Kapok: Yellow is the new red

In a recent op-ed published in the South China Morning Post, renowned blogger Jason Ng draws an instructive parallel between the on-going Yellow Vests Movement in France and Hong Kong’s 2014 Occupy Movement, also identified as the Umbrella Movement.

Interestingly enough, Jason’s piece can be read under two separate titles. On Jason’s blog, the emphasis is on the balanced examination of the differences and similarities, and the conclusion clearly leans towards aporia: “Same Color, Different Path”. In the Post however, the editor obviously chose to put the stress on the argument that a more “violent” path could have yielded greater results in the case of Hong Kong:  “What France’s ‘yellow vests’ can teach Hong Kong activists about political protests and the use of violence”. Is it an over-interpretation? There is only one certainty: Jason, who happens to be a lawyer, is no violence apologist, quite the contrary!

On the side of similarities, he stresses the identical yellow color (on the umbrella and the safety vests); the key role played by social media in organizing the demos; the lack of a clearly established leadership and thus the “self-organized” attribute of the movements; the same exasperation felt by demonstrators towards traditional elites overly inclined to design pro-(big)business policies; gaping and growing social inequalities, seen, in both cases, as the “deep-rooted economic woes” [in Hong Kong and France] fueling the movements “beneath the surface”; and of course the unexpected character of the whole unravelling, because of the setting, the magnitude and the impact these occurrences are having or have had on their respective communities and far beyond.

On the side of differences, Jason firstly points to violence and rioting in France vs. peaceful resistance and civic disobedience in Hong Kong—politically grounded creative destruction vs. moral high ground; then there is the divide in political culture, with France being credited for being the birthplace of “revolution” and having a long record of regime change brought about by popular uprisings whereas Hong Kong is described as a community primarily concerned by prosperity and stability—hence the difference in popular support; and finally, of course, the dissimilitude of political regimes and accountability, with French decision-makers having to factor popular support if they wish to be (re-)elected whereas Hong Kong governing bodies primarily answer to Beijing and Xi Jinping’s strongman leadership does not seem to encourage constructive responses to pressure coming from the streets.

In this very balanced depiction, the critical difference has more to do with the political setting and who the leaders have to answer to rather than the use of violence and its hypothetical superior “benefits” in terms of results. Popular sovereignty is the key and indeed the whole Occupy Movement was triggered by the extreme frustration at the political reform package backed by the central authorities.

Actually there is an equal feeling of “unfairness” in both cases, something that Jason Ng does not emphasize enough, especially in relation to the “high hope” people had for the reforms that were supposed to be carried out. It is precisely the discrepancy between the expectations and the bitter reality that allowed deep-rooted resentments to surface, in turn further fueling this acute feeling of unfairness.

In Hong Kong, the betrayal originated in the broken promise of universal suffrage. In France, the exasperation is arising from the perceived treachery of a young and untainted president who had pledged after his election to replace the “old world,” the one in which political elites had lost the sense of common good: he is now the “president of the rich”! Indeed, the Yellow Vests map of protests does not correspond to any traditional form of contestation, and beyond the apparent concessions made by the government to restore “social harmony,” it is the temptation of authoritarian populism that is becoming pressing, even more so now that representative bodies, trade unions and political parties alike, have been declared irrelevant by both the sitting government and the protesters. Similar symptoms in different settings, pointing to the same crisis of liberal values!  

Published in Macau Daily Times on December 14, 2018

Analysis: Serving the citizens, really?

For years we have complained that the policy address was a mere exercise in shortsightedness resting on a catalogue of administrative measures, mostly expressed in quantitative terms. Quality, so it seems, was always less of a concern as long as targets were announced as having been met and social sweeteners were on the rise: the wealth-partaking scheme basically doubled since its inception in 2008.

A somewhat complete review, let alone an effective and courageous assessment of past deeds, has always been absent or so cosmetic that it boiled down to complacent bragging. Pending issues, delayed policy-making or blunt failures are never discussed, and the “looking back” (huigu) part of the policy address was always, and is still very much, narrowly understood and defined.

We have argued time and time again that without any form of critical thinking, convincing the mind and winning the heart of the people would prove impossible. All these businessmen-turned-politicians who govern us should know better: business textbooks are full of half-baked recipes to turn managers into leaders, control freaks into inspirational visionaries, plumbers into architects.

Clearly, family-run businesses striving because of oligopolistic positions and privileged access to land do not abide by the same rules, but they can read, right? If they want to stay on the pragmatic side, they can simply follow the advice of Sir Winston Churchill, who aptly remarked, “Success is never final. Failure is never fatal. It is the courage to continue that counts.” Reality does bite, and sweeping pressing issues under the rug will only translate into distracting tactics.

But they could also go for more heavy-lifting reading, as both Li Keqiang and Wang Qishan, respectively China’s premier and vice-president, are said to have recommended to communist cadres the study of de Tocqueville’s “The Old Regime and the Revolution.” The point being that reform is needed if revolution is to be avoided, but that deciding what and how to reform are the key questions, something even democratic governments around the world, obsessed with procedures and plagued by elite reproduction, had somehow forgotten to prioritize.

In today’s China, reforming so-called “mass organizations”—the engagement with society—has indeed become a priority given the regime wants to fully capitalize on the effective gains of popularity derived from the sweeping and far-reaching war against corruption. Getting rid of corrupt officials does create expectations: from now on, things are going to be different; and if they are not, what’s the point? I wonder if the Macau representatives at the National’s People Congress and Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference are really doing their homework when they visit Beijing in March every year.

