Politicking in Macao at present is being blurred by the celebratory mood of the year-end, and Christmas has indeed a lot to do with it. With the visit of Xi Jinping on the occasion of the fifteenth anniversary of the handover (on top of the 65th anniversary of the establishment of the People’s Republic of China that some associations in Macao have been toasting to since the wee hours of January 1st), the overall atmosphere exudes an ever more ostensible display of loyalty and gratitude towards the benevolent fatherly figure whose tutelage has allowed Macao to (immensely) prosper in the past 15 years. Well, clearly, Macao has been (vastly) transformed since it was handed over back to China in 1999, but still what resonates in my mind is the corporate hype uttered by Sheldon Adelson in August 2007 during the inaugural speech of the Venetian that Macao would never be the same again after the opening of the world biggest casino. And here we are, seven years later, and Macao is seven times bigger than Vegas.
Yet, gaming revenues have plummeted in the past six months, and thus Macao is technically speaking in recession—two successive quarters of GDP contraction—, and the main culprit as reported by many gaming analysts and bankers alike is to be found in the anti-corruption drive that has been targeting both “flies and tigers” on the other side of the Portas do Cerco for the past two years—the latest high-profile victim being Zhou Yongkang, former domestic security tsar and former member of the ultra-selective Standing Committee of the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party. Is Santa Claus thus the Whipping Father in disguise? With the trouble encountered by the “one country, two systems” formula in Hong Kong in 2014, it is all but too easily understandable that Mr Xi and his proxies would be quite pleased and even extremely forgiving with scrupulous devotees to a very conservative interpretation of what was imagined by Deng Xiaoping at the end of the 1970s. Public policy non-sense, appalling infrastructures and mismanagement of public funds are indeed little things compared to the unquestionable compliance with a political imperious necessity.
Well, up to a certain point, hence the vocal call for diversification that is now expressly required from Macao—this is not a suggestion anymore, and this time it is for the sake of China as a whole—and the clean-slate approach to the forming of a new government on December 20th. But then why let the Chief Executive nominate someone like Mr Chan Chak Mo on the Executive Council? Mr Chan is a successful businessman (that helps qualify for this consultative body) and has been a legislator since 2001 (representing, quite oddly the cultural and sports sector). But then, he is also the president of the second permanent commission of the Legislative Assembly that tried to push through, in May 2014, the now infamous ‘Perks Bill’ that would have provided golden parachutes to retiring principal officials in Macao. At the time, Mr Chan characterised the bill as “very reasonable”. He also commented that it was “naïve” to organise demonstrations or have petitions signed to oppose the bill, as if the piece of legislature was bound to pass anyway. The president of the Legislative Assembly, Mr Ho Iat Seng, rejoiced at the idea that an additional legislator in the Executive Council could improve communication between the executive and the legislative powers, something that I quite agree with, despite Montesquieu being a fellow Frenchman. Yet, is a legislator who was elected by a mere 53 associations in a constituency in which he was the sole candidate the best choice? Is the man who is partially responsible for provoking the biggest ever demonstrations in Macao in 25 years because of his lack of understanding of the popular discontent the most appropriate? Surely if you want to convey the idea that indeed everything is under control. And then, for Mr Chan, this is just another “business opportunity”: after all, he will get 30% of the Chief Executive’s salary for simply attending one meeting a month… Where has the Whipping Father gone?
Published in Macau Daily Times on December 19th 2014
Friday, December 19, 2014
Friday, December 05, 2014
Kapok: Expected Expectations
Nobody can deny it: the announcement of the new government line-up last Monday did not come as a surprise, quite the opposite. Secretaries’ and other senior officials’ names had been the talk of the town since early November. First on social media platforms, and then splashed on the web-based liberal Aamacau.com (All About Macau, 論盡媒體) on November 8th and ultimately confirmed, in a Pravda-like announcement, on November 11th as the masthead of the front page of the Macau Daily News. Interesting to note that the city’s main pro-government and pro-China daily has lost part of its edge—it was late compared to new electronic media—and yet journalists and commentators only went berserk after the list had been anointed by the establishment’s mouthpiece, here trusted almost like the “official gazette”—can anybody imagine the Ta Kung Pao or the Oriental Daily News announcing the new government beforehand in Hong Kong and everybody else taking it for granted?
Before the summer, rumours were rife as to who would be the chosen ones, but the idea of a complete fresh start was remote, to say the least. The retirement perks bill, despite its fiasco, had confirmed that some kind of musical chairs game was at play, and the names of Lionel Leong Vai Tak as well as that of Alexis Tam Chon Weng were in the mind if not on the lips of everybody slightly interested in Macao politics. But then, the rationale was that continuity would be preserved, and that “good soldiers”, even though they had proven themselves dully unimaginative, would stay on. Even Lau Si Io, the secretary for Transport and Public Works, most probably the most unanimously derided high official, was believed to keep his portfolio. Truly, who would accept the job that is at the heart of most livelihood issues in Macao— transport and housing, and in that order, if the government’s think tank is to be trusted—and still ignominiously tainted by the Ao Man-long scandal of 2006? No wonder that Raimundo Arrais do Rosário had to be called back from his decade long spell in Europe representing Macao…
Why then the need for such an apparent “clean slate” approach? First and quite ironically, because Chui Sai On himself was returned unopposed in his Chief Executive position, thus demeaning the very nature of an election by making it totally uncompetitive. Rigidity on the one hand was calling for more flexibility on the other. Second, because a real popular demand does exist and moreover was taken into account by Chui the candidate. On the side of popular demand, the unfairness of the retirement perks bill pushed 20,000 people onto the streets in May, ultimately forcing the government to bury the bill for good. And despite the many hurdles and intimidations faced by the organisers of the Macau civic referendum of late August, close to 9,000 citizens took part in this independent probing of citizens’ preferences. Eventually, the whole of Chui’s “campaign” was about him having heard the demands of the people, as expressed by the more than 100,000 suggestions and opinions sent to his office while “on the campaign trail”. And third, the Hong Kong SAR situation, whatever the perception, positive or negative, has had a corroding effect on the self-confidence of the powers that be, and in order to prevent a possible stalemate, preemptively providing a resolute stance for (orderly) change appears to be a smart move—beyond the real necessity to do so.
And then came Li Fei, the chairman of the Macau Basic Law Committee and the Deputy Secretary-General of the National People’s Congress Standing Committee, the very same man who came to Hong Kong in late August to explain the ruling of the standing committee over universal suffrage in our sister SAR, and now most notorious for having said that “Only one person [candidate] does not make an election, but too many is not proper either”. While attending a forum in Macao this week, he remarked that contrary to what some people think, deep-seated problems in Macao do not lie in the nature of political governance or stem from the fact that Macao is not democratic enough, but rather derive from Macao’s “own limitations”, the system inherited from the Portuguese colonial administration and other factors related to social and economic development. He then made it clear that “the overwhelming dominance of gambling in Macao is not in line with the overall interest of Macao” and furthermore that it is not in the “socioeconomic safety, stability and developmental interest of the mainland and the whole nation”. What is thus asked from Macao is to reinvent itself with much less gambling and much more patriotism. That for sure requires a whole new team!
Published in Macau Daily Times on December 5th 2014.
Before the summer, rumours were rife as to who would be the chosen ones, but the idea of a complete fresh start was remote, to say the least. The retirement perks bill, despite its fiasco, had confirmed that some kind of musical chairs game was at play, and the names of Lionel Leong Vai Tak as well as that of Alexis Tam Chon Weng were in the mind if not on the lips of everybody slightly interested in Macao politics. But then, the rationale was that continuity would be preserved, and that “good soldiers”, even though they had proven themselves dully unimaginative, would stay on. Even Lau Si Io, the secretary for Transport and Public Works, most probably the most unanimously derided high official, was believed to keep his portfolio. Truly, who would accept the job that is at the heart of most livelihood issues in Macao— transport and housing, and in that order, if the government’s think tank is to be trusted—and still ignominiously tainted by the Ao Man-long scandal of 2006? No wonder that Raimundo Arrais do Rosário had to be called back from his decade long spell in Europe representing Macao…
Why then the need for such an apparent “clean slate” approach? First and quite ironically, because Chui Sai On himself was returned unopposed in his Chief Executive position, thus demeaning the very nature of an election by making it totally uncompetitive. Rigidity on the one hand was calling for more flexibility on the other. Second, because a real popular demand does exist and moreover was taken into account by Chui the candidate. On the side of popular demand, the unfairness of the retirement perks bill pushed 20,000 people onto the streets in May, ultimately forcing the government to bury the bill for good. And despite the many hurdles and intimidations faced by the organisers of the Macau civic referendum of late August, close to 9,000 citizens took part in this independent probing of citizens’ preferences. Eventually, the whole of Chui’s “campaign” was about him having heard the demands of the people, as expressed by the more than 100,000 suggestions and opinions sent to his office while “on the campaign trail”. And third, the Hong Kong SAR situation, whatever the perception, positive or negative, has had a corroding effect on the self-confidence of the powers that be, and in order to prevent a possible stalemate, preemptively providing a resolute stance for (orderly) change appears to be a smart move—beyond the real necessity to do so.
And then came Li Fei, the chairman of the Macau Basic Law Committee and the Deputy Secretary-General of the National People’s Congress Standing Committee, the very same man who came to Hong Kong in late August to explain the ruling of the standing committee over universal suffrage in our sister SAR, and now most notorious for having said that “Only one person [candidate] does not make an election, but too many is not proper either”. While attending a forum in Macao this week, he remarked that contrary to what some people think, deep-seated problems in Macao do not lie in the nature of political governance or stem from the fact that Macao is not democratic enough, but rather derive from Macao’s “own limitations”, the system inherited from the Portuguese colonial administration and other factors related to social and economic development. He then made it clear that “the overwhelming dominance of gambling in Macao is not in line with the overall interest of Macao” and furthermore that it is not in the “socioeconomic safety, stability and developmental interest of the mainland and the whole nation”. What is thus asked from Macao is to reinvent itself with much less gambling and much more patriotism. That for sure requires a whole new team!
Published in Macau Daily Times on December 5th 2014.
Friday, November 21, 2014
Kapok: Moaners
When I voiced concern in my column last February that Ho Iat Seng, the newly sworn-in president of the Legislative Assembly, was openly deploring the lack of “legal training” of legislators and thus questioning their ability to grasp public policy issues, and that Chan Chak Mo, the president of the second permanent commission of the same Assembly, was caught saying legislators should refrain from drafting “projects” of law and exclusively let the government make law “proposals”, I did so in pointing out that these two respectable figures of our community had basically decided on their own to interpret the Basic Law and let go of a key component of the legislators’ power, that is precisely to initiate legislation, as stipulated in article 75 of the Basic Law.
The right of initiative held by legislators is indeed true power and constitutes one of the few “actual” prerogatives that mitigates the derogatory judgment that the Macao legislature is nothing but a “rubber stamp” assembly—toothless and, above all, indefectible, as a whole, in its support to the executive. Power as it allows at minima to elevate the gravitas of the debate and help clarify the stand of each and every stakeholder: a good example of that is the Law on the Fundamental Rights to form Trade Unions that has been pushed by José Pereira Coutinho several times and got defeated (again) in April by just 14 votes to 9. Power as it forces the government to change its order of priority when it comes to policy-making: again, I believe that it is Coutinho’s continuous drive to have an Animal Protection Law that ultimately forced the municipal affairs administration (IACM) to come up with a law that was unanimously introduced in the first reading last month, whereas the IACM had been “promising” that law for more than a decade. And finally, the capacity to “make” a law and not only to vote on or amend it epitomizes the essence of the “legislative power” of that branch of government: the Law on the Protection of Private Data, which was considered up to this summer one of the most advanced pieces of legislation when it comes to the protection of citizens’ rights, was indeed introduced in 2005 by a collective of 8 legislators, including 3 directly elected ones.
