gravedigger of an inoffensive but embarrassing so-called “civic referendum” targeting Chui’s undisputed re-election in August 2014.
Nevertheless, even though she is only acting on behalf of the vision of the CE, she is supposed to prove herself, just like Alexis Tam and Raimundo do Rosário are trying to do. But then, healthcare, education, traffic management and lodging are top priorities, and the mandate given to her colleagues is loud and clear. On her side, we are in total denial: the system is sound and thus going beyond the reform of 2012 and the ridiculously muted “+2+2+100” formula is out of the question. Electoral democracy in Macao is a matter of technicalities: due processes for the registration of voters and candidates as well as financial aspects and length of the campaign are the only issues that matter. Representativeness: who cares? Quality of the debate: what’s the point? Actual and proven capacity of the ones who represent us all: to what end?
During the public consultation organized in May in preparation of the law proposal, and despite organizational biases favoring traditional and pro-government sectors of the society, persistent voices stressing key (substantial) issues were heard: in a TDM report, a lady was quoted as saying “the issue of insufficient directly-elected lawmakers has always bothered most of us residents” and another resident wondered “aren’t elections all about [justness] and fairness?”, thus “very [reasonably]” asking for “more directly-elected lawmakers” and “[cutting] down on the number of appointed lawmakers”.
To be fair, and in comparison to Hong Kong, the number of elected lawmakers is not that inadequate. In Hong Kong, as of today, we have 3,779,085 registered voters, and 35 (out of 70) legislators are returned through universal suffrage. Overall, that’s one directly elected legislator for 108,000 voters. In Macao, as of December 2015, we have 285,999 registered voters, for a total of 14 directly elected seats (out of 33 in total), so in effect one directly elected deputy for 20,500 voters. So why is the system perceived as unfair?
Having ALL indirectly elected lawmakers (whereas they are the exceptions in Hong Kong) voted in unopposed does not build trust. Having no law regarding political parties, no properly designed constituencies, a flawed electoral system dispersing the votes and an unjustifiable number of CE-appointed legislators do no help either. And then, introducing the review of the law a few months before the elections proper and dismissing any challenge to representativeness as one potentially threatening “stability” in Macao speak volumes about the lack of ambition of Chui: no wonder that the conclusions of the public consultation reports state that for any matter pertaining to the designation of legislators, the decision power rests exclusively with the central government. Submission it is then…

Kapok: To hoist or not to hoist?

In this part of the world, and especially at that time of the year, the right meteorological prediction can often be a matter of life and death: our subtropical climate endowed with a humid monsoon regime is characterized by a Typhoon-prone wet season in Summer, and tropical cyclones are not only fortuitous happenings — although they can provide the like of Joseph Conrad with great fictional inspiration — but regular manifestations of the (still) indomitable essence of Mother Nature.
The deadliest typhoons killed in the thousands, and memories of super-Typhoons do not date back exclusively to the nineteenth century: in 2013, Haiyan left a trail of some 6,300 dead people in its path, mainly in the Visayas in the Philippines, and some put the unofficial death toll well above 10,000. Many reasons can help explain such a dreadful outcome: the path of the tropical cyclone itself (a direct hit is always the worst), the quality of the constructions (more shoddy means more risky), the zoning of lands defined as proper for construction (floodable areas or landslide paths provide additional danger) and of course the extent of preventive measures, mostly determined by proper meteorological assessment.
Macao has a long history when it comes to early warnings in relation to tropical cyclones. Any visit to the Guia Lighthouse, now part of UNESCO world heritage, constitutes a clear reminder that the oldest modern lighthouse of the China coast (completed in 1865) was (and still is somehow) not only a precious guide for sailors returning to safety harbor but also the point of reference for Typhoon signals — made of black-painted metal — to be literally “hoisted” beside the proud white tower situated on top of Guia ill.
The current controversy regarding the non-issuance of the tropical cyclone No. 8 signal as Nida was making its way towards our shores on August 2nd — whereas not only Hong Kong, but also Shenzhen and Zhuhai had issued such a warning — is thus causing a particular worry in our SAR: how come, such a long and well-established level of competence regarding a system of severe weather condition advanced notices could have gone so much astray? Is it a scientific mistake — despite the director of the Weather Bureau (SMG) claiming to the contrary and that everything was done by the book? Is it a blunder — the decision-making process within the SMG proving dysfunctional? Is it the result of outside pressure and thus influence peddling — fingers are being pointed towards the gaming industry? Is it a public relation disaster — the overconfidence of the scientific bureaucrat proving extremely detrimental, as usual? Is it a mix of all these and then what would it take to make things better? José Pereira Coutinho is asking for the head of Mr Fong and some other legislators for an independent inquiry: would that be a start, or the end of the measures to be swiftly adopted?