To be fair, in his first genuine policy address—the one delivered in November 2010 and not earlier in March, necessarily more in the continuity of his predecessor—Chui Sai On did announce quite a radical break from the past. These were still the years in the aftermath of the 2007/2008 global financial crisis, and thus the idea of recovery was shaping the rationales. Moreover, the official motto in Hu Jintao’s China was to develop a “society of moderate prosperity,” one in which inequalities would be the focus of policy- making and redistributive measures would take the lead.

No wonder, then, that Chui insisted on caring for the ones in need at the bottom as well as nurturing the majority in the middle. The very idea of not antagonizing the middle-class, which had grown not only in number but also in skills—wanting more say in the political decisions that were made in their name—derived from a precise analysis of the latest demographic trends. Hence the new fad around “political consultations,” the perfect substitute to effective democratic changes.

Promoting the former secretary for culture and social affairs indeed made perfect sense, even more so because Chui had been associated with “social concerns” since 1992, the year he became legislator for the first time.

Besides, the measures that were to be taken had a renewed ambition: they would take place in a corruption-free environment—the previous administration had been irremediably tainted by the Ao Man Long scandal—and would be based on carefully weighted initiatives. The claim to scientificity was not new, but the framing was novel: we were to have a “sunshine government” (yanguang zhengfu), and “scientific decision-making” (kexue juece) would preside over the government’s decisions. That sounded awfully close to the jargon used in the first system, but for the first (and unique) time the wealth-partaking scheme went down by MOP1,000 for permanent residents. In many respects it was both a courageous and reasonable move to make. People get used to receiving sweeteners, even though this is in total contradiction to means-tested policies that aim at correcting social inequalities.

Unfortunately, corruption was not wiped out – far from it: former Prosecutor General Ho Chio-meng (15 years in the job!) was arrested in February 2016 and one year later sentenced to 21 years’ imprisonment on multiple accounts of fraud, abuse and trafficking of power, money laundering, etc. Prior to that, the Perks’ Bill, which was eventually ditched in May 2014 after 20,000 people had taken to the streets, had shown in crude light that policy-making, far from being scientifically grounded, could be construed as the exclusive playing field for a small coterie that moreover considered itself impervious to supervision. At the time, I used the word “kleptocracy” to characterize the form of government Macau was enjoying.

The whole lot of governmental secretaries was replaced in December 2014, and promises were made in the policy address that cronies and traditional patrons would have to lay low for a while, not being able to concurrently hold more than three advising positions to the government and for no more than two terms. That corresponded to the time when the economy was ailing—gross gaming revenues had started their decline in June that year and would continue their nosedive up until the summer of 2016. Old habits die hard: nothing much changed as far as governance was concerned—except for security—and in the wake of the disastrous management of deadly typhoon Hato, Chui’s team became the least popular government ever in the short history of the Macau SAR!

Today, we have a longer time frame for policies to be implemented step-by-step, thanks to the SAR’s five-year development plan (2016-2020), and all seems to be going fine: last year, the Chief Executive announced that 80 percent of the overall plan had already been achieved and this year the percentage stands at 92 percent. Fiscal reserves have reached a whooping MOP555 billion: that’s close to five years budgeted public expenditures! And Macao is set to become the richest place per capita by 2020! But then of course, the median salary is only MOP16,000 per month, three times what it was in 2000, whereas GDP has grown almost sixfold in the same period!

Ignorance is bliss though: the last time we had a Gini Index was in 2013! And then, do you really feel like you’re in New York, Berlin or Tokyo when walking the streets of Macau? Is the public hospital in the SAR on par with the one in Singapore? Is the skyline comparable to Doha? And then let’s not mention the elephant in the room: what about democratic reform? Is the “+2+2+100” the only steps that could be taken in 20 long years? And then why was the latest UN Universal Periodic Review so critical regarding Macau’s discriminatory practices? Core principles (Macau people governing Macau and a high degree of autonomy) have value only if they are incorporated into a vision that will in turn translate into reality.

Published in Macau Daily Times on November 23, 2018

Kapok: At a snail's pace

Looking back at the titles of my column over the past five years, I have now exhausted almost every possible expression to convey the idea of “slow” and “minimalistic” change when it comes to characterising the pace of institutional change in our city. At times, stronger wordings crept in the body text: missed-opportunity, unsubstantial, meaningless and even failure — as in total discrepancy between the proclaimed intent and the effective outcome. Mine being an opinion column penned by a free-wheeling academic, it is only logical that my take on things could be legitimately dismissed as being only a standpoint, one among many others, and this despite the many arguments provided.

With that in mind, let’s turn to the reply given by Sonia Chan, the Secretary for administration and justice who just presented her action plan for next year, to the query of legislators Sulu Sou and Au Kam San who expressed their concern regarding the lack of progress in democratising the political system of Macao. Even though Mr Sou was kind enough to add “since 2012” in his question, Mrs Chan insisted that indeed the reform of 2012 (additional two directly-elected seats and two indirectly- elected seats in the legislature as well as 100 extra representatives in the election committee of the Chief Executive) was “one step taken towards political development” — she actually refrained from using the word democracy or democratic, unlike her predecessor. She then argued that too “frequent changes” could actually have an adverse effect on the “social and economic development” of the SAR, and that it was thus better to “consolidate the outcomes” of the 2012 changes and further study the effects of these before moving forward again.