If this right to properly raise awareness, set the agenda of policy-making and legislate is forfeited, what is left then? Mere complaints that the government is not fast or good enough? If Melinda Chan champions the rights of the children so much, why doesn’t she come up with a piece of legislation herself? There are plenty of legal advisors in town to help her out—both in Portuguese and Chinese, and outside or inside the Assembly. But the problem is precisely that most of the businessmen-turned politicians conceive their role as having somewhat to do with populist brawling and badly acted moaning.
How can one otherwise explain the high-pitched whining of Mak Soi Kun regarding the noise disturbance generated by the Grand Prix whereas the Law on the Prevention and Control of Environmental Noise had already been voted in August, including favorably by himself? What credit can we give to legislators’ complaints about the level of execution of the government’s budget in November when the second permanent commission never found the time to review the mid-year report provided by the government in August? One of my friends who owns a pretty big business in China has the following slogan plastered on all the walls of his factory: “Winners find solutions, losers only find excuses.” No chance of losing when the game is not opened to competition.
And mind you, legislators cannot really propose laws on every single topic and issue: public expenditure, political structure or the operation of the government are expressly (and safely) out of bound. Legislators Ng Kuok Cheong and Au Kam San had thus to propose a mere debate on political reform and the implementation of universal suffrage in Macao. Expectedly, the proposal was vetoed by 27 legislators out of 33: when concerns get crucial and opinions become power, silence is then golden.
Published in Macau Daily Times, November 21 2014.
The right of initiative held by legislators is indeed true power and constitutes one of the few “actual” prerogatives that mitigates the derogatory judgment that the Macao legislature is nothing but a “rubber stamp” assembly—toothless and, above all, indefectible, as a whole, in its support to the executive. Power as it allows at minima to elevate the gravitas of the debate and help clarify the stand of each and every stakeholder: a good example of that is the Law on the Fundamental Rights to form Trade Unions that has been pushed by José Pereira Coutinho several times and got defeated (again) in April by just 14 votes to 9. Power as it forces the government to change its order of priority when it comes to policy-making: again, I believe that it is Coutinho’s continuous drive to have an Animal Protection Law that ultimately forced the municipal affairs administration (IACM) to come up with a law that was unanimously introduced in the first reading last month, whereas the IACM had been “promising” that law for more than a decade. And finally, the capacity to “make” a law and not only to vote on or amend it epitomizes the essence of the “legislative power” of that branch of government: the Law on the Protection of Private Data, which was considered up to this summer one of the most advanced pieces of legislation when it comes to the protection of citizens’ rights, was indeed introduced in 2005 by a collective of 8 legislators, including 3 directly elected ones.
If this right to properly raise awareness, set the agenda of policy-making and legislate is forfeited, what is left then? Mere complaints that the government is not fast or good enough? If Melinda Chan champions the rights of the children so much, why doesn’t she come up with a piece of legislation herself? There are plenty of legal advisors in town to help her out—both in Portuguese and Chinese, and outside or inside the Assembly. But the problem is precisely that most of the businessmen-turned politicians conceive their role as having somewhat to do with populist brawling and badly acted moaning.
How can one otherwise explain the high-pitched whining of Mak Soi Kun regarding the noise disturbance generated by the Grand Prix whereas the Law on the Prevention and Control of Environmental Noise had already been voted in August, including favorably by himself? What credit can we give to legislators’ complaints about the level of execution of the government’s budget in November when the second permanent commission never found the time to review the mid-year report provided by the government in August? One of my friends who owns a pretty big business in China has the following slogan plastered on all the walls of his factory: “Winners find solutions, losers only find excuses.” No chance of losing when the game is not opened to competition.
And mind you, legislators cannot really propose laws on every single topic and issue: public expenditure, political structure or the operation of the government are expressly (and safely) out of bound. Legislators Ng Kuok Cheong and Au Kam San had thus to propose a mere debate on political reform and the implementation of universal suffrage in Macao. Expectedly, the proposal was vetoed by 27 legislators out of 33: when concerns get crucial and opinions become power, silence is then golden.
Published in Macau Daily Times, November 21 2014.
Friday, November 07, 2014
Kapok: Red cards for yellow cabs
The disappearance of the yellow taxis in Macao is saddening. First, because they had become a customary fixture of our daily lives: the Official Gazette reminds us rather aridly that the license awarded to their operator, the Vang Iek Group, dates back to 1989, and a quick look at the Group’s website indicates that Vang Iek itself was established in 1935—a sign that the virtues of family business is not an assurance of sustainability in the new Macao. Second because, as Andrew Scott, the vocal founder of the Facebook group Macau Taxi Driver Shame, puts it, they were the “shining light” of the industry, while the “black taxis” are perceived as “being the problem.” This leaves us with a feeling of injustice. Third and finally, because the Transport Department (DSAT) appears to have performed, once again, below average when it comes to both its regulatory and tangible capacities—and here I am not even talking about style and disclosure skills.
Some might argue that they had it coming. At least 90% of their 100 taxis were supposed to be on call, but they ended up with only a fraction of the fleet actually on call. When the operator was told that the license would be renewed for another year, on condition that 80% of the taxis would satisfy that initial requirement, it failed to do so; and then the license was renewed for only 9 months, provided that 60% of the taxis would be on call. Vang Iek ultimately had to announce themselves that they would cease operations on November 6th, since the scheme was simply not viable—after all this is a company, not a charity. And Vang Iek’s management team noticeably pointed its finger to the lack of support and responsiveness of the DSAT. Sure, regulations and tender-biding commitments have to be respected, but then the overall context changed—and fast—so operating conditions should have adapted just as swiftly.
What are the main problems with taxis? The total number—too scarce—and the pricing—insufficient, thus encouraging malpractice, overcharging and abuse in general. This was clearly highlighted in the 2011 General Policy on Traffic and Land Transportation in Macao (2010-2020)—and what has the DSAT done since then? Not much regarding the taxis, and in fact the success of the Macau Taxi Driver Shame group (created in June 2014 and already counting more than 4,500 supporters) is an indication that the situation has worsened dramatically. I am myself not a big fan of this kind of group because—despite its claim that it is also “rewarding” the well behaved—it is designed to humiliate and discriminate against part of the community, making it very divisive and a trigger for equally acrimonious counter-strategies from those ‘shamed’. It creates a cycle of distrust and, although it allows disgruntled users to vent out their repressed resentment, ultimately it addresses the symptoms and not the ailment. Yet it still has its virtues, since its byproduct, the Macau Taxi Passengers Association (MTPA)—also headed by Andrew Scott—has submitted several recommendations to the DSAT in September in the framework of the consultation on the revision of the law on taxis—dating back to 1999, mind you.
Both the MTPA and DSAT propose comprehensive and far-reaching amendments regarding licensing, training, pricing, and monitoring (including punitive measures with much more significant fines and even the suspension and cancellation of licenses for non-complying drivers), but then where has the necessary holistic approach to public transportation as articulated by the 2011 plan gone? Is there any indication of the identity and motivations of clients, or the detailed breakdown of itineraries in today’s Macao?
The MTPA’s document relies on a rough estimate of operating costs of taxis—admittedly not in line with the ones of the Macau Taxi Driver Mutual Association—and a skimpy survey of only 172 respondents on “satisfaction”; whereas the DSAT’s 2014 consultation document is still in the infancy of proposing a “global study and scientific analysis” of the problem—again, what have they done since 2011?
On average, both Singapore and Hong Kong have 8 taxis per km of road, while Macao has 4.4, so my bet is that we only need to double the existing fleet of 1,380 taxis. Then service and conditions of operation are the real concerns, and for this to be solved, all stakeholders have to be involved if the whole community is to benefit in the end.
Published in Macau Daily Times, November 7th 2014
Some might argue that they had it coming. At least 90% of their 100 taxis were supposed to be on call, but they ended up with only a fraction of the fleet actually on call. When the operator was told that the license would be renewed for another year, on condition that 80% of the taxis would satisfy that initial requirement, it failed to do so; and then the license was renewed for only 9 months, provided that 60% of the taxis would be on call. Vang Iek ultimately had to announce themselves that they would cease operations on November 6th, since the scheme was simply not viable—after all this is a company, not a charity. And Vang Iek’s management team noticeably pointed its finger to the lack of support and responsiveness of the DSAT. Sure, regulations and tender-biding commitments have to be respected, but then the overall context changed—and fast—so operating conditions should have adapted just as swiftly.
What are the main problems with taxis? The total number—too scarce—and the pricing—insufficient, thus encouraging malpractice, overcharging and abuse in general. This was clearly highlighted in the 2011 General Policy on Traffic and Land Transportation in Macao (2010-2020)—and what has the DSAT done since then? Not much regarding the taxis, and in fact the success of the Macau Taxi Driver Shame group (created in June 2014 and already counting more than 4,500 supporters) is an indication that the situation has worsened dramatically. I am myself not a big fan of this kind of group because—despite its claim that it is also “rewarding” the well behaved—it is designed to humiliate and discriminate against part of the community, making it very divisive and a trigger for equally acrimonious counter-strategies from those ‘shamed’. It creates a cycle of distrust and, although it allows disgruntled users to vent out their repressed resentment, ultimately it addresses the symptoms and not the ailment. Yet it still has its virtues, since its byproduct, the Macau Taxi Passengers Association (MTPA)—also headed by Andrew Scott—has submitted several recommendations to the DSAT in September in the framework of the consultation on the revision of the law on taxis—dating back to 1999, mind you.
Both the MTPA and DSAT propose comprehensive and far-reaching amendments regarding licensing, training, pricing, and monitoring (including punitive measures with much more significant fines and even the suspension and cancellation of licenses for non-complying drivers), but then where has the necessary holistic approach to public transportation as articulated by the 2011 plan gone? Is there any indication of the identity and motivations of clients, or the detailed breakdown of itineraries in today’s Macao?
The MTPA’s document relies on a rough estimate of operating costs of taxis—admittedly not in line with the ones of the Macau Taxi Driver Mutual Association—and a skimpy survey of only 172 respondents on “satisfaction”; whereas the DSAT’s 2014 consultation document is still in the infancy of proposing a “global study and scientific analysis” of the problem—again, what have they done since 2011?
On average, both Singapore and Hong Kong have 8 taxis per km of road, while Macao has 4.4, so my bet is that we only need to double the existing fleet of 1,380 taxis. Then service and conditions of operation are the real concerns, and for this to be solved, all stakeholders have to be involved if the whole community is to benefit in the end.
Published in Macau Daily Times, November 7th 2014
Sunday, October 26, 2014
Kapok: Paper patriots
Patriotism is a double-edged sword: mustered adequately it becomes a potent mantra for the community to feel more united, but a ponderous and rather superfluous summon can easily devoid it of any meaning, and ultimately be conducive to a suspicion that ulterior motives are at play. Patriotism then serves as a disguise, an absolute injunction voiced by people who do not want issues to be discussed and addressed, and thus the call to patriotism acts as a cover-up. Very often, it also helps castigate the people you disagree with as “traitors” and “enemies of the nation”, and when at war or in a revolutionary situation, there can be no worse characterisation as it often entails the worst possible sanction.
In Hong Kong and Macao, the debate about what constitutes a “good” patriot is a story intertwined with the history of contemporary China. Sun Yat Sen, the father of the Republic that we celebrate every October 10th, found refuge, resources as well as a stage in both foreign enclaves to lambast the Qing court calling for a revolution. Interestingly enough for Macao, Sun is often presented as the first Chinese doctor to have practiced Western medicine in the territory at the end of the nineteenth century, thus importing foreign techniques to cure the Chinese body. Today, Hong Kong and Macao have returned to Chinese sovereignty, and there is no doubt that both SARs are thus Chinese, and yet because of their remarkable status, valid for 50 years, and a promise of political liberalisation contained in either the Basic Law or the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the debate about what it means to be “patriotic” goes on. And again, the pace of change is at the root of the questioning.