What is true is that for years Mr Fong and his chief subaltern, deputy director Leong Ka Cheng, had been under the authority of, first, the most corrupt officials of Macao, up to 2006, and then under one of the most incompetent, by some records, up to 2014. No wonder that bad habits — some revealed by a long and detailed article published by “Macau Concealers” — were taken: a sense of complete impunity by the top management, despite the many administrative enquiries, and the ever worsening mismanagement of human resources inside the bureau characterized by extreme forms of favoritism. Some of the shortcomings of the SMG had already started to show in April this year when the bureau was forced to apologize to the public regarding several blunders concerning mishaps related to rainstorm warnings untimely publicized.
Beyond the potential enquiry and the individual culprits that might be found in the end, and beyond the ever apologizing sense of duty displayed by Secretary Raimundo do Rosário, what will need to be restored is the trust within these public departments: only then can the link with the public prove healthy. Competent people need to be rewarded, not the contrary!

Published in Macau Daily Times on August 5th 2016

Kapok: Living together

Being in France just a few days after the horrendous truck attack that took place in the Southern French city of Nice on Bastille Day, claiming the life of 84 people, including many children, compels me to reflect on what makes a society hold together. Confronted with this form of indiscriminate terror and such a feeling of powerlessness, both on the side of society and the public authorities, how can we make sure that this kind of dreadful occurrence will be much less likely to happen in the future, close and distant, bearing in mind that zero risk does not exist? Is the call to unity a requirement or a promise, and in that case what will be its grammar? Will we unite because we need to or because we want to? Do we unite because now is not the time to divide ourselves or because we recognise in each and every member of our community, a “brother” or “sister” who is “equal” in status and in exercising his or her “freedom”? “Liberté, égalité, fraternité”, the three cardinal values of the French Republic.
What is eminently disturbing is the very fact that terrorists, are, somehow and in effect, winning, because these very values are being trampled over.
First, because in a political environment in which emotions rather than reason prevail, the first and foremost reaction is to resort to a blame game. Of a religious or at least communautarian nature, as if Islam at large was conducive to such violence and we were witnessing some form of holy and civilisational war, disregarding the very fact that a third of the 84 victims were themselves Muslims. Of a strictly politicking nature, when local authorities of a certain political orientation (more conservative and security prone) take aim at the national government of another political inclination (roughly speaking, more concerned with individual and civic rights) for failing to anticipate the highly improbable — a heavy vehicle attack is a first in France, and the only equivalent can be found in attacks perpetrated in Jerusalem over light rail stations back in 2014.
Second, because what is for now visible in terms of public policies regarding the prevention of terrorism is almost exclusively related to security. Everybody wants to feel reassured and safe, and safety is for many the very justification of the existence of a state — and we have known that since Thomas Hobbes. But then, the failures of twentieth century revolutionary ideologies have also taught us that “order without life” is tantamount to the “tranquility of the graveyard”, to quote Czech philosopher Jan Patočka, one of the signatories of Charter 77. This is why the Euro Cup organised by France had to take place, even though some strict protective measures were taken, including the now famous but at the time much reviled “fan zones”. And then, now that numerous cultural events are being cancelled on the Riviera — Rihanna’s concert is only one of them — what are the mid- and long-term horizons of security measures? Are we bound, just like it is now happening in Belgium, to not carry bags and not drive our cars to celebrate our National day? Now, tomorrow, and the day after tomorrow?
Some voices, more insistent on the meaning of the “islamisation of radicalism”, to use Olivier Roy’s formula, are pointing to the fact that the ideology of Daesh — in whose name all the recent terrorist attacks in France have been conducted — constitutes some form of new transnational utopia, one that offers to “suburban youth a sacralisation of the hatred of society, a hatred resulting from a feeling of social and economic exclusion, injustice and humiliation; and to middle-class youth, an answer to the vacuum of authority, the distaste for oneself or another form of anomia” (Farhad Khosrokhavar).
Education and social economic inclusion will thus be of utmost importance, as rightly emphasised by the European Parliament’s Report on the prevention of radicalisation. Beyond the centres for de-radicalisation that are yet to open in France, nations and communities of people will thus have to rediscover what binds them together, all of them.