In similar fashion to the discussion related to the establishment of a new municipal level of government, Mrs Chan was very bluntly dismissive of Sou and Au’s challenging objections, whereas they were merely asking for a plan and agenda. For Mrs Chan, these are only “matters of opinion” — two, among many others. But are they really?

First, the very fact that an additional “two directly- elected seats” represent a marginal 7% increase in the overall number of seats in the legislature would tend to acknowledge the idea of a very small step taken in 2012 — the two additional indirectly-elected seats cannot really be counted as a “progress” as both slots were filled by candidates running unopposed, thus even further diluting the meagre advance. We can note furthermore that in the transcript of Mrs Chan’s response, there is no indication that she considers the December 2016 changes in the Electoral Law for the legislature as a further development.

Second, the constitutional changes of 2012 have already affected two rounds of legislative election (in 2013 and 2017), and thus a new cycle of constitutional amendments would only affect the next election (in 2021): can this be deemed too frequent? If 2012 is considered as a step, then it calls for other steps and by definition, even though the pace is slower than one of radical change — no running — it entails further developments, sooner than later if one does not want to fall.

Third, what have the very limited constitutional amendments of 2012 been conducive to? Further competition and thus pressure on senior officials? Think Fernando Chui running unopposed in 2014 and his brother becoming the vice-president of the Assembly in 2017. Further accountability of senior officials? Think Prosecutor general Ho Chio Meng being put behind bars and Fong Soi-kun deciding to raise Typhoon 8 signals from his home.

Fourth, if it is only a matter of opinion, why weren’t there (many) other legislators to support Mrs Chan and her suggestion that further democratisation can impede “socio-economic development” — read, “democracy is disruptive and we don’t want that in our harmonious society”? If they agree, which I do not doubt, why did not they say it loud and clear? And then, how do they intend to make the system truly accountable?

As once noted by William Blake, “prudence is a rich, ugly old maid courted by incapacity.”

Published in Macau Daily Times on November 24, 2017

Kapok: The pitfalls of populism

It does not happen very often but Mr Fong Chi Keong has a point when he warns the government of the dangers of “populism” in Macao, adding, in plenary session of the Legislative Assembly, that the issue of how the government deals with public opinion and democracy has to be resolved properly.

Topping his concerns is the situation in Europe and what he calls “the paradox of democracy”. From his own reckoning, this so-called paradox was coined by analysts, an admission that in itself is worth stressing as Mr Fong has repeatedly characterised experts and scholars as “useless”. For him the contradiction lies in the overpowering capacity of the people to influence policy-making whereas very few citizens actually master the complexity and the ins and outs of institutional politics and economic development, and simply speaking, lack the ability to form an informed opinion. The consequence being on the one hand that people’s participation is seen as both “excessive” and “blind” (his words), and on the other that citizens can easily be manipulated.

Mr Fong then highlights the two main aptitudes that a government must display if populism is to be warded off. The first is for a government to face its responsibilities. Failing to do so, in his mind, will put the people at a loss, fuel social hostility and ultimately help populism blossom.

Mr Fong’s main target appears to be the excessive recourse to “public consultations”, in which he sees a distortion of the political system, an indication of the weakness of the government’s capacity to change things and a clear lack of self-confidence. And then, if the government does eventually uphold its responsibilities, it needs to act as a mediator — a second necessary skill — in order to mitigate the adverse effects of ongoing developments. Here, the main example given by legislator Fong is the conciliation role the government needs to play in labour disputes, at a time when labour movements have grown in autonomy and thus more demanding.

This is all very well, and being French and having just participated in the first round of France’s presidential election that many have dubbed a “triumph of populism”, I can concur: when “populism” wins, public policies rooted in reason and social stability are put at risk. But then this is one of the characteristics of democracy: sovereignty resides in the people, and even though it might look messy, it also means that people can rebel without resorting to revolution by using the legal channels of election, even if it means breaking away from the European Union or putting in the White House a whimsical twitting-maniac as the most powerful leader of the planet. Is it challenging? Hell yeah! Are democratic institutions crumbling? Well, Brexit is being engineered by Theresa May along the idea of a “deep and special relationship” with the European Union and Mr Trump has experienced a few setbacks regarding the scrapping of the Obamacare, enforcing illegal travel bans or even letting go the North American Free Trade Agreement.

What does Mr Fong actually mean by populism in a place where the Chief Executive runs unopposed and only 41% of the legislators are returned via universal (competitive) suffrage? What does he mean by the government not “assuming responsibility”? By his own token, given that Mr Fong was one of the most vocal opponents of the domestic violence law (ultimately passed) and the staunchest supporter of the 2014 perks’ bill for senior officials (ultimately withdrawn following the most important street demonstrations since 1989), what would “taking his responsibility” mean? My guess is a bit of courage and for him to resign.

The root cause of populism is not democracy: it is the perpetuation of illegitimate and plutocratic community leaders who have proven time again their incapacity to make the right choices for the common good. In a democracy or even in a result-driven autocracy benefiting the majority, the paradox can somehow be resolved more or less peacefully…

Published in Macau Daily Times, April 28, 2017

Kapok: Frustrating exhilaration

Against all odds, the democratic fervour that has engulfed Hong Kong in the past two years appears far from being abated—quite the contrary.