Is it what legislators Sio Chi Wai and Zheng Anting had in mind when they went on a rant about patriotism during the first plenary session of the Macao Legislative Assembly on October 16th? Both of them heavily criticised the “Occupy Central” movement in Hong Kong, insisting on its illegality and the harm it is bringing to our sister SAR for itself, its people and because of the image it offers to the world. Mr Sio insisted on the role played by the Internet in distorting information and polarising young minds, thus easily bringing about distrust and dissatisfaction with the government because of too much eagerness for change. He remarked that the “one country, two systems” formula’s success in Macao owes much to the strict compliance with “the love for our nation and Macao” as “the social basis” of the SAR’s legal system. Mr Zheng went one step further, worried about similar brewing trouble in Macao, calling upon the government to further “patriotic education” and strictly apply the national security law adopted in February 2009.
Mr Sio’s position comes as no surprise. Being appointed by the Chief Executive, he is a defender of the orthodoxy. He is also the secretary of the second commission of the Assembly, the one responsible for introducing in May the now infamous perks bill that pushed some 20,000 people onto the street—mostly young and mobilised via social networks! In June, representing the interests of employers, Mr Sio made it very public that he was strongly against a significant amendment of the Labor Relations Law, especially regarding the ridiculously low capping of earnings for the calculation of compensation fees for laid-off employees—set for now at a maximum of MOP$14,000 a month… what an irony! In August, Mr Sio was also among the two legislators openly calling for a boycott of the civil referendum on universal suffrage jointly organised by pro-democratic groups. As far as Mr Zheng Anting is concerned, he was elected for the first time in 2013 as second on the list of Mr Mak Soi Kun, a widely recognised pro-Beijing supporter. Moreover, Mr Zheng serves as the vice-president of the Jiangmen Folks Association, the one group that openly defended the perks bill in May and even organised a “favorable” counter-parade that gathered some 1,000 people—mostly elderly though.
Winning young minds goes beyond incessant cant, half-veiled threats and blind acts of faith. Remember that Joshua Wong in Hong Kong started his activist career via his Facebook Scholarism group precisely out of concern about the introduction of patriotic education.
Monday, October 13, 2014
Kapok: Hong Kong and us
The Occupy Central movement is, of course, about democracy and the rejection of the perceived National People’s Congress’ fool’s bargain of August 31st. The central authorities have decided that the nominating committee for the 2017 Chief Executive election would be identical in number and composition to the election committee of 2012, that any potential candidate would need an endorsement of at least 50% of that massively pro-Beijing committee to run, and that a maximum of 3 candidates would eventually enter the fray. In doing so, they were not only being extremely intransigent and blind to widely shared aspirations; the kind demonstrated by widespread support for the third motion of the June civic referendum. They have actually hollowed out the promise enshrined in article 45 of the Basic Law, which states that candidates should be nominated “in accordance with democratic procedures”. Prejudiced pre-screening is quite the contrary.
And yet, despite these actions and the unexpected release of the White Paper on Hong Kong in June, in which Beijing was ostensibly reaffirming its prevalent authority over the “high-degree of autonomy” enjoyed by the SAR and vilipending the influence of “outside forces”, Occupy Central organizers confided in early September that they expected no more than “a few thousand” participants when October 1st arrived. Is the abusive 46-hour detention of a 17-year old “repeating” accidental leader on September 26th solely responsible for the massive movement that is making its mark on Asia’s “World City”? Are the 87 canisters fired at the crowd on Sunday 28th and a viral video of a seemingly innocent passerby being pepper-sprayed at close range the unique triggers for a 200,000-strong crowd occupying three symbolic quarters of Asia’s financial and shopping capital? How can we explain the endurance of the movement, despite the apparent lack of leadership and the half-veiled threats appearing in the People’s Daily, as well as the growing adversarial sentiment among shopkeepers and the lower half of the white-collar class? Is it the extensive and global media coverage of an exceptionally innovative, self-disciplined and peaceful crusade, one enthusiastically undertaken by boisterous yet geeky-looking teenagers? Or the playful usage of slogans and symbols, borrowed from everyone from Lu Xun to John Lennon, and from May 4th 1919 to May 1968 and June 1989, combined with a versatile and persistent usage of social media? All of these elements may partially account for the impetus and the forcefulness of the “umbrella revolution”, and help to explain its twists and turns, but they do not add up to a sufficient explanation!
With the revelation on Wednesday that Chief Executive C.Y. Leung might have accepted HK$50 million from an Australian company over the past two years as compensation for acting as the company’s “referee and adviser” back in 2011 arrives the latest—overly dramatic and amazingly coincidental—avatar of the deep-rooted, common thread that can actually explain this rebellious civic movement: trust. More precisely, it is a lack of faith in our own institutions and their gatekeepers. Beyond the initial suspicion about Leung being a communist in disguise, the very fact that the August NPC’s decision was based on a report formulated by the CE indicated an inability to convey to Beijing the underlying currents at work in society, and an unwillingness to shoulder responsibility for the benefit of the whole community. Earlier in May, former chief secretary Rafael Hui Si-yan stood accused of pocketing HK$35 million for being the “eyes and ears” in the government of the Kwok brothers, the two co-chairmen of Sun Hung Kai Properties Ltd, Asia’s largest real-estate developer. On September 23rd, three days before the arrest of Joshua Wong, the same Mr Hui had admitted to secretly receiving HK$11 million in 2007 from Liao Hui, then director of China’s Office for Hong Kong and Macao Affairs, simply to pursue his job and continue enjoying his lavish lifestyle. This is something his boss, former Chief Executive Donald Tsang, seemed to have emulated, despite his devout (if not frugal) Catholic faith. With an ICAC investigation on the move, C.Y. Leung is clearly on his way out. What got to him is not the allegedly naïve aspiration for democracy: it is the fact that he could not be trusted. Democracy comes later, when one realizes that only the “least worst” of the systems allows for corrective measures when leaders are exposed for incompetence and dishonesty. Article 45 is thus not a prerequisite, but a liberal setting is, and so is its attendant, “muckraking” press. Food for thought, on both sides of the delta.
Published in Macau Daily Times, October 10 2014.
And yet, despite these actions and the unexpected release of the White Paper on Hong Kong in June, in which Beijing was ostensibly reaffirming its prevalent authority over the “high-degree of autonomy” enjoyed by the SAR and vilipending the influence of “outside forces”, Occupy Central organizers confided in early September that they expected no more than “a few thousand” participants when October 1st arrived. Is the abusive 46-hour detention of a 17-year old “repeating” accidental leader on September 26th solely responsible for the massive movement that is making its mark on Asia’s “World City”? Are the 87 canisters fired at the crowd on Sunday 28th and a viral video of a seemingly innocent passerby being pepper-sprayed at close range the unique triggers for a 200,000-strong crowd occupying three symbolic quarters of Asia’s financial and shopping capital? How can we explain the endurance of the movement, despite the apparent lack of leadership and the half-veiled threats appearing in the People’s Daily, as well as the growing adversarial sentiment among shopkeepers and the lower half of the white-collar class? Is it the extensive and global media coverage of an exceptionally innovative, self-disciplined and peaceful crusade, one enthusiastically undertaken by boisterous yet geeky-looking teenagers? Or the playful usage of slogans and symbols, borrowed from everyone from Lu Xun to John Lennon, and from May 4th 1919 to May 1968 and June 1989, combined with a versatile and persistent usage of social media? All of these elements may partially account for the impetus and the forcefulness of the “umbrella revolution”, and help to explain its twists and turns, but they do not add up to a sufficient explanation!
With the revelation on Wednesday that Chief Executive C.Y. Leung might have accepted HK$50 million from an Australian company over the past two years as compensation for acting as the company’s “referee and adviser” back in 2011 arrives the latest—overly dramatic and amazingly coincidental—avatar of the deep-rooted, common thread that can actually explain this rebellious civic movement: trust. More precisely, it is a lack of faith in our own institutions and their gatekeepers. Beyond the initial suspicion about Leung being a communist in disguise, the very fact that the August NPC’s decision was based on a report formulated by the CE indicated an inability to convey to Beijing the underlying currents at work in society, and an unwillingness to shoulder responsibility for the benefit of the whole community. Earlier in May, former chief secretary Rafael Hui Si-yan stood accused of pocketing HK$35 million for being the “eyes and ears” in the government of the Kwok brothers, the two co-chairmen of Sun Hung Kai Properties Ltd, Asia’s largest real-estate developer. On September 23rd, three days before the arrest of Joshua Wong, the same Mr Hui had admitted to secretly receiving HK$11 million in 2007 from Liao Hui, then director of China’s Office for Hong Kong and Macao Affairs, simply to pursue his job and continue enjoying his lavish lifestyle. This is something his boss, former Chief Executive Donald Tsang, seemed to have emulated, despite his devout (if not frugal) Catholic faith. With an ICAC investigation on the move, C.Y. Leung is clearly on his way out. What got to him is not the allegedly naïve aspiration for democracy: it is the fact that he could not be trusted. Democracy comes later, when one realizes that only the “least worst” of the systems allows for corrective measures when leaders are exposed for incompetence and dishonesty. Article 45 is thus not a prerequisite, but a liberal setting is, and so is its attendant, “muckraking” press. Food for thought, on both sides of the delta.
Published in Macau Daily Times, October 10 2014.
Friday, September 19, 2014
Kapok: In praise of the vouchers
Let me be honest: at first I was more than doubtful about what I was reading, and one could even say that I started looking deeper into the matter with pretty self-assured and somehow offensive ulterior motives. Come on, how could this be? “A study concludes that healthcare vouchers have prevented 123 deaths a year,” read a headline, or in this very newspaper, a milder “Study: Medical Vouchers Prevented Fatalities, Should be Given to TNRs.” For those of you not aware of cross-feeding multilingual acronyms, “TNRs” means non-resident workers, as in the very elegant perfunctory statistical category derived from the Portuguese “trabalhadores não residentes”. So vouchers distributed by the government equal saving lives, and this should be indiscriminate when it comes to human life, hence the noble appeal to extend it to all the contributing participants to and of the community. When absolute efficiency meets generosity…
A scientific mind has a craving for heuristic (meaning that one is always trying to find causality) relations: what are the causes behind a phenomenon, and to what extent these causes alone can explain things. In social sciences, the real “hard sciences” as everything is more complex when one deals with human nature, single factor explanations are pretty rare to come by, and often follow rather cryptic statistical considerations in which the whole exercise consists in isolating factors and relating a dependent variable (in this case mortality because of a disease) with an independent one (the introduction of vouchers).
The press reports based on a Lusa dispatch insist on the main conclusion of Professor Zhang Jinghua’s study, that a 24 percent decrease in cardiovascular diseases recorded as of 2010, compared to the 2001-2009 period, can be directly connected to the introduction of medical vouchers back in 2009, resulting in the prevention of 123 deaths a year over 2010-2012 (the claimed drop in mortality, 0.22%, multiplied by an average of 560,000 residents over the period). And vouchers are here seen as having a direct influence on citizens scheduling health checks or taking medical exams that would have otherwise probably not been undertaken without this exclusive incentive.
My first reaction was not to go to the report but to international studies, especially one by the OECD that indicates that the main reasons behind the sharp decrease in cardiovascular disease mortality rates have to do foremost with the decline of tobacco consumption and also with the improvements in medical care—why would Macao be any different? Then, I went to the official statistics, and if it indeed shows a decline in mortality rates for “cardiovascular diseases” in recent years, it also indicates that the year with the least number of deaths because of cardiovascular issues was in 2007 and the mortality rate because of respiratory diseases has increased rather significantly—the number of deaths because of respiratory diseases used to be 1/3 of the one for cardiovascular diseases, now it is 2/3!
