Kapok: What has been will be again

Not everything is about arithmetic, far from it, as Macao’s Chief Executive election clearly shows.

If numbers were all that matters, elections in Macao would seem fairer than in Hong Kong: in the case of our SAR, the CE is elected by an electoral college of 400 electors, that is to say there is one elector for every 776 registered voters (total of 310,400 registered voters at the end of 2018), whereas there is only 1 for 3,178 in Hong Kong (1,200-member strong electoral college for the CE election and 3,814,318 registered voters).

And then, even with only one candidate in Macao against three candidates in 2017 in Hong Kong, our SAR gets the upper-hand, even though the margin is less striking—basically twofold against the Fragrant Harbour. Macao has a non-competitive selection process with a single candidate and still, somehow, the ratio of electors to voters is in Macao’s favour.

In a recent piece, I made the assumption that there would be close to no change in the composition of the electoral college that is going to elect our next Chief Executive.

First, I have to admit to a slight mistake as the structure of the college will accommodate two newcomers, in terms of functions: representatives of the newly revamped Municipal Affairs Bureau will replace two Macao delegates to the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC).

And then, there should be new faces among the Macao delegates to both the National People’s Congress (NPC) and the CPPCC as both assemblies were “elected” in 2017/2018.

On the side of the NPC, we have 12 Macao representatives, but only four are actually new: Dominic Sio Chi Wai, Ng Sio Lai, Lai Sai Kei and Si Ka Lon. But these people can hardly be characterized as unfamiliar: Sio is a businessman, close associate of the present CE and a former legislator; Ng is the president of the Macau General Union of Neighbourhood Associations (Kai Fong); Lai is a vice-chairman of the Macau Chinese Educators Association; and Si is a Fujian-community leader, close associate of Mr Chan Meng Kam and currently a two-term legislator. And then, the four of them participated in the election of Chui Sai On back in 2014: Sio and Si as legislators, Lai in the education constituency and Ng in the social services constituency. Zero changes after all.

Now, looking at the CPPCC delegates, things get a bit tricky. For sure, Ng Lap Seng who got four years in a US jail for bribing UN officials and Or Wai Shuen, the chairman of Polytec Asset Holdings Limited involved in a trial over a land plot dispute with the Macao government will not be present as they have not been re-appointed to the august assembly. But out of 29 delegates for Macao, 18 are new, including O Lam, the chief of cabinet of the Chief Executive; Cheong U, the former Secretary for Social Affairs and Culture; Vong Hin Fai and Chan Hong, both sitting legislators non-competitively elected in functional constituencies; Wu Zhiliang, the president of the Macao Foundation; Leong Lai, the director of Education and Youth Affairs Bureau and; Ho Ion Sang, a directly elected legislator. A few might actually make the cut to the electoral committee (possibly 4 or 5 among 14 out of 29 in total) even though they were not among the happy few in 2014. But again, none of these people are really novel, to say the least.

The functional constituencies, returning some 350 electors to the election committee, are another game altogether that deserves more detailed scrutiny—to be continued!—especially because some of these electors extend their reach across the Delta. If Pansy Ho, the chairlady of Shun Tak Holding, elects the Macao CE, her sister, Daisy Ho, the chairlady of SJM Holding Limited, elects the Hong Kong one. But nobody can beat Francis Lui Yiu-tung, the deputy chairman of Galaxy Entertainment Group, who himself elects both the CE in Hong Kong (as a delegate to the CPPCC) and the CE of Macao (as one of the 120 electors representing business and industry). Showing the way for further integration? 

Published in Macau Daily Times on March 1, 2019

Kapok: Clubbing sessions

It’s once again this time of the year when the unique institutional design of the People’s Republic of China displays its highest degree of sophistication: March corresponds to the convening of the “two meetings” or “two sessions”, the gathering of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference that started last Friday, a purely consultative body that has been likened to a gentlemen’s club, and the plenary session of the National People’s Congress, supposedly the highest organ of state power.

The CPPCC is the translation of what we call “united front work” in China, meaning in official speech a “multi-party [8 small parties] cooperation and political consultation led by the Communist Party of China”, that is to say the closest thing to a ritualized form of consultation process under the very strict guidance of THE Party in lieu of any democratic undertaking, with no actual power. In this cenacle of happy few — a bit more than 2,000 members — happenings are always possible though, as when Luo Fuhe, a vice-chairman of the CPPCC and the executive vice-chairman of the China Association for Promoting Democracy, breaks ranks and denounces openly the heavy hand of censorship over the internet as hampering scientific research and economic development in the country. He, of course, stops short of denouncing censorship for its adverse effects over freedom of speech, but then, can anyone imagine Edmund Ho or Tung Chee-hwa, both of them equally vice-chairmen, doing the same? After all, they represent the “second system”, in which — fear not — liberal ideas are tolerated and alive, despite the very limited and ever-shrinking grounding of democracy.