The clear-cut victory of the pro-democracy camp in the geographic constituencies in September and the advent of a young boisterous generation of self-determination-leaning legislators served as a proof that the spirit of the 2014 Occupy Central with Love and Peace and the subsequent Umbrella Movement had not waned but instead transformed into a fiery force able to rock the boat of institutional politics from within.

Then came the so-called “oath-taking controversy” triggered by legislators-elect Baggio Leung and Yau Wai-ching, that ultimately led to them being unseated by Hong Kong’s High Court on November 15. In the meantime, the pro-establishment camp had ridiculed itself by engaging in self-deprecating bickering and absenteeism and the central authorities had been somehow convinced that a heavy-handed intervention in the form of a secretly sought interpretation of the Basic Law would “scare the chickens by killing the monkeys”.

Up to 15 legislators could fall victim of the ruling, if Wang Zhenmin, the legal advisor of the Hong Kong Liaison Office, was to be trusted. Ultimately, “only” four others are being submitted to a new judicial review instigated by CY Leung and his Secretary for Justice on December 2, including veteran activist “Long Hair” Leung Kwok-hung and Edward Yiu Chung-yim, the newly elected assistant professor representing the Architectural, Surveying, Planning and Landscape (ASPL) functional constituency.

Yet the whole process had but two consequences: on the one hand, the pro-democracy camp has regrouped and is now displaying a resolute unity in denouncing the illegitimacy of Beijing’s ruling: by equating the provocative independence drive of a few with the self-determination-leaning stance of the many, what was originally a discordant aggregate had been turned into a united bloc; on the other hand, the public is becoming ever more wary of the situation, and the public sentiment index released by Hong Kong University on December 15 indicates a plunge of 7.1 points compared to November—Government Appraisal faring the worst—with a level that is becoming dangerously close to the low tide of January 2016 when the disappearance of the Causeway Bay booksellers started to unravel.

No doubt that the announcement, on December 9, by CY Leung himself that he would not run—allegedly for “family reasons”—for a second term in the coming March Chief Executive election was intended as a gesture of conciliation or even a disguised admission of failure: the long-term dislike of and distrust in “689” (the number of votes he received in 2012) aka “the wolf” was yet again underscored on December 13, when another HKU survey revealed that Leung is now the least appreciated Chief Executive since the handover, at only 35 points, beating even the dwindling approval rate of Tung Chee-hwa at the time of the combined SARS and Article 23 crisis!

But if there is one thing that the Hong Kong electorate has learnt from these troubling times it is that their voice will only be faithfully defended by a handful few, whatever the context and the venue, and even though these few cannot be the majority by institutional design they have to become more numerous: on December 11, the pro-democracy camp thus won more than a quarter of the seats on the Election Committee that will designate the next Chief Executive in March 2017. 325 seats out of 1,200! In the election committee subsectors of Social Welfare, Information Technology, Health Services, Legal, Education and Higher Education, the pro-democrats won all the seats and they won a majority in accountancy, ASPL, medical and engineering—all of these knowledge-based!

Out of curiosity I checked if this could ever happen in Macao—thus allowing some form of competition—but unfortunately, even in the more spirited social or education sectors, pro-establishment figures rule and command the votes, including present-day Secretaries and soon-to-be recipients of the Golden and Silver Lotus(es). In Macao, nothing short of universal suffrage can change the system.

Published in Macau Daily Times, December 16, 2016

Kapok: Between Scylla and Charybdis

It is again that time of the year when the executive power in Macao is trying very hard to look accountable to the people: the Chief Executive (CE) solemnly and rather painfully delivers his policy address to the Assembly for the year to come, then takes questions, and subsequently the five secretaries, who make up his high-powered government, take the stage consecutively to further detail the action plan in their respective area.

This year, as usual, the exercise starts on November 15 and concludes on December 6—that is three full weeks! Now add the three to four months of preparation for that ordeal—at least on the side of the civil servants asked to work out the details that will allow their revered superior to address any possible Q&A—and you have a real measure of the supposed importance of the whole operation that has all the apparent characteristics of a government’s programme.

In pure theory, the CE should not have to do this: after all, he is elected neither by the people nor by the legislature. Given the actual structure of government, he is only accountable to the 400 members of the election committee that designates him—although on both occasions Mr Chui was “running” unopposed—and to the Central People’s Government that appoints him—in that respect, a much more demanding patron. But article 65 of the Macao Basic Law states that “the Government of the Macao Special Administrative Region” is “accountable to the Legislative Assembly of the Region” and that “it shall present regular policy addresses to the Assembly” and “answer questions raised by members of the Assembly”.

So here we are, without clear rational justification, listening to programmatic declarations that, for the most part, will either fail to materialise on time, fail to materialise properly or fail to materialise at all. Examples are numerous: social and economic housing, bridges, light rail transport, Coloane hospital, diversification of the economy, reform of the judicial system,  “scientific policy-making” and “sunshine government”, and of course a “gradual” establishment of “a democratic decision-making process” that was conceived, back in November 2010, as the pivotal condition to making fewer blunders and being resolutely less corrupt.