So I finally went directly to the source, and Professor Zhang’s study is indeed pretty comprehensive and compelling, taking into account a multiplicity of factors (medical resources—numbers of physicians, nurses and patient beds per thousand population and public healthcare expenditure, economic development level—GDP per capita, the human development index, population ageing factor, natural seasonal effects and long-term trends), scrutinising the yearly reports of the Macao Health Bureau (incidentally pointing out to the inefficiency of the awareness and educational campaigns) and even admitting to certain shortcomings in the lack of compelling statistics about cerebrovascular diseases or simply the rather limited consideration given to the improvement of medical care because of new technologies, better training and more efficient drug therapies. Ultimately, in its own words, the study merely “suggests a robust connection between the timing of the implementation of the Macao Medical Voucher Program and a significant decrease in the mortality from circulatory system diseases in Macao, but their causal relationship awaits confirmation in further research.” The mere fact that the cancer mortality rate has increased significantly over the same period—as indicated in the study—should have led to more caution in the media reports: I would bet my salary that the vouchers program, conversely, was not responsible for that!
Published in Macau Daily Times, September 19th 2014
A scientific mind has a craving for heuristic (meaning that one is always trying to find causality) relations: what are the causes behind a phenomenon, and to what extent these causes alone can explain things. In social sciences, the real “hard sciences” as everything is more complex when one deals with human nature, single factor explanations are pretty rare to come by, and often follow rather cryptic statistical considerations in which the whole exercise consists in isolating factors and relating a dependent variable (in this case mortality because of a disease) with an independent one (the introduction of vouchers).
The press reports based on a Lusa dispatch insist on the main conclusion of Professor Zhang Jinghua’s study, that a 24 percent decrease in cardiovascular diseases recorded as of 2010, compared to the 2001-2009 period, can be directly connected to the introduction of medical vouchers back in 2009, resulting in the prevention of 123 deaths a year over 2010-2012 (the claimed drop in mortality, 0.22%, multiplied by an average of 560,000 residents over the period). And vouchers are here seen as having a direct influence on citizens scheduling health checks or taking medical exams that would have otherwise probably not been undertaken without this exclusive incentive.
My first reaction was not to go to the report but to international studies, especially one by the OECD that indicates that the main reasons behind the sharp decrease in cardiovascular disease mortality rates have to do foremost with the decline of tobacco consumption and also with the improvements in medical care—why would Macao be any different? Then, I went to the official statistics, and if it indeed shows a decline in mortality rates for “cardiovascular diseases” in recent years, it also indicates that the year with the least number of deaths because of cardiovascular issues was in 2007 and the mortality rate because of respiratory diseases has increased rather significantly—the number of deaths because of respiratory diseases used to be 1/3 of the one for cardiovascular diseases, now it is 2/3!
So I finally went directly to the source, and Professor Zhang’s study is indeed pretty comprehensive and compelling, taking into account a multiplicity of factors (medical resources—numbers of physicians, nurses and patient beds per thousand population and public healthcare expenditure, economic development level—GDP per capita, the human development index, population ageing factor, natural seasonal effects and long-term trends), scrutinising the yearly reports of the Macao Health Bureau (incidentally pointing out to the inefficiency of the awareness and educational campaigns) and even admitting to certain shortcomings in the lack of compelling statistics about cerebrovascular diseases or simply the rather limited consideration given to the improvement of medical care because of new technologies, better training and more efficient drug therapies. Ultimately, in its own words, the study merely “suggests a robust connection between the timing of the implementation of the Macao Medical Voucher Program and a significant decrease in the mortality from circulatory system diseases in Macao, but their causal relationship awaits confirmation in further research.” The mere fact that the cancer mortality rate has increased significantly over the same period—as indicated in the study—should have led to more caution in the media reports: I would bet my salary that the vouchers program, conversely, was not responsible for that!
Published in Macau Daily Times, September 19th 2014
Friday, September 05, 2014
Kapok: Hong Kong and us
The recent debate over universal suffrage for the 2017 election of the Chief Executive in Hong Kong, and the much anticipated ruling made by the National People’s Congress (NPC) last Sunday over the issue have proven both fascinating and, rather unfortunately, extremely worrying.
Fascinating because the political awareness demonstrated by the Hong Kong citizenry at large has become a key feature of the distinct identity of our sister SAR. This was not originally “a given”, and it became salient only back in 2002-2003 over the debate regarding article 23 and the appending national security law with the SARS outbreak as a backdrop. Social movements and unrests of some significance have quite a long history in Hong Kong, but then the triggering causes clearly used to intertwine anti-colonial sentiments and mainly labor issues with China’s own turmoil of the time, as exemplified by the massive riots of the 1920s and 1960s. The vast demonstrations in the wake of the Tiananmen massacre in June 1989 were already encompassing a wider array of the population, but the scale of the mobilization was commensurate with the emotional shock felt by many because of the blood-stained character of the repression, and then genuine feelings of solidarity with the victims precipitated growing fears about the future of Hong Kong itself after 1997. The 2003 events mark a turning point as they took place after the handover to Chinese sovereignty and mainly gathered white-collar and professional segments of society, along with their families, and thus exhume the coming of age of what political scientists characterize as a “vibrant civil society”, targeting the government for being too weak in its commitment to uphold “a high degree of autonomy” for the SAR. Since then, the “civility” of society has grown both in strength and scope, whether one considers attendance to the June 4th vigil in Victoria Park, the youth-led Scholarism movement against patriotic education, the Occupy Central movement and of course the civil referendum of June 2014.
The worrying side derives palpably from the inflexible stance adopted by the central authorities, as the NPC ruling completely excludes popular initiatives by requiring candidates for the 2017 elections to be endorsed by a majority vote casts in a non-elected 1,200-member nominating committee, and furthermore limits the number of candidates to two or three nominees. Quite a stark contrast with the winning motion of the civil referendum that garnered the acquiescence of more than 330,000 people for a “three-track” proposal (public, nominating committee and parties) to put forward candidates! For Michael Davis, professor of law at the University of Hong Kong, this constitutes a major betrayal of the spirit and letter of both the 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration and the Hong Kong Basic Law as it subverts completely the commitment to universal suffrage. In a very strong opinion published in the South China Morning Post on September 3rd, Prof. Davis further argues that not only does this ruling undermine the rule of law, but also infringes international law as it contradicts the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, of which Hong Kong is a signatory—article 25 of that Covenant provides every citizen the right “to vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage… guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors—, and furthermore contradicts the aim, as voiced out by Deng Xiaoping himself, for Hong Kong people to “put their hearts at ease”. For all these reasons, Prof. Davis concludes—without any risk of being sacked—that “democrats in the Legislative Council have no reason to support a bill under these constraints”.
What is there for us when Article 47 of our Macao Basic Law unmistakably lacks a straightforward commitment to universal suffrage? Well, first, this acts as a reminder that Macao is also a signatory of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [see art. 40 in the 3rd section of the MBL], and thus, if we follow the UN Human Rights Committee that interpret the Covenant, that not only suffrage should be “universal and equal” but that “persons entitled to vote have a free choice of candidates”. And then, we have the statement of Li Fei, the deputy secretary general of the standing committee of the NPC sent to Hong Kong to explain the ruling: “Only one person [candidate] does not make an election, but too many is not proper either” [一個人就不是選舉，但多了也不合適]. This constitutes a prompt recall that elections are chiefly about building trust, and thus Mr Chui’s commitment to further develop democracy in Macao, as stated in his 2014 platform, appears more pressing than one would have initially expected.
Published in Macau Daily Times, September 5th 2014
Fascinating because the political awareness demonstrated by the Hong Kong citizenry at large has become a key feature of the distinct identity of our sister SAR. This was not originally “a given”, and it became salient only back in 2002-2003 over the debate regarding article 23 and the appending national security law with the SARS outbreak as a backdrop. Social movements and unrests of some significance have quite a long history in Hong Kong, but then the triggering causes clearly used to intertwine anti-colonial sentiments and mainly labor issues with China’s own turmoil of the time, as exemplified by the massive riots of the 1920s and 1960s. The vast demonstrations in the wake of the Tiananmen massacre in June 1989 were already encompassing a wider array of the population, but the scale of the mobilization was commensurate with the emotional shock felt by many because of the blood-stained character of the repression, and then genuine feelings of solidarity with the victims precipitated growing fears about the future of Hong Kong itself after 1997. The 2003 events mark a turning point as they took place after the handover to Chinese sovereignty and mainly gathered white-collar and professional segments of society, along with their families, and thus exhume the coming of age of what political scientists characterize as a “vibrant civil society”, targeting the government for being too weak in its commitment to uphold “a high degree of autonomy” for the SAR. Since then, the “civility” of society has grown both in strength and scope, whether one considers attendance to the June 4th vigil in Victoria Park, the youth-led Scholarism movement against patriotic education, the Occupy Central movement and of course the civil referendum of June 2014.
The worrying side derives palpably from the inflexible stance adopted by the central authorities, as the NPC ruling completely excludes popular initiatives by requiring candidates for the 2017 elections to be endorsed by a majority vote casts in a non-elected 1,200-member nominating committee, and furthermore limits the number of candidates to two or three nominees. Quite a stark contrast with the winning motion of the civil referendum that garnered the acquiescence of more than 330,000 people for a “three-track” proposal (public, nominating committee and parties) to put forward candidates! For Michael Davis, professor of law at the University of Hong Kong, this constitutes a major betrayal of the spirit and letter of both the 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration and the Hong Kong Basic Law as it subverts completely the commitment to universal suffrage. In a very strong opinion published in the South China Morning Post on September 3rd, Prof. Davis further argues that not only does this ruling undermine the rule of law, but also infringes international law as it contradicts the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, of which Hong Kong is a signatory—article 25 of that Covenant provides every citizen the right “to vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage… guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors—, and furthermore contradicts the aim, as voiced out by Deng Xiaoping himself, for Hong Kong people to “put their hearts at ease”. For all these reasons, Prof. Davis concludes—without any risk of being sacked—that “democrats in the Legislative Council have no reason to support a bill under these constraints”.
What is there for us when Article 47 of our Macao Basic Law unmistakably lacks a straightforward commitment to universal suffrage? Well, first, this acts as a reminder that Macao is also a signatory of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [see art. 40 in the 3rd section of the MBL], and thus, if we follow the UN Human Rights Committee that interpret the Covenant, that not only suffrage should be “universal and equal” but that “persons entitled to vote have a free choice of candidates”. And then, we have the statement of Li Fei, the deputy secretary general of the standing committee of the NPC sent to Hong Kong to explain the ruling: “Only one person [candidate] does not make an election, but too many is not proper either” [一個人就不是選舉，但多了也不合適]. This constitutes a prompt recall that elections are chiefly about building trust, and thus Mr Chui’s commitment to further develop democracy in Macao, as stated in his 2014 platform, appears more pressing than one would have initially expected.
Published in Macau Daily Times, September 5th 2014
Friday, August 22, 2014
Kapok: The uniqueness of being only one
Elections get me excited, even when one has no real choice and the predictability of the outcome is no less than 100%. This is uncommon, I admit, as what fills people with enthusiasm during electoral events is the thrill of the contest, the uncertainty of the ultimate result despite the polls and the predictions, and of course the fact that any election is an exercise in power, the power of the one dropping her or his ballot in the box in order to decide upon her or his community’s future for the next four or five years. Elections in essence need to be contested; they suppose competition. In order for this competition to take place, differences have to be carved up, contrasts revealed, ideological stances spelled out, contradictory options openly expressed, alternative proposals debated, etc. More often than not, the infighting and bickering have more to do with ego and personal postures than with platforms, and yet this is a moment when the whole body of citizens gets hooked by the “affairs of the city”, the etymological meaning of politics. Macao people still remember very vividly the 2012 elections of the Chief Executive (CE) in Hong Kong: images of Henry Tang, often caricatured as a pig in the satirical press, blasting live on TV Leung Chun-ying, nicknamed the wolf by the same press, over his tough stand on civil liberties were gripping—and indeed the original front-runner ultimately lost the race to the challenger. The pro-democratic camp candidate, Albert Ho, who stood no chance of winning right from the start, was ultimately relegated to an even fainter secondary role, despite his many attempts to corner both pro-establishment candidates over their (lack of) commitment regarding universal suffrage. And the ultimate irony is that there was no real power of the people either, as the “election committee” was only made up of 1,200 members.
