Policy Address: Better vs. More

After a few years observing Macao politics, I have learned just but one thing: lower your expectations of change otherwise you are in for great(er) disappointment! Nothing out of the ordinary, really, as this just confirms an old adage and thus constitutes common wisdom. This of course applies to the “Policy Address” that Mr Fernando Chui Sai On will duly recite on November 13. And yet, remembering the very powerful speech on “A More Perfect Union” literally chanted by Barack Obama in March 2008 on the road to winning his first mandate as the first ever-American black President of the US, I cannot help but think that this is wrong, that I should be more hopeful… That the need for far-reaching change should be embraced, and that human beings being in essence innovative creatures should rightly expect such transformational cravings, as long of course as they are not rooted in mere ideological fables completely disconnected from the reality of life. But of course things are different when you have to earn the trust of the people through universal suffrage, something that leaders in Hong Kong will experience in 2017.
Every single year, the “Policy Address” in Macao looks more or less the same, and fails to convey any sense of powerful vision on what needs to be done for the community in the short, medium and long terms, and this despite the fact that senior civil servants have been working for months on their reports for the Chief executive to prepare that speech—especially regarding possible questions that could be raised by the only popularly accountable politicians in the city, that is to say 12, soon-to-be 14, members of the Legislative Assembly returned via popular suffrage.
The first part of the address is supposed to be some kind of review of the year passed: unfortunately, it reflects every single year a very narrow understanding of the word “review” and corresponds merely to a pompous exercise in self-proclaimed self-satisfaction and self-promotion. In Chinese, the word that is used is 回顧 (huigu), which simply means “looking back” and is thus devoid of any appraisal or assessment dimension. The word for a more critical review would correspond to 檢查 (jiancha), and as one of my Chinese colleagues genuinely commented, this usually is an exercise done by someone else, not by the government regarding its own action. And yet Hu Jintao himself is pronouncing a huigu at this very same moment in Beijing, and despite him being part of the far more constrained “first system”, he is nevertheless highlighting a few pending issues that he himself along with his governing team have failed to properly address: on top of economic hardships and the huge issue of seemingly unstoppable mounting wealth inequalities, corruption is in his own words being characterized as a potentially “fatal” blow to the Chinese Communist Party that will require absolute and immediate attention by the new leadership! Thus a semantic distinction will never solely explain the lack of courage—courage to face one’s own shortcomings—and vision—vision for these shortcomings to be tackled properly and bring the community as a whole into the next beneficial and hopeful phase of change—that has been crippling the policy address over the past six years, ever since Macao became the most profitable place for gambling in the world. 
Then will come a long list of measures that will supposedly help address the pressing issues facing Macao. As if semantic limitations were not enough, time-span restrictions come into play: the policy address is almost solely designed for the year to come, as if the government was effectively managing issues as they arise, not projecting itself in the mid- and long terms. Some policies actually take time to implement—and very often in Macao too much time, like the LRT, the medical facilities or social and economic housing residences—and one could easily imagine an agenda for policy design, implementation and review in which the scheduling would be delineated concurrently for one, three and five-year objectives—vision, again. Even firemen today know that prevention and preparedness encompass more than two-thirds of their job, and let’s be honest, almost all our senior officials in Macao have been the same over the past 13 years—plenty of time beyond the one-year political myopia!
Now, let’s strip down the issues to a few key elements—in fact two—that have been guiding the roadmap of policy making in Macao for the past ten years and a bit more since Macao has moved from being a successful to an incredibly successful gambling haven after that particular industry had been liberalized in 2002. With success come change, fast change and the need to adapt. This is true both in terms of economic outlook—growth needs to be nurtured to endure—and social prospects—the more a community is impacted, the greater its needs. You can call it the necessity to establish “a more perfect union” or build “a harmonious society”; it always boils down to making the community stand as one, a community in which the whole is more than the sum of its parts. With success also come means—and the government in Macao is presently spending only a quarter of its fiscal revenues, mostly derived from gambling—and thus the capacity to enrich the quality of life of the community and prepare for the future. Now, does the solely redistributive approach of the Macao government correspond to these necessities? There is no doubt that the casinos in Macao have improved to an amazing extent (more and better services, higher salaries for the employees, greater job prospects, etc.). Can we say the same for these areas between the casinos that we call our city? Have public transportation, housing, healthcare, sport facilities, education at all levels, retirement homes, management of the flux of foreign and domestic workforce, the environment, etc. overall bettered at the same magnitude? Will it take Macao to become just one big casino for these changes to be on par quality wise? Is that sustainable? Then comes the second key element: the need for diversification—the Loch Ness monster of Macao! Ladies and gentlemen it is there: the Hengqin island development is a unique opportunity if properly embraced by the Macao government when it comes to clarifying the statutes under which the island is going to be developed with Macao money. A real touristic and recreational hub for China and, beyond, Asia, just like it is envisioned in article 118 of the Macao Basic Law! But then, just as courage and vision are needed, this requires competence (aka “scientific policy-making”, real one), and if competence is not met then accountability kicks in and provides for alternative solutions. 
There is a growing sense of frustration among the people of Macao, and it takes not much for that frustration to transmute into anger, and for that anger to lead to more explosive forms of social discontent. The very weak scope of the political reform that was adopted this year constitutes an incredible missed opportunity for courage, vision, competence and accountability to potentially become cornerstones of Macao politics: will more half-baked consultation processes do the trick? Is the glass ceiling of vested interests that unbreakable?