The show follows a very predictable script in which, among other things, business-oriented legislators lambast the unjustifiable increase in the number of civil servants, decried as contradicting the professed drive to streamline and rationalise public administration. Maybe so, but does anybody provide elements of comparison? The ratio of civil servants to the population or to the labour force is actually double what we find in Hong Kong and Singapore, respectively… And a good 34% of the civil servants are employed by the security forces in Macao!

Turning to the budget, vociferous critics denounce the prospective 12.6% increase in expenditure for the coming year at a time of economic slowdown, targeting again the ever expanding costs in personnel. Maybe, or maybe not—actually there should be more investments given the vast public reserves—but who cares? The very same legislators will vote the budget without any amendment; the very same legislators never request mid-term reports on the budget, and it is rather ironic that while the First permanent commission examines the 2017 law on public finance, it is the Third commission that reviews the execution of the past budget (2015). The left hand is not exactly aware of what the right one is doing, and what indeed matters for most lawmakers is whether or not they will get their fair share of uncompetitive public procurement—something not discussed openly in plenary sessions!

When Ng Kuok Cheong walks out of the chamber to protest against the response of the CE who considers that political development and universal suffrage are solely decided and initiated by Beijing, he is actually putting in crude light the very fact that neither the government nor most of the legislators can be trusted for things to really change. Small circles are ultimately vicious ones.

Published in Macau Daily Times, November 25, 2016

Kapok: Fair... and competitive?

On December 30th, the official reports on the latest elections of both the Legislative Assembly (AL) and the Chief Executive (CE) were made public. At long last – as this took a whopping 16 months since the CE selection and no less than 27 months for the AL elections! For the latter, the 39-page report (in Chinese) was penned by the Commission in February 2014 and yet only released publicly more than half-way through the legislature’s mandate: how can this be justified, if not for democratic principles, at least for the sake of transparency?

The only time democracy 民主 is mentioned in the Macao Basic Law – no disconcerting mention of universal suffrage in our own BL – it is openly associated with “openness”. It furthermore appears, quite ironically, in the Annex dedicated to the selection process of the CE, which reads that the members (300 initially and now 400) of the Election Committee that designates the CE should be chosen according to an electoral law designed “in accordance with the principles of democracy and openness.”
Initially, the reports did not attract much attention. Maybe because of the timing: who wants to write (beyond a quasi repeat of the content) or even read about elections on December 31st? Maybe because of the lack of urgency after so many months on the back-burner. Maybe because of the content: only six meagre “suggestions” for each, with the disproportionate ambition – in the case of the AL – to “improve competitiveness of indirect elections and fairness” in the overall electoral process.
Since then, the debate has flared slightly. On January 4th, Jason Chao, from Macao Conscience and the New Macao Association, denounced the reports as “biased, misleading and unfair.” In the case of the AL review, it was decried for disproportionally targeting some cases while downplaying others that were later actually convicted of “vote buying”. Furthermore, Jason Chao indicated that the early promotion of some of the outgoing CE’s key political proposals – the construction of 28,000 public housing units in particular – could be construed as misuse of public resources. This first salvo was accurately and extensively covered in the Chinese press, including All About Macau and Cheng Pou, with the notable exception of Macao Daily News.
Actually, Macao Daily News presented an excellent idea on January 12th to interview some noteworthy unsuccessful candidates of 2013. Among them Agnès Lam of Civil Watch (5,225 votes), Kuan Vai Lam of Caring for Macao (5,323 votes), Paul Pun of the Betterment of our Community (2,306 votes) and Hong Weng Kuan of the Promotion of the Citizens’ Rights (only 848 votes… significant, really?) – but of course no Liberals (3,227 votes) headed by… Jason Chao. Although Agnès Lam explored in more detail certain aspects of the reports –casting doubts on the efficiency of the proposals to tackle some aspects of corruption or emphasising the problematic absence of a law for political parties [see my own take on that] – the overall message conveyed by Macao Daily News was one of consensus (how surprising!): the campaign period should not be restricted to 15 days, rather be extended, for the informal part, to the time when lists of candidates are being recognised (at the very least) and possibly up to six months before election day.
I have no doubt that an extended and reconfigured campaign period would help: the debate of ideas requires time and opportunity for reason to have a chance. Breaking away from rather outdated traditional modes of mobilisation based on narrow-interest associations – an open door for corruption and populist excesses – supposes it as a precondition. A well-­harnessed modernity demands it. A more focused Electoral Commission commands it. But then, what about the other proposals? Is providing the contact details of the members of the CE Electoral Committee enough to encourage competition? At least for the AL, we will have a public consultation. Hopefully, the discussion has just begun.