So, what can get me so excited about the present CE elections in Macao? Of course not the program of the unique candidate, which remarkably resembles its 2009 previous incarnation. Of course not the campaign itself, which consists of touring the ever supportive corporations aka traditional interests-associations and hearing patiently their very segmented grievances and proposals, as if they had not have ample time to express these during the past five legislative sessions, again missing the big picture of the overall interest of the community. No, what really fascinates me is the acquiescent abjuration of the most basic democratic values voiced out by some commentators. The argument goes like this: There is no alternative, this is the nature of the “other” system in Macao, and a contested CE election is the exception in our SAR, as it only happened once, back in 1999.
It is true that Hong Kong, in that respect, is quite the opposite as it experienced only two “exceptions” in 2002 and 2005, when Tung Chee Hwa and Donald Tsang respectively ran unopposed—a contested electoral process is thus the rule on the other side of the Pearl River. But what should be added is that these exceptions occurred at a time when our sister SAR went through its worst crisis of confidence ever—Tung indeed resigned before the end of his term, supposedly for health reasons. If we broaden the perspective to the world and google “elections with only one candidate”, what are the instances that we get? Yemen, Zimbabwe and North Korea… Let’s be honest, even “old democracies” fall victims of uncontested elections: in 2012, for example, some 40% of candidates ran uncontested in the state legislature elections in the United States, the highest percentage in 10 years. What kind of commentaries did that situation attract though? Acquiescence and fatalism or a genuine worry about the balance of power and the democratic outlook? Back in 2009 in Macao, there were talks of a possible challenger, the quite popular Prosecutor general Ho Chio-meng. 2009 was also a year during which many politically sensitive surveys and polls were conducted, thus giving the impression that public opinion was much more directly probed.
I partially agree with the idea that this time around what will really matter is foreseeably the new appointments and possibly the new structure of government that will be revealed at the end of December. Yet, with the challenge of the civic referendum looming, I guess it would have been a good idea for Mr Chui to at least bring the novelty of a live TV show, some kind of hybrid between a debate and a forum. Courage is indeed a component of political legitimacy.
Published in Macau Daily Times, August 22nd 2014
So, what can get me so excited about the present CE elections in Macao? Of course not the program of the unique candidate, which remarkably resembles its 2009 previous incarnation. Of course not the campaign itself, which consists of touring the ever supportive corporations aka traditional interests-associations and hearing patiently their very segmented grievances and proposals, as if they had not have ample time to express these during the past five legislative sessions, again missing the big picture of the overall interest of the community. No, what really fascinates me is the acquiescent abjuration of the most basic democratic values voiced out by some commentators. The argument goes like this: There is no alternative, this is the nature of the “other” system in Macao, and a contested CE election is the exception in our SAR, as it only happened once, back in 1999.
It is true that Hong Kong, in that respect, is quite the opposite as it experienced only two “exceptions” in 2002 and 2005, when Tung Chee Hwa and Donald Tsang respectively ran unopposed—a contested electoral process is thus the rule on the other side of the Pearl River. But what should be added is that these exceptions occurred at a time when our sister SAR went through its worst crisis of confidence ever—Tung indeed resigned before the end of his term, supposedly for health reasons. If we broaden the perspective to the world and google “elections with only one candidate”, what are the instances that we get? Yemen, Zimbabwe and North Korea… Let’s be honest, even “old democracies” fall victims of uncontested elections: in 2012, for example, some 40% of candidates ran uncontested in the state legislature elections in the United States, the highest percentage in 10 years. What kind of commentaries did that situation attract though? Acquiescence and fatalism or a genuine worry about the balance of power and the democratic outlook? Back in 2009 in Macao, there were talks of a possible challenger, the quite popular Prosecutor general Ho Chio-meng. 2009 was also a year during which many politically sensitive surveys and polls were conducted, thus giving the impression that public opinion was much more directly probed.
I partially agree with the idea that this time around what will really matter is foreseeably the new appointments and possibly the new structure of government that will be revealed at the end of December. Yet, with the challenge of the civic referendum looming, I guess it would have been a good idea for Mr Chui to at least bring the novelty of a live TV show, some kind of hybrid between a debate and a forum. Courage is indeed a component of political legitimacy.
Published in Macau Daily Times, August 22nd 2014
Friday, July 25, 2014
Kapok: Drawing the line
I must admit it is often tricky to “draw the line between academic research, political commentary and direct political intervention”—to quote my former employer, and for sure, the easiest way to draw that line is to make sure that there can be no conflict between these three forms of endeavor by just eliminating the first one, even though your mission is precisely to make sure that everything academic is protected under your watch.
If you don’t write about politics from an academic perspective, then there are few chances that you will be sought after to provide political commentary and for sure any “direct political intervention” will be seen as “just” the act of any citizen, unless you become yourself an “activist”, that it is to say a recognized figure of a political movement.
Many questions arise from that “easiest” path: is it worthy of a university to let go of sophistication and decide that all intellectual undertakings should be governed by the most basic law of electricity of “on or off”, depending on the circumstances? Is it even effective in the short-term and can the expected trade-off, set at a few tens of millions, be “safely” secured? Is it sustainable in terms of image and standing in the community, and if yes, how so? From a moral standpoint, the “easiest” path is plain wrong because the end justifies the means, but then, even from a practical and almost cynical angle, what are the actual benefits going to be?
Now, regarding my own “convictions”. I know no political scientist who is not a democrat at heart. How can one studying “power in a social context” and deciphering the best forms of government be in favor of totalitarianism or even authoritarianism given our dark and traumatizing twentieth century? And even if we let go of the old categories, everybody knows, even the highest officials of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the dangers of plutocracy—the government of, by and for the wealthiest—and kleptocracy—the government of confiscators/thieves. Why would Xi Jinping engage in such a wide-sweeping campaign to fight corruption if that was not the case? Why would close to 200 members of the Central Committee of the CCP, including a few from the elite Politburo, fall for good because of that new operation to catch “flies as well as tigers”?
Sure thing, “democracy” is not as popular as it used to be in the People’s Republic, say up to March 2012 when then Premier Wen Jiabao emotionally spoke about the need for political reform following democratic imperatives.
In fact, democracy seems pretty much the target of the “Seven Speak-Nots” defined in May 2013 as the taboo subjects that should not be discussed openly in the press or by academic circles (universal values, civil society, citizen rights, judicial independence, freedom of the press, past mistakes of the communist party, and the privileged capitalist class). Should that affect Macao? Is there any Communist party in need of restructuring in Macao? Is there a party that does not want to see its capacity to rule affected by an unquestionably weakening drive to uproot corruption in its own ranks?
Being a democrat at heart does not mean that one does not know the shortcomings of democracy, especially when it comes to “efficiency” and the claim of representativeness—disenchantment arises as much in “archaeodemocracies” as in “neodemocracies”. But then, one of the things I argue in my latest “academic” paper is that the corporatist outlook of Macao’s political system inherited from the 1980s, despite or because of the liberal context, has become fairly frustrating for a locally engaged, more affluent, more professional and better-educated youth that can but all too easily blame outdated and unsuitable intermediation bodies for all the inadequate public policies catering only for segmented parts of the community. That cost me my job.
Published in Macau Daily Times, July 25th 2014
If you don’t write about politics from an academic perspective, then there are few chances that you will be sought after to provide political commentary and for sure any “direct political intervention” will be seen as “just” the act of any citizen, unless you become yourself an “activist”, that it is to say a recognized figure of a political movement.
Many questions arise from that “easiest” path: is it worthy of a university to let go of sophistication and decide that all intellectual undertakings should be governed by the most basic law of electricity of “on or off”, depending on the circumstances? Is it even effective in the short-term and can the expected trade-off, set at a few tens of millions, be “safely” secured? Is it sustainable in terms of image and standing in the community, and if yes, how so? From a moral standpoint, the “easiest” path is plain wrong because the end justifies the means, but then, even from a practical and almost cynical angle, what are the actual benefits going to be?
Now, regarding my own “convictions”. I know no political scientist who is not a democrat at heart. How can one studying “power in a social context” and deciphering the best forms of government be in favor of totalitarianism or even authoritarianism given our dark and traumatizing twentieth century? And even if we let go of the old categories, everybody knows, even the highest officials of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the dangers of plutocracy—the government of, by and for the wealthiest—and kleptocracy—the government of confiscators/thieves. Why would Xi Jinping engage in such a wide-sweeping campaign to fight corruption if that was not the case? Why would close to 200 members of the Central Committee of the CCP, including a few from the elite Politburo, fall for good because of that new operation to catch “flies as well as tigers”?
Sure thing, “democracy” is not as popular as it used to be in the People’s Republic, say up to March 2012 when then Premier Wen Jiabao emotionally spoke about the need for political reform following democratic imperatives.
In fact, democracy seems pretty much the target of the “Seven Speak-Nots” defined in May 2013 as the taboo subjects that should not be discussed openly in the press or by academic circles (universal values, civil society, citizen rights, judicial independence, freedom of the press, past mistakes of the communist party, and the privileged capitalist class). Should that affect Macao? Is there any Communist party in need of restructuring in Macao? Is there a party that does not want to see its capacity to rule affected by an unquestionably weakening drive to uproot corruption in its own ranks?
Being a democrat at heart does not mean that one does not know the shortcomings of democracy, especially when it comes to “efficiency” and the claim of representativeness—disenchantment arises as much in “archaeodemocracies” as in “neodemocracies”. But then, one of the things I argue in my latest “academic” paper is that the corporatist outlook of Macao’s political system inherited from the 1980s, despite or because of the liberal context, has become fairly frustrating for a locally engaged, more affluent, more professional and better-educated youth that can but all too easily blame outdated and unsuitable intermediation bodies for all the inadequate public policies catering only for segmented parts of the community. That cost me my job.
Published in Macau Daily Times, July 25th 2014
Friday, July 11, 2014
Kapok: Contentious words
Let’s be clear, from a constitutional point of view there is nothing “illegal” in organizing an informal public consultation aka survey in the form of a mock referendum regarding the Chief Executive selection process. It is however legally “invalid”, as stated by both the Macao SAR government and the Central Government Liaison Office, as it has absolutely no binding effect in law. But is that what really matters?
In the words of the three organizers of this “civil referendum” or “civil society sponsored consultation”, the whole idea is to “give citizens an opportunity to experience the exercise of civil rights and civil liberty”. It is of course highly politically motivated, as this will take place right before the election of the Chief Executive in August, and results will be announced only after the highly probable reappointment of Chui Sai On for a second term. Of the two motions to be discussed, one will concern the possible election of the Chief Executive through universal suffrage in 2019, but the other is definitely targeted at the ongoing process, as this second motion could be either “Do you have confidence in the sole candidate in the Chief Executive Election 2014 [name of the candidate] to become the Chief Executive?” or “Which candidate in the Chief Executive Election 2014 do you favor as the Chief Executive?” In the eyes of the MSAR government, this political stunt is thus clearly seen as a provocation, and the “illegal” characterization can then be understood as a condemnation of a perceived attempt to discredit the official result by resorting to a non-legally binding substitutive method of designation.
Two elements of context have to be kept in mind. The fact that close to 800,000 people participated in a civil referendum at the end of June in Hong Kong to advocate a citizen initiative in the selection process for the candidates who will participate in the Chief Executive elections in 2017. The issue is to say: let’s not transform the promise of “universal suffrage” as enshrined in article 45 of the Hong Kong Basic Law into a meaningless one if the choice of candidates is not to be open. But then, the Hong Kong SAR government can legitimately claim that the sentence preceding that promise takes precedence: the method “shall be specified in the light of the actual situation in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and in accordance with the principle of gradual and orderly progress.” Yet, sponsored by the Occupy Central with Love and Peace, the Hong Kong civil referendum was only concerned with an election to come, and was commissioned to the Public Opinion Programme of The University of Hong Kong and the Centre for Social Policy Studies of the Hong Kong Polytechnic University, thus giving it the “respectability” of both distance in time and academic grounding—can anybody imagine ANY university in Macao engaging in that kind of endeavor?