Published in Macau Daily Times on November 13 2012.

KAPOK: The magnificent seven

Every ten years, it has become a ritual that a change of leadership occurs in China, and a “new” team takes over and is expected to usher the country (now the second biggest economy in the world) into an era of rejuvenated economic vitality and reshuffled social cohesiveness.
This master narrative of a peaceful transition of power in a communist regime is all the more surprising that it can claim thirty years of existence – and this in spite of having been vehemently contested during the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989 at a time when, precisely, Communism was crumbling in Eastern Europe. Yet, what is also striking is the level of secrecy that still adorns this change of leadership, even today, in spite of China hosting the largest population of Internet users — officially 538 million as of last July!
Mix tantalizing and worldwide curiosity with secrecy, cloak and dagger behind-the-scenes factional strife, and flawed yet viral circulation of information and you get an explosive cocktail of wildly spinning rumors and crippled certainties. Yet, a bit of historical perspective and cool-headed analytical consideration can help defuse reporting stirs overloaded with anxiety.
One of the arguments oft cited as fuelling the rumors is the fact that, as of today, the dates of the 18th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) are still not disclosed, or more precisely, are merely scheduled for “the second half” of 2012. Rather imprecise one would agree, as if the game were still “open” and thus arrangements for the succession not yet carved in stone. In a recent posting, Qian Gang from the China Media Project reminded us that it was not until 1982 that the CCP Congress managed to make good on the once-every-five-years tempo. At the time when the Congress was supposed to be held annually or triennially, political turmoil led to staggering delays: 17 years between the 6th (1928) and the 7th (1945) congresses, 11 years between the 7th and 8th (1956) and 13 years between the 8th and 9th (1969)… On the contrary, the two held in the 1970s were convened one year in advance: the 10th Congress (1973) because of the suspicious death of Lin Biao and the 11th (1977) because of the downfall of the Gang of Four! Just for reference, the 17th Congress was held from 15th to 21st October 2007.
As to the recent spat of rumors regarding the disappearance of the Secretary General in waiting, Xi Jinping, for 11 days: The press, especially the international media, started noticing when Xi canceled meetings with Secretary of State Hillary R. Clinton and Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong. Now rumors have run havoc, ranging from a simple ailment due to a back problem to a heart attack, a car crash, and even a terrorist attack! Words like back injury 背伤 or crown prince 皇储, a netizen nickname for Xi, are banned from micro-blogging services in China. And things got even worse when it was reported that He Guoqiang, the No. 8 on the Standing Committee, had himself not been seen since August 28th! Let’s just remember that Premier Li Peng back in 1993 went missing for 7 long weeks! And let’s be honest, even in a democracy, from Roosevelt to François Mitterrand, health conditions and the exercise of power at the highest level have often had obscure relations.
Yes, the CCP and the regime it clings power to are still extremely secretive. Will all this hype change anything? Nope: it is now almost certain that Xi Jinping, Li Keqiang, Yu Zhengsheng, Zhang Dejiang, Li Yuanchao, Wang Qishan and Wang Yang will become the paramount leaders of China. What would really bring uncertainty though would be an announcement right after the Congress that intra-party democracy 党内民主 should be the guiding principle of political reform in the coming five years!

Published in Macau Daily Times on September 14th 2012