Published in Macau Daily Times, January 15th 2016

Kapok: Going back to politics

Politics in many a modern polity seems to have become taboo; a notion somewhat perceived as coming from the past, when ideologies reigned and ultimately proved to be the inspiration for some of the deadliest man-made catastrophes of the twentieth century. Religions are today being used as political repertoire by some organizations for which “–ism” soon become “–ist”, but far from speculating on the specific workings of better tomorrows and more egalitarian polities, radical political movements inspired by twisted reinterpretation of religion are “merely” contesting an existing political order and thus protest more than they propose. Clearly, it is a mistake to allow radicals exclusive recourse to politics.
In Macao, politics has often been reduced to politicking — the last vivid memory we have of radicalism dates back to 1966. Since the handover, most of the promises made by our executive-led government have provided perfect illustrations for the expression “vanishing in thin air”. Simply looking at policy addresses, the buzzword for the economy up to 2003 had been “restructuring”, and starting as early as November 2003, less than two years after the liberalization of gambling, this was replaced by the sacred requirement for “diversification”. In 2015, we are still dominated by the imperative to diversify, only this time under a period of “adjustment” corresponding to a “new normal” with an ultimate objective of “sustainable development”, and this no longer for the sole benefit of Macao but China. Mind you, we belong to a wider community and syphoning hundreds of billions of renminbi (the people’s money) for more than a decade had to come at a price, especially when the new head of state regards the fight against corruption as a question of survival.
Talking about “diversification”, the economist Albano Martins recently reminded us that total earnings from the MICE industry for a whole year equated to the revenues of “three hours of gambling”! No wonder Lionel Leong is betting on the development of traditional medicine in Hengqin as the way to go: not in Macao and not now!
In many democracies, promises made during electoral campaigns get buried when confronted by the reality of governing in an ever more interdependent global environment. Let’s be honest, quite a significant number of pledges made while on the campaign trail are rather theatrical: a former French president, Jacques Chirac, once said that promises were only binding for those who listen to them, and he got elected twice! Yet, issues get debated, alternatives envisioned and if a government defaults too much on its commitments, it ultimately gets sacked. In August last year while running unopposed for a new mandate, the last point on Mr Chui’s program was to further democratic development in Macao. Of course, this is only second to “sunshine policies” (meaning transparent and without corruption) and “scientific governance” (meaning based on rationality, due processes and benchmarking).
The greatest achievements in democratic development in Macao has been the suppression of the electoral registration card in order to fight electoral corruption, and the addition of a few seats in both the Legislative Assembly and the Chief Executive Election committee in order to improve representation of the people. Even mitigated by more popular forms of consultation, I sincerely doubt that these have proven successful, on either account.
Now, the newly appointed secretary for Administration and Justice, Sonia Chan, is promising to make the “indirectly elected” seats at the Assembly more competitive, the consultative committees of all hues more diverse and to establish a renewed form of municipal organization. What is at stake, and this is precisely why we have a brand new government, is to partially get rid of “vested interests”, the one thing that has crippled the healthy development of Macao for the past 15 years. But, beyond the letter of the Basic Law, why be scared of entrusting these revamped entities with political power? Just as legal changes are often not a matter of public opinion, as perfectly pointed out by Leonel Alves, grooming a new generation of leaders requires they be entrusted with authority.


Published in Macau Daily Times, April 3 2015

Kapok: Expected Expectations

Nobody can deny it: the announcement of the new government line-up last Monday did not come as a surprise, quite the opposite. Secretaries’ and other senior officials’ names had been the talk of the town since early November. First on social media platforms, and then splashed on the web-based liberal Aamacau.com (All About Macau, 論盡媒體) on November 8th and ultimately confirmed, in a Pravda-like announcement, on November 11th as the masthead of the front page of the Macau Daily News. Interesting to note that the city’s main pro-government and pro-China daily has lost part of its edge—it was late compared to new electronic media—and yet journalists and commentators only went berserk after the list had been anointed by the establishment’s mouthpiece, here trusted almost like the “official gazette”—can anybody imagine the Ta Kung Pao or the Oriental Daily News announcing the new government beforehand in Hong Kong and everybody else taking it for granted?
Before the summer, rumours were rife as to who would be the chosen ones, but the idea of a complete fresh start was remote, to say the least. The retirement perks bill, despite its fiasco, had confirmed that some kind of musical chairs game was at play, and the names of Lionel Leong Vai Tak as well as that of Alexis Tam Chon Weng were in the mind if not on the lips of everybody slightly interested in Macao politics. But then, the rationale was that continuity would be preserved, and that “good soldiers”, even though they had proven themselves dully unimaginative, would stay on. Even Lau Si Io, the secretary for Transport and Public Works, most probably the most unanimously derided high official, was believed to keep his portfolio. Truly, who would accept the job that is at the heart of most livelihood issues in Macao— transport and housing, and in that order, if the government’s think tank is to be trusted—and still ignominiously tainted by the Ao Man-long scandal of 2006? No wonder that Raimundo Arrais do Rosário had to be called back from his decade long spell in Europe representing Macao…
Why then the need for such an apparent “clean slate” approach? First and quite ironically, because Chui Sai On himself was returned unopposed in his Chief Executive position, thus demeaning the very nature of an election by making it totally uncompetitive. Rigidity on the one hand was calling for more flexibility on the other. Second, because a real popular demand does exist and moreover was taken into account by Chui the candidate. On the side of popular demand, the unfairness of the retirement perks bill pushed 20,000 people onto the streets in May, ultimately forcing the government to bury the bill for good. And despite the many hurdles and intimidations faced by the organisers of the Macau civic referendum of late August, close to 9,000 citizens took part in this independent probing of citizens’ preferences. Eventually, the whole of Chui’s “campaign” was about him having heard the demands of the people, as expressed by the more than 100,000 suggestions and opinions sent to his office while “on the campaign trail”. And third, the Hong Kong SAR situation, whatever the perception, positive or negative, has had a corroding effect on the self-confidence of the powers that be, and in order to prevent a possible stalemate, preemptively providing a resolute stance for (orderly) change appears to be a smart move—beyond the real necessity to do so.
And then came Li Fei, the chairman of the Macau Basic Law Committee and the Deputy Secretary-General of the National People’s Congress Standing Committee, the very same man who came to Hong Kong in late August to explain the ruling of the standing committee over universal suffrage in our sister SAR, and now most notorious for having said that “Only one person [candidate] does not make an election, but too many is not proper either”. While attending a forum in Macao this week, he remarked that contrary to what some people think, deep-seated problems in Macao do not lie in the nature of political governance or stem from the fact that Macao is not democratic enough, but rather derive from Macao’s “own limitations”, the system inherited from the Portuguese colonial administration and other factors related to social and economic development. He then made it clear that “the overwhelming dominance of gambling in Macao is not in line with the overall interest of Macao” and furthermore that it is not in the “socioeconomic safety, stability and developmental interest of the mainland and the whole nation”. What is thus asked from Macao is to reinvent itself with much less gambling and much more patriotism. That for sure requires a whole new team!