The NPC is in another league, with its slightly less than 3,000 members. On paper, it can amend the constitution, enact and amend laws, ratify and abrogate treaties. It also approves the state budget and plans for national economic and social development, and can elect as well as impeach top officials of the state (including the President) and judiciary, and supervise the work of the executive, the military and the judiciary. Zhang Dejiang, its chairman who will retire next year, ranks No. 3 of the all-powerful Politburo Standing Committee of the Party. Yet, in reality, the NPC plenary session serves mainly as a nation-wide nod giving bonding ceremony that bestows 80%+ approval rates to decisions already taken by the Communist Party — hence the “rubber-stamp” characterization.

Both congresses are in their twelfth instalment, and mandates span over five years. Next year will see the swearing-in of supposedly renewed representatives.

Hong Kong and Macao do participate of course. Hong Kong sends 36 NPC deputies and 203 CPPCC delegates, and Macao respectively 12 and 29 — there are actually more CPPCC delegates from Macao, but they represent other functional constituencies.

If we turn our eyes exclusively to Macao, there is no doubt that our CPPCC delegates describe perfectly what a former member equated to “a sort of chamber of commerce” for the rich and powerful to mingle, to the point where actually some NPC deputies and almost all our CPPCC delegates are members of the Macao Chinese General Chamber of Commerce — a venerable institution that counts more than 150 (!) members in leadership positions! All but one in the CPPCC, as Ng Lap Seng has been under house arrest on corruption charges in the United States since September 2015.

For the NPC, the Macao deputies can be best described as long-term Beijing loyalists. In that respect, they resemble their ancestors of the fourth National Congress (1975-1978), in which the first deputies for Macao were “great patriots” representing business (Ho Yin, the father of Edmund Ho), the central authorities (O Cheng Peng), trade unions (Liang Pei) and education (Sin Wai Hang). Today is about the same — tradition is a Macao thing — except that we also have the President of the Legislative Assembly and a serving Secretary of Economy and Finance! No such thing in Hong Kong of course, but in Macao, conflicts of interest(sss), actual or perceived, are part and parcel of the system.

Published in Macau Daily Times on March 10, 2017

Olho mágico: O senhor Wong vai a Pequim / Peephole: Mr Wong goes to Beijing

O encontro anual em pleno daquilo a que nos referimos como as “duas reuniões” (兩會) é um momento importante da vida política da República Popular da China (RPC). Os media nacionais e regionais, incluindo também os nossos, de Macau, têm dedicado um número significativo de páginas a estes encontros. Tal não é apenas verdade para jornais como o Diário do Povo: a página de acesso da secção de notícias do Baidu, o motor de busca chinês dominante no qual acontecem quatro em cada cinco pesquisas feitas no Império do Meio, apresenta-se actualmente com um portal em vermelho vivo e clicável adornado de uma bandeira vermelha esvoaçante, nuvens brancas e a imagem evanescente da estrela vermelha em espiral que está no tecto interior do Grande Palácio do Povo. O título que se sobrepõe em dourado brilhante é simplesmente “Duas reuniões nacionais 2015” – não é algo que possamos imaginar o Google a fazer por ocasião das sessões do Congresso dos Estados Unidos.

O mais importante dos dois órgãos que tradicionalmente se reúnem em sessão plenária por menos de duas semanas na primeira metade de Março é a Assembleia Popular Nacional (APN). No papel – ou seja, na Constituição – a APN é o órgão mais elevado do poder do Estado. Pode rever a Constituição, aprovar e rever leis, ratificar e revogar tratados, aprovar o orçamento de Estado e planos para o desenvolvimento económico e social, eleger e afastar os principais dirigentes do Estado e do sector judiciário (incluindo o Presidente), e fiscalizar o trabalho do Conselho de Estado, da Presidência, da Comissão Militar Central, do Supremo Tribunal Popular e Suprema Procuradoria Popular. Porém, como nota Susan Lawrence, “a APN exerce muitos desses poderes apenas na forma”, e tal deve-se em primeiro lugar ao facto de competir à APN meramente dar aval a decisões já tomadas pelo Partido Comunista – daí o epíteto frequente de que é “uma assembleia-carimbo”. Além disso, o partido nomeia todos os candidatos à posição de delegado – há ainda assim sempre mais candidatos que assentos disponíveis – e mais de quatro quintos dos delegados são também dirigentes do Partido e do Estado.