Published in Macau Daily Times, July 22nd 2016

Kapok: Fooling the Fools

It is indeed always moving to see the rich and powerful coming to the rescue of the rule of law, or more exactly the rule by law, which has to be amended because it no longer suits the interests of the happy few. The proposed alteration to the Land Law is a superb lobbying operation in the name — name only — of the general interest adorned by distorted legal, economic and political arguments. It would amount to a good laugh if this human comedy did not involve billions of MOP and the healthy development of the city at a time of renewed challenges, hence the dramatic turn of the whole story.

From a strictly aesthetic perspective, it does follow the three unity rules of neoclassical drama: a unity of action (land developers failing to develop land plots), a unity of time (25 years of provisory land concessions) and a unity of place (well-situated land plots never opened to public tendering promising juicy returns). The ending of the play should be obvious: if you meet the deadline, you get wealthier; if you miss it, you forfeit your future gains and hand back the concessions. The problem is: the parties disagree on who is to blame for the failure.
The story of the 113 idle plots of land first surfaced back in 2009 thanks to a report released by the Land, Public Works and Transport Bureau (DSSOPT). In 2010-2011, 48 of these plots were recognised as not having been developed solely due to the inaction of the land grantees, and were thus meant to be recovered by the government at the leases’ expiration. Sixty-five were excluded because responsibility was shared, and the lack of proper regulatory work and planning by the government had impacted the delay. The Land Law was passed in 2013, and new constraints were imposed: article 48 states that “provisory concessions [of maximum 25 years] cannot be renewed.”
With a new government being sworn in December 2014, the formerly dozing DSSOPT sprang into action, and thus land plots started to be repossessed. In June 2015, the new Secretary for Transport and Public Works, Raimundo do Rosário, made it public that out of 48 land plots, 16 had been excluded from recovery. Even though a public hearing on the case was denied in the legislature, a CCAC enquiry commissioned by the Chief Executive concluded that the only dubious aspect of the story was the lack of “proactive, systematic, and scientific communication” about the exemptions that were deemed perfectly legitimate. This was despite the fact that some legislators were shown to have directly benefited from the technical derogations, such as Angela Leong, Chui Sai Cheong and Vitor Cheung Lup Kwan. Since then, other plots have been recovered, more are at risk and court actions do not seem to favour developers.
The legislator leading the charge for a revision to the Land Law, or more precisely a retroactive annexed interpretation of the law, is no other than Gabriel Tong. Mr Tong is an academic (acting dean of the law department at UMAC!), but he is also an appointed legislator and a partner in a law firm. He voted in favour of the Land Law in 2013 and now claims he was “deceived” at the time: I thought that these guys got their job because of their expertise? And can we be 100% sure that he has no conflict of interest in proposing the amendments? And then the developers would not be interested in (necessarily limited) compensations but rather to deliver on their promise? Why not earlier? Why act at best in the mid-2000s (UNESCO heritage dates to 2005), thus crippling the development of the city after the real-estate downturn of 1994?
By my own calculation, based on the market, the initial land fee, the premiums and today’s construction costs, they don’t want to pass on 300% return! When there is only one team on the soccer field, I don’t see the point in providing it with extra time after July 31!

Published on Macau Daily Times, July 8th 2016