Published in Macau Daily Times on December 5th 2014.

Kapok: Drawing the line

I must admit it is often tricky to “draw the line between academic research, political commentary and direct political intervention”—to quote my former employer, and for sure, the easiest way to draw that line is to make sure that there can be no conflict between these three forms of endeavor by just eliminating the first one, even though your mission is precisely to make sure that everything academic is protected under your watch.
If you don’t write about politics from an academic perspective, then there are few chances that you will be sought after to provide political commentary and for sure any “direct political intervention” will be seen as “just” the act of any citizen, unless you become yourself an “activist”, that it is to say a recognized figure of a political movement.
Many questions arise from that “easiest” path: is it worthy of a university to let go of sophistication and decide that all intellectual undertakings should be governed by the most basic law of electricity of “on or off”, depending on the circumstances? Is it even effective in the short-term and can the expected trade-off, set at a few tens of millions, be “safely” secured? Is it sustainable in terms of image and standing in the community, and if yes, how so? From a moral standpoint, the “easiest” path is plain wrong because the end justifies the means, but then, even from a practical and almost cynical angle, what are the actual benefits going to be?
Now, regarding my own “convictions”. I know no political scientist who is not a democrat at heart. How can one studying “power in a social context” and deciphering the best forms of government be in favor of totalitarianism or even authoritarianism given our dark and traumatizing twentieth century? And even if we let go of the old categories, everybody knows, even the highest officials of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the dangers of plutocracy—the government of, by and for the wealthiest—and kleptocracy—the government of confiscators/thieves. Why would Xi Jinping engage in such a wide-sweeping campaign to fight corruption if that was not the case? Why would close to 200 members of the Central Committee of the CCP, including a few from the elite Politburo, fall for good because of that new operation to catch “flies as well as tigers”?
Sure thing, “democracy” is not as popular as it used to be in the People’s Republic, say up to March 2012 when then Premier Wen Jiabao emotionally spoke about the need for political reform following democratic imperatives.
In fact, democracy seems pretty much the target of the “Seven Speak-Nots” defined in May 2013 as the taboo subjects that should not be discussed openly in the press or by academic circles (universal values, civil society, citizen rights, judicial independence, freedom of the press, past mistakes of the communist party, and the privileged capitalist class). Should that affect Macao? Is there any Communist party in need of restructuring in Macao? Is there a party that does not want to see its capacity to rule affected by an unquestionably weakening drive to uproot corruption in its own ranks?
Being a democrat at heart does not mean that one does not know the shortcomings of democracy, especially when it comes to “efficiency” and the claim of representativeness—disenchantment arises as much in “archaeodemocracies” as in “neodemocracies”. But then, one of the things I argue in my latest “academic” paper is that the corporatist outlook of Macao’s political system inherited from the 1980s, despite or because of the liberal context, has become fairly frustrating for a locally engaged, more affluent, more professional and better-educated youth that can but all too easily blame outdated and unsuitable intermediation bodies for all the inadequate public policies catering only for segmented parts of the community. That cost me my job.