Well, there was one previously – a survey I ran on the election of the Chief Executive back in early 2009. We found that 51% of our respondents favored “suffrage universal” out of the 4 possible choices. No claim here in being legally binding, but then, neither does it contradict article 47 of the Macao Basic Law: “The Chief Executive of the Macao Special Administrative Region shall be selected by election or through consultations held locally and be appointed by the Central People’s Government.”
Ultimately, from an academic perspective, my questions are: why do like-minded civil groups in Macao have to resort to this kind of “political happening”? In plain English, why is the system so “stuck” that it does not allow for new forms of political participation to emerge? Isn’t it obvious that between the depiction of the 2012 political reform package as having “a positive impact on the maintenance of a stable political system and improved democratic elements in the constitution of Macao” (Macao Yearbook 2013) and the 20,000 people demonstrating on May 25th 2014 against a government-sponsored law regarding a (too) generous retirement scheme for senior officials, there is a growing discrepancy? What is really missing in the Basic Law is not the promise of universal suffrage but the duty to take into account “the actual situation” of Macao. Clearly, the principle of “one position, one candidate” that has been the rule since 2004, although not illegal, is not helping…
Published in Macau Daily Times, July 11th 2014
In the words of the three organizers of this “civil referendum” or “civil society sponsored consultation”, the whole idea is to “give citizens an opportunity to experience the exercise of civil rights and civil liberty”. It is of course highly politically motivated, as this will take place right before the election of the Chief Executive in August, and results will be announced only after the highly probable reappointment of Chui Sai On for a second term. Of the two motions to be discussed, one will concern the possible election of the Chief Executive through universal suffrage in 2019, but the other is definitely targeted at the ongoing process, as this second motion could be either “Do you have confidence in the sole candidate in the Chief Executive Election 2014 [name of the candidate] to become the Chief Executive?” or “Which candidate in the Chief Executive Election 2014 do you favor as the Chief Executive?” In the eyes of the MSAR government, this political stunt is thus clearly seen as a provocation, and the “illegal” characterization can then be understood as a condemnation of a perceived attempt to discredit the official result by resorting to a non-legally binding substitutive method of designation.
Two elements of context have to be kept in mind. The fact that close to 800,000 people participated in a civil referendum at the end of June in Hong Kong to advocate a citizen initiative in the selection process for the candidates who will participate in the Chief Executive elections in 2017. The issue is to say: let’s not transform the promise of “universal suffrage” as enshrined in article 45 of the Hong Kong Basic Law into a meaningless one if the choice of candidates is not to be open. But then, the Hong Kong SAR government can legitimately claim that the sentence preceding that promise takes precedence: the method “shall be specified in the light of the actual situation in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and in accordance with the principle of gradual and orderly progress.” Yet, sponsored by the Occupy Central with Love and Peace, the Hong Kong civil referendum was only concerned with an election to come, and was commissioned to the Public Opinion Programme of The University of Hong Kong and the Centre for Social Policy Studies of the Hong Kong Polytechnic University, thus giving it the “respectability” of both distance in time and academic grounding—can anybody imagine ANY university in Macao engaging in that kind of endeavor?
Well, there was one previously – a survey I ran on the election of the Chief Executive back in early 2009. We found that 51% of our respondents favored “suffrage universal” out of the 4 possible choices. No claim here in being legally binding, but then, neither does it contradict article 47 of the Macao Basic Law: “The Chief Executive of the Macao Special Administrative Region shall be selected by election or through consultations held locally and be appointed by the Central People’s Government.”
Ultimately, from an academic perspective, my questions are: why do like-minded civil groups in Macao have to resort to this kind of “political happening”? In plain English, why is the system so “stuck” that it does not allow for new forms of political participation to emerge? Isn’t it obvious that between the depiction of the 2012 political reform package as having “a positive impact on the maintenance of a stable political system and improved democratic elements in the constitution of Macao” (Macao Yearbook 2013) and the 20,000 people demonstrating on May 25th 2014 against a government-sponsored law regarding a (too) generous retirement scheme for senior officials, there is a growing discrepancy? What is really missing in the Basic Law is not the promise of universal suffrage but the duty to take into account “the actual situation” of Macao. Clearly, the principle of “one position, one candidate” that has been the rule since 2004, although not illegal, is not helping…
Published in Macau Daily Times, July 11th 2014
Friday, June 06, 2014
Kapok: The old regime
If Hong Kong did indeed host “China’s largest 25th anniversary Tiananmen remembrance rally” on June 4th, it was not, contrary to the South China Morning Post's headline, the “only” one on Chinese soil, and nor was it its first ever installment on the southern bank of the Pearl River. What was new though was the fact that it gathered more than 2,000 people in Macao, people who were on the steps of Saint Paul’s façade already in 1989 to demonstrate their dismay in the wake of the repression as well as younger participants, not even born at that time, concurring in the same aspiration to see the official verdict of “counter-revolutionary riot” be reversed. Desires to rectify the master narratives of historical events that are perceived as having been vastly distorted by an official truth are awfully enduring in any human community, and quite understandably so as this is the condition for collective memories to be soothed and united again.
Even though the figures seem pale in comparison with the 180,000 who amassed in Victoria Park on Wednesday evening, the very fact that more than 10 times the usual number of participants assembled in Senado Square, right in the middle of it, next to the fountain and up to the entrance of a popular cosmetics shop, is worthy of careful consideration.
Regarding the location, organizers of the event benefitted from two sets of distinct and yet converging factors: the cancelling of the traditional extravaganza celebrating “Children’s Day” because of the official mourning of one of Macao’s greatest Chinese patriots passing away, and two rulings of the Court of Final Appeal stating that not only did associations organizing the vigil have every right to apply for Senado Square but that the Public Security Police had no ground in deciding to restrict the vigil to the traditional small corner of Senado Square facing Saint Dominic’s Church.
As far as numbers are concerned, it is of course tricky to decide whether the importance of the turnout was mainly due to the particular significance of the 25th anniversary or to a broader social context that had seen some 20,000 Macao citizens, often very young ones, demonstrate on May 25th and again 7,000 on May 27th against a perceivably unjustifiable bill setting in place very generous packages for retiring officials along with unwarranted criminal immunity for the Chief Executive. If one looks at the past for an indication, it is true that the 20th anniversary did mark in Hong Kong a three fold increase between 2008—less than 50,000 people—and 2009—about 150,000. But for Macao, as far as one can remember, there was no such upsurge, as participants back in 2009 were in the 2 to 300, only marginally more numerous than in 2008. Thus, the constant references made by some of the organizers in Macao to the May 25th/27th demonstrations must not be taken lightly, as it is unquestionable that the 2014 June 4th vigil in Macao appears, if not yet as a turning point, at least as a landmark.
Party leaders in China, and especially Wang Qishan, the Politburo Standing Committee member in charge of Party discipline, are reportedly great readers of Tocqueville’s "The Old Regime and the Revolution" and have stressed the paradox that revolutions do not happen when things are worse, but rather when things have just started to change, thus making the need for deeper and yet incremental reforms somehow imperative if unnecessarily violent turmoil is to be avoided. Even if the China Daily says so.
Published in Macau Daily Times, June 6th 2014
Even though the figures seem pale in comparison with the 180,000 who amassed in Victoria Park on Wednesday evening, the very fact that more than 10 times the usual number of participants assembled in Senado Square, right in the middle of it, next to the fountain and up to the entrance of a popular cosmetics shop, is worthy of careful consideration.
Regarding the location, organizers of the event benefitted from two sets of distinct and yet converging factors: the cancelling of the traditional extravaganza celebrating “Children’s Day” because of the official mourning of one of Macao’s greatest Chinese patriots passing away, and two rulings of the Court of Final Appeal stating that not only did associations organizing the vigil have every right to apply for Senado Square but that the Public Security Police had no ground in deciding to restrict the vigil to the traditional small corner of Senado Square facing Saint Dominic’s Church.
As far as numbers are concerned, it is of course tricky to decide whether the importance of the turnout was mainly due to the particular significance of the 25th anniversary or to a broader social context that had seen some 20,000 Macao citizens, often very young ones, demonstrate on May 25th and again 7,000 on May 27th against a perceivably unjustifiable bill setting in place very generous packages for retiring officials along with unwarranted criminal immunity for the Chief Executive. If one looks at the past for an indication, it is true that the 20th anniversary did mark in Hong Kong a three fold increase between 2008—less than 50,000 people—and 2009—about 150,000. But for Macao, as far as one can remember, there was no such upsurge, as participants back in 2009 were in the 2 to 300, only marginally more numerous than in 2008. Thus, the constant references made by some of the organizers in Macao to the May 25th/27th demonstrations must not be taken lightly, as it is unquestionable that the 2014 June 4th vigil in Macao appears, if not yet as a turning point, at least as a landmark.
Party leaders in China, and especially Wang Qishan, the Politburo Standing Committee member in charge of Party discipline, are reportedly great readers of Tocqueville’s "The Old Regime and the Revolution" and have stressed the paradox that revolutions do not happen when things are worse, but rather when things have just started to change, thus making the need for deeper and yet incremental reforms somehow imperative if unnecessarily violent turmoil is to be avoided. Even if the China Daily says so.
Published in Macau Daily Times, June 6th 2014
Monday, May 26, 2014
Kapok: What happens in Macao… doesn’t stay in Macao
The newly revised bill soon to be introduced for a plenary vote at the Legislative Assembly that deals with the benefits granted to the Chief Executive (CE) and the principal officials (the five secretaries, the two commissioners, and the heads of the police and customs) upon leaving their office is creating quite a stir in the community and beyond. The main arguments of the opponents of the bill revolve around three sets of questions: its adequacy with the Basic Law; the amount of these benefits; and issues pertaining to procedural decision-making—in plain English, the absence of a public consultation regarding the matter. But the dispute has now spread beyond the legislative hemicycle: a petition asking for citizens to express their disagreement is claiming several thousand signatures; a Facebook page adorned with a picture of a pig and entitled “Greedy officials’ severance benefits are really excessive” has attracted hundreds of postings, close to 1,500 Likes and been shared more than 1,100 times; and the news has appeared and even made the front page, on May 21st, of the most widely-read Chinese newspaper in Hong Kong, the reputedly pro-Beijing leftist and yet grassroots-oriented Oriental Daily News—one of the titles raising the question whether Macao legislators had paved the way for the creation of a “third system”.
As far as the Basic Law is concerned, the main squabble has to do with the article related to the criminal immunity of the CE, also encapsulated in the bill, and the fact that this would contradict the principle of equality among citizens enshrined in our mini-constitution, especially because the “presidential immunity” that exists in many a place precisely concerns heads of state or prime ministers, whereas the CE can merely be considered has a “super province governor”. Yet, I beg to disagree: one cannot advocate the uniqueness of the second system all year long, and nevertheless diminish the status of the CE: our CE acts and symbolizes our whole political community, and the Basic Law is our constitution. What is missing though are possible derogations in order to waive this immunity, especially vested in the legislature, in case the CE commits acts that can be construed as incompatible with his responsibilities.
In principle, I personally believe and this is the case in many polities around the world, that the highest authority of a community should be entitled to life-long benefits upon retirement from official duty, at least for the sake of integrity and independence of the person who has embodied the whole community, and ultimately because he or she will never cease to represent this community. All benefits in nature (a car with a driver, a guard and an office) seem logical, and of course a revenue has to be included. What has now been decided, retroactively up to the year 2000, is to provide a revenue equivalent to 70% of the CE's monthly remuneration, and this for as long as he or she does not receive a salary from private employment. This corresponds to about MOP189,000 per month—a pretty comfy retirement scheme (a former French president, by comparison, makes MOP57,000 a month). Principal officials would get a one-time lump sum as severance benefit equivalent to 30% of a monthly salary times the number of months in service if not returning to the public sector and only 14% if returning to the public sector. Therefore, a secretary who has served ten years would receive MOP6,743,000 upon leaving office if not returning to the public sector—this is equivalent to 3 years of full salary, whereas, again in France, a former minister will only collect his full salary for 6 months. The amounts are thus pretty impressive, and the timing of the law quite tactless, as the salaries of the CE and principal officials have just increased by 10% in January and the whole administration is lined-up for an important reshuffle at the end of the year.