Ainda que aqueles que detêm cargos no Estado, no sector judiciário e na Procuradoria estejam impedidos de estar no Comité Permanente da APN, o órgão de topo que efectivamente conduz os assuntos da APN e se reúne a cada dois meses, o presidente do Comité Permanente da APN – actualmente, Zhang Dejiang – é também membro do poderoso Comité Permanente do Partido, e o terceiro em hierarquia de um grupo de sete membros actuais, atrás do Presidente, Xi Jinping, e do primeiro-ministro, Li Keqiang. Xi foi “eleito” Presidente da República em Março de 2013, mas antes tinha já sido designado como Secretário-Geral do Partido, em Novembro de 2012, e uma vez que a China não valida o princípio de separação de poderes – a pedra angular dos sistemas políticos das regiões administrativas especiais de Macau e Hong Kong, apesar da preponderância do Executivo – Xi é também membro da APN, tal como o primeiro-ministro.

A Conferência Consultiva Política do Povo Chinês (CCPPC) é a outra instituição que actualmente se está a reunir em Pequim e a sua natureza é bastante diferente, tendo apenas uma “função consultiva”. Em conjunto com oito partidos políticos menores, a CCPPC e as suas versões locais são aquilo que permite aos líderes da RPC caracterizarem o seu sistema político como tendo por base “a cooperação multi-partidária e a consulta política dirigida pelo Partido Comunista Chinês” – uma ficção que tem sido mantida viva desde os primeiros dias da RPC. Mas não é pelo facto da CCPPC não ter poderes e a APN estar subjugada ao Partido que estas duas instituições não são “centros de poder” por direito próprio. Ao examinar – e, em última análise, aprovar – orçamentos, relatórios de agências governamentais, e nomeações, os delegados da APN têm a possibilidade de se absterem “marginalmente” e assim exibirem uma forma de “abordagem pluralista” quando decidem aprovar apenas por menos de 80 por cento o relatório do Supremo Tribunal Popular ou o orçamento do Ministério das Finanças. Além disso, não é de negligenciar o papel que os delegados têm na defesa de algumas questões de interesse, não sendo raro assistir a fortes posições a favor do desenvolvimento de reformas nos vários sectores, incluindo nos trabalhos específicos da APN. E, porque os membros da CCPPC vêm de diferentes sectores sociais e são sempre figuras destacadas dentro da comunidade, podem ser aventadas propostas inovadoras e progressistas com respeito a políticas públicas, ainda que, em última análise, o Partido não tenha qualquer obrigação de agir de acordo com as sugestões apresentadas.

Os 12 delegados da APN que representam Macau – de um total ligeiramente inferior a três mil – e os cerca de 40 membros de Macau na CCPPC (incluindo os que representam interesses nas áreas da economia, trabalho e segurança social) de um total um pouco superior a dois mil têm por conseguinte um papel importante no futuro da nossa região administrativa especial. Em linha com as “quatro expectativas” propaladas por Xi Jinping durante a sua visita em Dezembro último – governar de acordo com a lei, diversificar a economia para promover o desenvolvimento sustentável, construir fundações sólidas para a estabilidade e harmonia sociais, e fortalecer a educação dos jovens – várias das declarações e sugestões feitas pelos delegados de Macau têm alimentado de forma positiva uma visão para Macau, o que faz com que estas reuniões comecem a aparentar ser muito mais do que meras oportunidades convívio social –, e, segundo as “oito directivas”, os habituais banquetes ensopados em Maotai tiveram de passar a dimensões mais modestas. Porém, durante as reuniões plenárias e de grupos, as “três expectativas” de Zhang Dejiang, bem como a preocupação manifesta de Li Gang com o significado real das enormes manifestações de Maio último em Macau – tendo em mente o movimento Occupy Central de Hong Kong – servem para nos lembrar que os nossos delegados têm por missão cumprir a tarefa inequívoca de promover a integração de Macau na RPC – daí que o caminho de diversificação seja descrito nos termos da cooperação regional e haja o repetido instar do “fortalecimento do Estado”. Muitos dos delegados andam nisto há muitos anos e, lamentavelmente, parecem ter entendido a admoestação das autoridades centrais como a necessidade de um maior alinhamento com a linha do Partido. Mas deve a resposta ser meramente restritiva e defensiva, especialmente quando Pequim deseja que as regiões administrativas especiais se mantenham atraentes e inclusivas? Infelizmente, um número importante de personalidades que assumirão a responsabilidade de responder aos desafios próximos consiste nas mesmas pessoas que demonstraram bastante impermeabilidade ao ritmo rápido de mudanças que estão a moldar uma sociedade mais complexa.