Published in Macau Daily Times, July 25th 2014

Kapok: Imperious engagement

Agreed, for society to engage with the state, the government, rules have to be prescribed and followed, and yet, engagement, on society’s part, is as much a matter of orderly procedure as it is a staple of creative novelty, especially when demands appear to fall on deaf ears on the receiving end. Few regimes in the world, with the patent exception of North Korea, openly advocate the irrelevance of the people—and even for supremo Kim the Third, it is only because he has been led to believe that he is the stellar guide and the god-like embodiment of “his” people on earth. For idealist and progressive minds, the strength and balance of a democratic regime depend on the existence of a vibrant “civil society” engaging the state, even though very often this means contesting it. This has proven true for most of the peaceful transitions from authoritarian rule to democracy, and this is equally significant in more established democratic settings, those in which citizens have started to question the validity of a purely electoral definition of democracy that only cares about citizen-voters every 4 to 5 years—what scholars dub “liberal democracy disenchantment”. Hence the fad for participatory democracy, public consultations, deliberative polling and “civil sector” partaking in government to partly compensate for the ubiquitous “careerisation” of politics. I am being cynical here, as if it was a mere instrumentalisation on the side of politicians—some kind of conspiracy to preserve the domination of the few on the many by defusing revolutionary threats—, but these forms of engagement are actually designed to restore the legitimacy of a regime that claims to be by, of and for the people.
The same rationale goes for dictatorships and for what political scientists call “anocracies”—a midway between autocracy and democracy in which vested interests compete among themselves and yet confiscate power. Whatever the regime, what matters ultimately is for ruling elite to last and moreover, for their natural or anointed inheritors to outlive them in the same capacity—here, Kim the Third is truly an exception, and even the most obscure despotic apprentice knows it. Hence the necessity for the “people” to be solicited and consulted in order to keep track of the common good, even though there are no electoral mechanisms to make the rulers accountable. Of course, the exercise has its limits, even in a place as sophisticated as China. Cao Shunli, one of the most respected and eminent “petitioners” paid this very fact with her life on March 14: arrested at Beijing International Airport on September 14 last year while on her way to Geneva to attend a human rights event, she was only indicted in December for “picking quarrels to create disturbances” and ultimately fell into a coma at the end of February because of appalling detention conditions, only to die a few weeks after. Petitioning for Cao Shunli, a law graduate, had become the only “channel” to reach a government necessarily comprehended as benevolent—her “petitioner” crusade started back in 2002 after she had been sacked from her work unit for exposing corruption in housing distribution. This time around, many believe she was actually arrested because of the two-month long sit-in she organized along 60 other petitioners in front of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to request to participate in the drafting of the ‘National Human Rights Action Plan’, as law—Chinese law—entitled her to.
In Macao, petitioning is not as lethally hazardous, but the fact that out of 900 petitions addressed to Mr Chui Sai On in 2013, only 82 have been answered directly, a bit less than 600 sent to relevant secretaries and 306 archived without any kind of reply has prompted disquieted comments by some analysts—mainly stressing that the Chief Executive was wrong to treat so lightly the ever expanding power of the people to directly voice their anxieties. I would add that first of all we would need to know a bit more about the relevance of the answers produced by the Chief Executive and his secretaries—ask legislators how their queries to the government are being timely and adequately treated… And then, why should “direct” contacts with the highest authorities via petitions or radio call-in show take precedence over “mediated” and “informed” probing coming from “concerned groups”, media and legislators?

Published in Macau Daily Times, March 21 2014

Kapok: Trust me if you can

With the cold front coming from the north, the sudden drop in temperature “holding” ground level emissions down and excessive production of fine particulates of 2.5 micrometres—the very lethal tiny bits that get deep in your lungs and are universally recognized, even by CCTV, to be a major cause in the rise of lung and cardio-vascular diseases in our modern society—, I was poised to write about the past-the-looming calamity of air pollution in Macao.

Readings in the past week were far above the 25-35 micrograms per cubic metre average daily threshold flagged by international as well as Chinese regulators: on February 13, the daily average was in the 70 µgrams/m3 and on the 17, there were peaks in the 120 µgrams/m3! We are still quite far from the 347 µgrams/m3 recorded in Beijing yesterday by the American embassy, characterizing the air in the Chinese capital as “hazardous”, but concern is salient, measurable, and cars appear to hold a significant part of the responsibility if the 20-30% drop observed after midnight and up to 8 a.m. is to be relied upon.

It is high time we move from a rather silly Air-Quality-cum-Index smiley to a more owe-inspiring Air Quality Health Index, thus indicating the short-term health risks, just like Hong Kong, inspired by Canada, did last December. This would be all the fairer to Macao as our SAR actually started recording levels of fine particulates before its Pearl River neighbor!

But fine particulates are not the only thing polluting our atmosphere, unfortunately, and these other factors are more political than scientific in nature—and yet translate into mounting and highly visible concerns as well.

First, we have a president of the Legislative Assembly, Mr Ho Iat Seng, deploring on the sidelines of a Spring festival lunch the limitations of his fellow legislators because of their lack of legal training and thus questioning their capacity to grasp the “goals” of policy-making deriving from their lack of “knowledge” and possibly some “confusion” regarding their intended role—a passing comment rather amusing regarding possible conflict of interests when one thinks that Mr Ho is concurrently the only member from Macao of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress in Beijing. Going one step further during the same agapes, Mr Chan Chak Mo, president of the second standing committee of the Assembly, even suggested that the legislators should refrain from drafting “projects” of law and let the government exclusively make law “proposals”, that would then of course be duly discussed by legislators.

If individual legislators can always be reminded of their shortcomings during plenary sessions—especially now that debates are publicly broadcasted—it is neither up to Mr Ho or Mr Chan to discuss the “legitimacy” of assemblymen and their “sacred” right of legislative initiative: none of these two august legislators is elected through universal suffrage and the Basic Law, and only it, can prescribe what is the duty of a legislator (art. 75 in that particular case). In Europe, since the Treaty of Lisbon (2009), there is such a thing called the European Citizens’ Initiative, and thus initiative of a legal act rests also directly with the citizens: do citizens need all to be trained in law? Legislative duty, unfortunately, also implies design: if Mr Chan does not feel up to the task, maybe he should either resign or hire more legal advisers. Always hiding behind the necessity for these laws to be the product of “public consultations” is a farce: governing is deciding and leading, not following. Sometimes one has actually to explain to the community why decisions need to be made even at the risk of disquieting the public mood. But in Macao, the air is too polluted by the Lao Si Lo syndrome: everybody claims that he or she “can absolutely face the public”, and then no one actually does…

Published in Macau Daily Times, February 21 2014