Would a public consultation help quiet down a growing public anxiety, as advocated by opposition legislators? Possibly, as the matter would at least be opened for discussion. But most surely, what would make a difference is if the president of the legislative commission responsible for the bill could come up with a better explanation than the one openly admitting that amounts and percentages were decided in a “non-scientific” way and because they seemed right. What would also help is if a CE-picked legislator would refrain from declaring that the principal officials even deserve “50%”, instead of the 30% already bumped up from the original 14%. Small circle politics has to be played with sophistication if it vies to elude embarrassment.
Published in Macau Daily Times, May 26th 2014
As far as the Basic Law is concerned, the main squabble has to do with the article related to the criminal immunity of the CE, also encapsulated in the bill, and the fact that this would contradict the principle of equality among citizens enshrined in our mini-constitution, especially because the “presidential immunity” that exists in many a place precisely concerns heads of state or prime ministers, whereas the CE can merely be considered has a “super province governor”. Yet, I beg to disagree: one cannot advocate the uniqueness of the second system all year long, and nevertheless diminish the status of the CE: our CE acts and symbolizes our whole political community, and the Basic Law is our constitution. What is missing though are possible derogations in order to waive this immunity, especially vested in the legislature, in case the CE commits acts that can be construed as incompatible with his responsibilities.
In principle, I personally believe and this is the case in many polities around the world, that the highest authority of a community should be entitled to life-long benefits upon retirement from official duty, at least for the sake of integrity and independence of the person who has embodied the whole community, and ultimately because he or she will never cease to represent this community. All benefits in nature (a car with a driver, a guard and an office) seem logical, and of course a revenue has to be included. What has now been decided, retroactively up to the year 2000, is to provide a revenue equivalent to 70% of the CE's monthly remuneration, and this for as long as he or she does not receive a salary from private employment. This corresponds to about MOP189,000 per month—a pretty comfy retirement scheme (a former French president, by comparison, makes MOP57,000 a month). Principal officials would get a one-time lump sum as severance benefit equivalent to 30% of a monthly salary times the number of months in service if not returning to the public sector and only 14% if returning to the public sector. Therefore, a secretary who has served ten years would receive MOP6,743,000 upon leaving office if not returning to the public sector—this is equivalent to 3 years of full salary, whereas, again in France, a former minister will only collect his full salary for 6 months. The amounts are thus pretty impressive, and the timing of the law quite tactless, as the salaries of the CE and principal officials have just increased by 10% in January and the whole administration is lined-up for an important reshuffle at the end of the year.
Would a public consultation help quiet down a growing public anxiety, as advocated by opposition legislators? Possibly, as the matter would at least be opened for discussion. But most surely, what would make a difference is if the president of the legislative commission responsible for the bill could come up with a better explanation than the one openly admitting that amounts and percentages were decided in a “non-scientific” way and because they seemed right. What would also help is if a CE-picked legislator would refrain from declaring that the principal officials even deserve “50%”, instead of the 30% already bumped up from the original 14%. Small circle politics has to be played with sophistication if it vies to elude embarrassment.
Published in Macau Daily Times, May 26th 2014
Friday, April 18, 2014
Kapok: Swift and resolute
The recently dismissed mayor of Bogota, Gustavo Petro, was absolutely right when he stated that “a developed country is not a place where the poor have cars. It’s where the rich use public transportation.” I am pretty sure our neighbors in Hong Kong, having just been listed ‘best city in the world for commuters’, would beg to disagree: indeed developed countries can have it all—nice cars for those who can afford them and great public transportations for everybody—it just comes at a price.
If Hong Kong tops the list of the 84 cities assessed in the “The Future of Urban Mobility 2.0”, it still underachieves when it comes to the development of cycling paths and is clearly not faring well as far as air quality indicators are concerned. And yet, even in the first installation of the very same report produced by consulting firm Arthur D. Little in 2011, Hong Kong was already No. 1 and its success was seen as resulting from “a well-balanced split between different forms of transport that move people away from individualized motorized transport”—the Octopus card, owned at the time by 95% of citizens, was being deemed the cornerstone of a “well-articulated mobility strategy”.
In 2014 the wording has grown stronger: Hong Kong is now doted with “the most advanced urban mobility system in the world.” Among the key elements of that system: public transport represents 64% of the modal split; the number of vehicles registered per capita is among the lowest amongst the cities surveyed; and the average number of smart cards per citizen reaches 3.1! Residents often own two cards, whereas both cross-border commuters and tourists alike are strongly encouraged to get one. When it comes to “green” drawbacks, things have obviously deteriorated since 2011, apart from cycling paths: transport-related CO2 emissions have doubled in just three years! Hence the adoption of the resolute and ambitious “Clean Air Plan” in March 2013, clearly a pre-condition for cycling paths to be rolled out beyond the New Territories…
What about Macao?
In a previous column, I already stressed the inadequacy of the yearly assessment provided by the Transport Department (DSAT) regarding the setting in motion of the “General Policy on Traffic and Land Transportation in Macao (2010-2020)”—which, back in 2009, lucidly identified the main issues while making some far-reaching, although not mandatory, recommendations. To put it simply, the DSAT report can hardly hide that “too little” is done and “too slow”. Key statistics, like the share of public transport in the modal split, the penetration of smart cards or the cars per capita ratio are simply absent—despite some of these indicators being used in the 2009 consultation document.
The criteria delineated by the Arthur D. Little survey could therefore be of interest: all together, it is some 19 factors divided between “maturity” and “performance” elements that allow for a fruitful comparative perspective. On the “maturity” side, only 2 out of 12 criteria seem to bode well in favor of Macao: the low public transportation fare and the frequency of the busiest transportation lines. But road density is about 7 times more than in Hong Kong and the number of cars per capita at least 2 times more, even if we exclude the 2-wheelers. On the side of “performance”, hardly any criteria seem to have improved based on measurements available in Macao: air indicators are deteriorating; traffic-related fatalities are worsening; the evolution of the share of public transport or zero-emissions means in the modal split are marginally positive; and the mean travel time to work has clearly gotten worse.
While waiting for the LRT to be completed, swift and resolute action seems needed. Even though the “how(s)” would require undoubtedly more than a column to explore, redesigning bus routes and operations might prove useful, while making a better integrated usage of the Macau Pass could help—all parking meters in Hong Kong have been Octopus friendly since 2004. But first things first: let’s improve the assessment criteria!
Published in Macau Daily Times on April 18 2014
If Hong Kong tops the list of the 84 cities assessed in the “The Future of Urban Mobility 2.0”, it still underachieves when it comes to the development of cycling paths and is clearly not faring well as far as air quality indicators are concerned. And yet, even in the first installation of the very same report produced by consulting firm Arthur D. Little in 2011, Hong Kong was already No. 1 and its success was seen as resulting from “a well-balanced split between different forms of transport that move people away from individualized motorized transport”—the Octopus card, owned at the time by 95% of citizens, was being deemed the cornerstone of a “well-articulated mobility strategy”.
In 2014 the wording has grown stronger: Hong Kong is now doted with “the most advanced urban mobility system in the world.” Among the key elements of that system: public transport represents 64% of the modal split; the number of vehicles registered per capita is among the lowest amongst the cities surveyed; and the average number of smart cards per citizen reaches 3.1! Residents often own two cards, whereas both cross-border commuters and tourists alike are strongly encouraged to get one. When it comes to “green” drawbacks, things have obviously deteriorated since 2011, apart from cycling paths: transport-related CO2 emissions have doubled in just three years! Hence the adoption of the resolute and ambitious “Clean Air Plan” in March 2013, clearly a pre-condition for cycling paths to be rolled out beyond the New Territories…
What about Macao?
In a previous column, I already stressed the inadequacy of the yearly assessment provided by the Transport Department (DSAT) regarding the setting in motion of the “General Policy on Traffic and Land Transportation in Macao (2010-2020)”—which, back in 2009, lucidly identified the main issues while making some far-reaching, although not mandatory, recommendations. To put it simply, the DSAT report can hardly hide that “too little” is done and “too slow”. Key statistics, like the share of public transport in the modal split, the penetration of smart cards or the cars per capita ratio are simply absent—despite some of these indicators being used in the 2009 consultation document.
The criteria delineated by the Arthur D. Little survey could therefore be of interest: all together, it is some 19 factors divided between “maturity” and “performance” elements that allow for a fruitful comparative perspective. On the “maturity” side, only 2 out of 12 criteria seem to bode well in favor of Macao: the low public transportation fare and the frequency of the busiest transportation lines. But road density is about 7 times more than in Hong Kong and the number of cars per capita at least 2 times more, even if we exclude the 2-wheelers. On the side of “performance”, hardly any criteria seem to have improved based on measurements available in Macao: air indicators are deteriorating; traffic-related fatalities are worsening; the evolution of the share of public transport or zero-emissions means in the modal split are marginally positive; and the mean travel time to work has clearly gotten worse.
While waiting for the LRT to be completed, swift and resolute action seems needed. Even though the “how(s)” would require undoubtedly more than a column to explore, redesigning bus routes and operations might prove useful, while making a better integrated usage of the Macau Pass could help—all parking meters in Hong Kong have been Octopus friendly since 2004. But first things first: let’s improve the assessment criteria!
Published in Macau Daily Times on April 18 2014
Friday, March 21, 2014
Kapok: Imperious engagement
Agreed, for society to engage with the state, the government, rules have to be prescribed and followed, and yet, engagement, on society’s part, is as much a matter of orderly procedure as it is a staple of creative novelty, especially when demands appear to fall on deaf ears on the receiving end. Few regimes in the world, with the patent exception of North Korea, openly advocate the irrelevance of the people—and even for supremo Kim the Third, it is only because he has been led to believe that he is the stellar guide and the god-like embodiment of “his” people on earth. For idealist and progressive minds, the strength and balance of a democratic regime depend on the existence of a vibrant “civil society” engaging the state, even though very often this means contesting it. This has proven true for most of the peaceful transitions from authoritarian rule to democracy, and this is equally significant in more established democratic settings, those in which citizens have started to question the validity of a purely electoral definition of democracy that only cares about citizen-voters every 4 to 5 years—what scholars dub “liberal democracy disenchantment”. Hence the fad for participatory democracy, public consultations, deliberative polling and “civil sector” partaking in government to partly compensate for the ubiquitous “careerisation” of politics. I am being cynical here, as if it was a mere instrumentalisation on the side of politicians—some kind of conspiracy to preserve the domination of the few on the many by defusing revolutionary threats—, but these forms of engagement are actually designed to restore the legitimacy of a regime that claims to be by, of and for the people.
The same rationale goes for dictatorships and for what political scientists call “anocracies”—a midway between autocracy and democracy in which vested interests compete among themselves and yet confiscate power. Whatever the regime, what matters ultimately is for ruling elite to last and moreover, for their natural or anointed inheritors to outlive them in the same capacity—here, Kim the Third is truly an exception, and even the most obscure despotic apprentice knows it. Hence the necessity for the “people” to be solicited and consulted in order to keep track of the common good, even though there are no electoral mechanisms to make the rulers accountable. Of course, the exercise has its limits, even in a place as sophisticated as China. Cao Shunli, one of the most respected and eminent “petitioners” paid this very fact with her life on March 14: arrested at Beijing International Airport on September 14 last year while on her way to Geneva to attend a human rights event, she was only indicted in December for “picking quarrels to create disturbances” and ultimately fell into a coma at the end of February because of appalling detention conditions, only to die a few weeks after. Petitioning for Cao Shunli, a law graduate, had become the only “channel” to reach a government necessarily comprehended as benevolent—her “petitioner” crusade started back in 2002 after she had been sacked from her work unit for exposing corruption in housing distribution. This time around, many believe she was actually arrested because of the two-month long sit-in she organized along 60 other petitioners in front of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to request to participate in the drafting of the ‘National Human Rights Action Plan’, as law—Chinese law—entitled her to.