Published in Ponto Final, March 10 2015

And the original in English:

The yearly convening in full attendance of what is referred to as the “two meetings” (兩會) is an important moment in the political life of the People’ Republic of China (PRC). National and regional media, including our own in Macao, are devoting a significant number of pages to the gatherings. And this is not only true for the like of the People’s Daily: the entry page of the news section of Baidu, the dominant Chinese search engine that tackles 4 searches out of 5 in the Middle Kingdom, is presently enclosed with a clickable bright red doorframe portal adorned on top by a floating red flag, white clouds and a fading image of the red star converging swirl-like ceiling of the Great Hall of the People, the overlapping title in bright gold being simply “2015 Two national meetings” — not something you can easily imagine Google doing when the American Congress is in session.
The most important of the two bodies traditionally gathering in plenary session for less than two weeks during the first part of March, is the National People’s Congress (NPC). On paper — meaning the Constitution — the NPC is the highest organ of state power. It can amend the constitution, enact and amend laws, ratify and abrogate treaties, approve the state budget and plans for national economic and social development, elect and impeach top officials (including the President) of the state and judiciary, and supervise the work of the State Council, the Presidency, the State Central Military Commission, the Supreme People’s Court, and the Supreme People’s Procuratorate. However, as pointed out by Susan Lawrence, “the NPC exercises many of those powers in name only”, and the main reason is to be found in the very fact that the NPC merely has to give the nod to decisions already taken by the Communist Party, hence the sticking characterization of a “rubber-stamp assembly”. Additionally, the Party nominates all candidates for positions as deputies — there are nevertheless always more candidates than seats available — and more than four fifths of the deputies are also Party or state officials.

Even though people who hold state, judicial, and procuratorial positions are barred from serving on the NPC Standing Committee, the top body that actually conducts the affairs of the NPC and convenes every two months, the chairman of the Standing Committee of the NPC — presently Zhang Dejiang — is also a member of the powerful Standing Committee of the Party, and third in rank out of only seven members today after the President, Xi Jinping, and the Premier, Li Keqiang. Mr Xi was “elected” President of the Republic back in March 2013, but he had been previously designated as the General Secretary of the Party in November 2012, and because China does not validate the principle of the separations of power — the cornerstone of both the Macao SAR and the Hong Kong SAR political systems, despite being Executive-led — Mr Xi is also a member of the NPC, and so is the Premier.

The Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) is the other institution currently congregating in Beijing and is quite different in nature, having only a “consultative role”. Together with the eight minor political parties, the CPPCC and its local versions are what allow the PRC’s leaders to characterize their own political system as being based on “multi-party cooperation and political consultation led by the Communist Party of China” — a fiction kept alive since the very first days of the PRC. But it is not because the CPPCC is toothless and the NPC subdued by the Party that these two institutions are not “centers of power” in their own right. While examining — and ultimately approving — budgets, agency reports, and personnel appointments, NPC deputies have the possibility to “marginally” abstained and thus display a form of “plural approach” when they decide to only support by less than 80% the Supreme People’s Court’s report or the Ministry of Finance’s budget report. Additionally, the “advocacy” aspect of the deputies’ role is not to be neglected, and it is not rare to see strong stands being taken in favor of further developments of reform in all sectors, including the specific workings of the NPC. And because CPPCC members come from all-walk of life and are always prominent figures of the community, innovative and forward thinking proposals pertaining to public policies can be aired, even though ultimately the Communist Party has absolutely no obligation to act upon those suggestions.

The 12 NPC deputies representing Macao — out of a bit less than 3,000 in total — and the close to 40 CPPCC members from Macao (including the ones representing economic, labor and social welfare interests) out of a bit more than 2,000 thus have an important role for the future of our SAR. In line with the “four hopes” aired by Xi Jinping during his visit in December — grounding governance in the law, diversifying the economy in order to promote sustainable development, building strong foundations for social harmony and stability, and strengthening the education of the youth — several of the reports and suggestions made by the Macao delegates have nourished very positively a vision for Macao, thus starting to make these gatherings to look much more than mere social networking occasions — and under the “eight directives”, the usual Maotai-spilled lavish feasts had to be scaled down. Yet, during plenary and small group meetings, Mr Zhang Dejiang’s own “three hopes” as well as Mr Li Gang’s openly expressed worry about the actual significance of last May’s huge demonstrations in Macao — with now Hong Kong’s Occupy Central movement in mind — are reminders that our delegates are entrusted with a unequivocal duty in carrying out further the integration of Macao into the PRC — hence the diversification path described in terms of regional cooperation and the oft repeated urge to “strengthen patriotic education”. Many of the delegates have been around for many years and seem to have regrettably understood the admonition made by the central authorities as further towing the Party line. But can the answer be only restrictive and defensive, especially if Beijing wants the SARs to remain both attractive and inclusive? Unfortunately, quite a number of personalities who will take the responsibility of harnessing coming challenges are also the ones who have proven themselves to be quite impervious to the fast pace of change shaping up a more complex society.

Kapok: What happens in…

As is often the case with sayings, their actual meaning is commonly debatable and easily twisted by the interest and the context of the moment. Such is the case with “What happens in Vegas stays in Vegas”, that pulls together two sets of meanings. On the one hand, related to permissiveness and secrecy—you can engage in anything borderline in Vegas, but whatever you do out there will not spill over Vegas’s vicinity—and on the other, connected to absolute otherness—this is only possible in Vegas. Apart from the fact that this sin-charged marketing motto strikes a particular cord for us in Macao, this is the expression that popped into my mind while reading reports about recent declarations made in Beijing by Peter Lee Ka-kit, Hong Kong-based Henderson Land Development’s vice chairman, in which he stated that “polls” conducted by University of Hong Kong’s Public Opinion Programme were “biased” against the pro-establishment/pro-Beijing camp in the SAR. He went on namely to target the programme’s director, Robert Chung, by questioning the scientific character of the polls and came up with a “pragmatic” solution according to which a selected few trade associations, naturally pro-establishment, would start funding alternative polls that would be conducted by the Chinese University of Hong Kong and the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, the two competitors of Mr. Chung’s institution among the top tier universities in our sister SAR. Very pragmatic indeed, as any businessman should be: if you are not happy with a supplier, just go to another one! 
These remarks were made in Beijing during a meeting held on the fringe of the annual ten-day-long annual full session of the National People’s Congress (NPC) between delegates from Hong Kong and Macao to the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), of which Peter Lee is a member of the standing committee, and NPC chairman Zhang Dejiang. Let’s just recall that this annual meeting of the NPC is the only moment of the year when the supervisory power of this otherwise rubber-stamp assembly can somehow frailly glow—the government’s budget is always approved, but sometimes only by 80% of the members!—and that the CPPCC, in itself a purely advisory body, is supposed to help engage in “political consultation” with and perform “democratic supervision” of the Communist Party. In theory, members of the CPPCC can thus be expected to display some kind of innovative thinking that can help the Party better itself. In practice, it is far too often the occasion for prominent exemplary citizens to exhibit their absolute submission to the current Party line. Journalists in Beijing noted that Peter Lee’s remarks along with the ones made by another tycoon’s progeny, Victor Li Tzar-kuoi (son of Asia’s richest man, Li Ka-shing, and also a CPPCC standing committee member) characterizing the Occupy Central movement as being contrary to Hong Kong’s core values, were made just hours after a high-level official from the central government liaison office had urged Hong Kong members of the CPPCC to speak more openly against Occupy Central.
That leads me back to my saying, this time with a local flavor: let’s hope that what happens in Beijing stays in Beijing, even though this doesn’t bode well for much needed political reforms in the first system. But can it really be so? What is there to gain, apart from radicalization, in adding worries over academic freedom to nagging questioning about threats to the freedom of the press in our neighboring SAR? And then, will what happens in Hong Kong stay in Hong Kong? On one side, we have businessmen suggesting the government “dissolve the people and elect another,” to echo Bertold Brecht’s famous verse, and on the other side we are expected to remain impervious to menaces growing on our doorstep. But of course, in Macao, we seem to be content with the simple fact that Mr Chui has finally ended the excruciating speculations about his candidacy for a second mandate and we have our own businessmen suggesting that legislators should simply forfeit their right to legislative initiative. Nothing to worry about, really.

Published in Macau Daily Times, March 7 2014