In Macao, petitioning is not as lethally hazardous, but the fact that out of 900 petitions addressed to Mr Chui Sai On in 2013, only 82 have been answered directly, a bit less than 600 sent to relevant secretaries and 306 archived without any kind of reply has prompted disquieted comments by some analysts—mainly stressing that the Chief Executive was wrong to treat so lightly the ever expanding power of the people to directly voice their anxieties. I would add that first of all we would need to know a bit more about the relevance of the answers produced by the Chief Executive and his secretaries—ask legislators how their queries to the government are being timely and adequately treated… And then, why should “direct” contacts with the highest authorities via petitions or radio call-in show take precedence over “mediated” and “informed” probing coming from “concerned groups”, media and legislators?
Published in Macau Daily Times, March 21 2014
The same rationale goes for dictatorships and for what political scientists call “anocracies”—a midway between autocracy and democracy in which vested interests compete among themselves and yet confiscate power. Whatever the regime, what matters ultimately is for ruling elite to last and moreover, for their natural or anointed inheritors to outlive them in the same capacity—here, Kim the Third is truly an exception, and even the most obscure despotic apprentice knows it. Hence the necessity for the “people” to be solicited and consulted in order to keep track of the common good, even though there are no electoral mechanisms to make the rulers accountable. Of course, the exercise has its limits, even in a place as sophisticated as China. Cao Shunli, one of the most respected and eminent “petitioners” paid this very fact with her life on March 14: arrested at Beijing International Airport on September 14 last year while on her way to Geneva to attend a human rights event, she was only indicted in December for “picking quarrels to create disturbances” and ultimately fell into a coma at the end of February because of appalling detention conditions, only to die a few weeks after. Petitioning for Cao Shunli, a law graduate, had become the only “channel” to reach a government necessarily comprehended as benevolent—her “petitioner” crusade started back in 2002 after she had been sacked from her work unit for exposing corruption in housing distribution. This time around, many believe she was actually arrested because of the two-month long sit-in she organized along 60 other petitioners in front of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to request to participate in the drafting of the ‘National Human Rights Action Plan’, as law—Chinese law—entitled her to.
In Macao, petitioning is not as lethally hazardous, but the fact that out of 900 petitions addressed to Mr Chui Sai On in 2013, only 82 have been answered directly, a bit less than 600 sent to relevant secretaries and 306 archived without any kind of reply has prompted disquieted comments by some analysts—mainly stressing that the Chief Executive was wrong to treat so lightly the ever expanding power of the people to directly voice their anxieties. I would add that first of all we would need to know a bit more about the relevance of the answers produced by the Chief Executive and his secretaries—ask legislators how their queries to the government are being timely and adequately treated… And then, why should “direct” contacts with the highest authorities via petitions or radio call-in show take precedence over “mediated” and “informed” probing coming from “concerned groups”, media and legislators?
Published in Macau Daily Times, March 21 2014
Friday, March 07, 2014
Kapok: What happens in…
As is often the case with sayings, their actual meaning is commonly debatable and easily twisted by the interest and the context of the moment. Such is the case with “What happens in Vegas stays in Vegas”, that pulls together two sets of meanings. On the one hand, related to permissiveness and secrecy—you can engage in anything borderline in Vegas, but whatever you do out there will not spill over Vegas’s vicinity—and on the other, connected to absolute otherness—this is only possible in Vegas. Apart from the fact that this sin-charged marketing motto strikes a particular cord for us in Macao, this is the expression that popped into my mind while reading reports about recent declarations made in Beijing by Peter Lee Ka-kit, Hong Kong-based Henderson Land Development’s vice chairman, in which he stated that “polls” conducted by University of Hong Kong’s Public Opinion Programme were “biased” against the pro-establishment/pro-Beijing camp in the SAR. He went on namely to target the programme’s director, Robert Chung, by questioning the scientific character of the polls and came up with a “pragmatic” solution according to which a selected few trade associations, naturally pro-establishment, would start funding alternative polls that would be conducted by the Chinese University of Hong Kong and the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, the two competitors of Mr. Chung’s institution among the top tier universities in our sister SAR. Very pragmatic indeed, as any businessman should be: if you are not happy with a supplier, just go to another one!
These remarks were made in Beijing during a meeting held on the fringe of the annual ten-day-long annual full session of the National People’s Congress (NPC) between delegates from Hong Kong and Macao to the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), of which Peter Lee is a member of the standing committee, and NPC chairman Zhang Dejiang. Let’s just recall that this annual meeting of the NPC is the only moment of the year when the supervisory power of this otherwise rubber-stamp assembly can somehow frailly glow—the government’s budget is always approved, but sometimes only by 80% of the members!—and that the CPPCC, in itself a purely advisory body, is supposed to help engage in “political consultation” with and perform “democratic supervision” of the Communist Party. In theory, members of the CPPCC can thus be expected to display some kind of innovative thinking that can help the Party better itself. In practice, it is far too often the occasion for prominent exemplary citizens to exhibit their absolute submission to the current Party line. Journalists in Beijing noted that Peter Lee’s remarks along with the ones made by another tycoon’s progeny, Victor Li Tzar-kuoi (son of Asia’s richest man, Li Ka-shing, and also a CPPCC standing committee member) characterizing the Occupy Central movement as being contrary to Hong Kong’s core values, were made just hours after a high-level official from the central government liaison office had urged Hong Kong members of the CPPCC to speak more openly against Occupy Central.
That leads me back to my saying, this time with a local flavor: let’s hope that what happens in Beijing stays in Beijing, even though this doesn’t bode well for much needed political reforms in the first system. But can it really be so? What is there to gain, apart from radicalization, in adding worries over academic freedom to nagging questioning about threats to the freedom of the press in our neighboring SAR? And then, will what happens in Hong Kong stay in Hong Kong? On one side, we have businessmen suggesting the government “dissolve the people and elect another,” to echo Bertold Brecht’s famous verse, and on the other side we are expected to remain impervious to menaces growing on our doorstep. But of course, in Macao, we seem to be content with the simple fact that Mr Chui has finally ended the excruciating speculations about his candidacy for a second mandate and we have our own businessmen suggesting that legislators should simply forfeit their right to legislative initiative. Nothing to worry about, really.
Published in Macau Daily Times, March 7 2014
These remarks were made in Beijing during a meeting held on the fringe of the annual ten-day-long annual full session of the National People’s Congress (NPC) between delegates from Hong Kong and Macao to the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), of which Peter Lee is a member of the standing committee, and NPC chairman Zhang Dejiang. Let’s just recall that this annual meeting of the NPC is the only moment of the year when the supervisory power of this otherwise rubber-stamp assembly can somehow frailly glow—the government’s budget is always approved, but sometimes only by 80% of the members!—and that the CPPCC, in itself a purely advisory body, is supposed to help engage in “political consultation” with and perform “democratic supervision” of the Communist Party. In theory, members of the CPPCC can thus be expected to display some kind of innovative thinking that can help the Party better itself. In practice, it is far too often the occasion for prominent exemplary citizens to exhibit their absolute submission to the current Party line. Journalists in Beijing noted that Peter Lee’s remarks along with the ones made by another tycoon’s progeny, Victor Li Tzar-kuoi (son of Asia’s richest man, Li Ka-shing, and also a CPPCC standing committee member) characterizing the Occupy Central movement as being contrary to Hong Kong’s core values, were made just hours after a high-level official from the central government liaison office had urged Hong Kong members of the CPPCC to speak more openly against Occupy Central.
That leads me back to my saying, this time with a local flavor: let’s hope that what happens in Beijing stays in Beijing, even though this doesn’t bode well for much needed political reforms in the first system. But can it really be so? What is there to gain, apart from radicalization, in adding worries over academic freedom to nagging questioning about threats to the freedom of the press in our neighboring SAR? And then, will what happens in Hong Kong stay in Hong Kong? On one side, we have businessmen suggesting the government “dissolve the people and elect another,” to echo Bertold Brecht’s famous verse, and on the other side we are expected to remain impervious to menaces growing on our doorstep. But of course, in Macao, we seem to be content with the simple fact that Mr Chui has finally ended the excruciating speculations about his candidacy for a second mandate and we have our own businessmen suggesting that legislators should simply forfeit their right to legislative initiative. Nothing to worry about, really.
Published in Macau Daily Times, March 7 2014
Friday, February 21, 2014
Kapok: Trust me if you can
With the cold front coming from the north, the sudden drop in temperature “holding” ground level emissions down and excessive production of fine particulates of 2.5 micrometres—the very lethal tiny bits that get deep in your lungs and are universally recognized, even by CCTV, to be a major cause in the rise of lung and cardio-vascular diseases in our modern society—, I was poised to write about the past-the-looming calamity of air pollution in Macao.
Readings in the past week were far above the 25-35 micrograms per cubic metre average daily threshold flagged by international as well as Chinese regulators: on February 13, the daily average was in the 70 µgrams/m3 and on the 17, there were peaks in the 120 µgrams/m3! We are still quite far from the 347 µgrams/m3 recorded in Beijing yesterday by the American embassy, characterizing the air in the Chinese capital as “hazardous”, but concern is salient, measurable, and cars appear to hold a significant part of the responsibility if the 20-30% drop observed after midnight and up to 8 a.m. is to be relied upon.
It is high time we move from a rather silly Air-Quality-cum-Index smiley to a more owe-inspiring Air Quality Health Index, thus indicating the short-term health risks, just like Hong Kong, inspired by Canada, did last December. This would be all the fairer to Macao as our SAR actually started recording levels of fine particulates before its Pearl River neighbor!
But fine particulates are not the only thing polluting our atmosphere, unfortunately, and these other factors are more political than scientific in nature—and yet translate into mounting and highly visible concerns as well.
First, we have a president of the Legislative Assembly, Mr Ho Iat Seng, deploring on the sidelines of a Spring festival lunch the limitations of his fellow legislators because of their lack of legal training and thus questioning their capacity to grasp the “goals” of policy-making deriving from their lack of “knowledge” and possibly some “confusion” regarding their intended role—a passing comment rather amusing regarding possible conflict of interests when one thinks that Mr Ho is concurrently the only member from Macao of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress in Beijing. Going one step further during the same agapes, Mr Chan Chak Mo, president of the second standing committee of the Assembly, even suggested that the legislators should refrain from drafting “projects” of law and let the government exclusively make law “proposals”, that would then of course be duly discussed by legislators.
If individual legislators can always be reminded of their shortcomings during plenary sessions—especially now that debates are publicly broadcasted—it is neither up to Mr Ho or Mr Chan to discuss the “legitimacy” of assemblymen and their “sacred” right of legislative initiative: none of these two august legislators is elected through universal suffrage and the Basic Law, and only it, can prescribe what is the duty of a legislator (art. 75 in that particular case). In Europe, since the Treaty of Lisbon (2009), there is such a thing called the European Citizens’ Initiative, and thus initiative of a legal act rests also directly with the citizens: do citizens need all to be trained in law? Legislative duty, unfortunately, also implies design: if Mr Chan does not feel up to the task, maybe he should either resign or hire more legal advisers. Always hiding behind the necessity for these laws to be the product of “public consultations” is a farce: governing is deciding and leading, not following. Sometimes one has actually to explain to the community why decisions need to be made even at the risk of disquieting the public mood. But in Macao, the air is too polluted by the Lao Si Lo syndrome: everybody claims that he or she “can absolutely face the public”, and then no one actually does…
Published in Macau Daily Times, February 21 2014
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