Policy Address: Better vs. More

After a few years observing Macao politics, I have learned just but one thing: lower your expectations of change otherwise you are in for great(er) disappointment! Nothing out of the ordinary, really, as this just confirms an old adage and thus constitutes common wisdom. This of course applies to the “Policy Address” that Mr Fernando Chui Sai On will duly recite on November 13. And yet, remembering the very powerful speech on “A More Perfect Union” literally chanted by Barack Obama in March 2008 on the road to winning his first mandate as the first ever-American black President of the US, I cannot help but think that this is wrong, that I should be more hopeful… That the need for far-reaching change should be embraced, and that human beings being in essence innovative creatures should rightly expect such transformational cravings, as long of course as they are not rooted in mere ideological fables completely disconnected from the reality of life. But of course things are different when you have to earn the trust of the people through universal suffrage, something that leaders in Hong Kong will experience in 2017.
Every single year, the “Policy Address” in Macao looks more or less the same, and fails to convey any sense of powerful vision on what needs to be done for the community in the short, medium and long terms, and this despite the fact that senior civil servants have been working for months on their reports for the Chief executive to prepare that speech—especially regarding possible questions that could be raised by the only popularly accountable politicians in the city, that is to say 12, soon-to-be 14, members of the Legislative Assembly returned via popular suffrage.
The first part of the address is supposed to be some kind of review of the year passed: unfortunately, it reflects every single year a very narrow understanding of the word “review” and corresponds merely to a pompous exercise in self-proclaimed self-satisfaction and self-promotion. In Chinese, the word that is used is 回顧 (huigu), which simply means “looking back” and is thus devoid of any appraisal or assessment dimension. The word for a more critical review would correspond to 檢查 (jiancha), and as one of my Chinese colleagues genuinely commented, this usually is an exercise done by someone else, not by the government regarding its own action. And yet Hu Jintao himself is pronouncing a huigu at this very same moment in Beijing, and despite him being part of the far more constrained “first system”, he is nevertheless highlighting a few pending issues that he himself along with his governing team have failed to properly address: on top of economic hardships and the huge issue of seemingly unstoppable mounting wealth inequalities, corruption is in his own words being characterized as a potentially “fatal” blow to the Chinese Communist Party that will require absolute and immediate attention by the new leadership! Thus a semantic distinction will never solely explain the lack of courage—courage to face one’s own shortcomings—and vision—vision for these shortcomings to be tackled properly and bring the community as a whole into the next beneficial and hopeful phase of change—that has been crippling the policy address over the past six years, ever since Macao became the most profitable place for gambling in the world. 
Then will come a long list of measures that will supposedly help address the pressing issues facing Macao. As if semantic limitations were not enough, time-span restrictions come into play: the policy address is almost solely designed for the year to come, as if the government was effectively managing issues as they arise, not projecting itself in the mid- and long terms. Some policies actually take time to implement—and very often in Macao too much time, like the LRT, the medical facilities or social and economic housing residences—and one could easily imagine an agenda for policy design, implementation and review in which the scheduling would be delineated concurrently for one, three and five-year objectives—vision, again. Even firemen today know that prevention and preparedness encompass more than two-thirds of their job, and let’s be honest, almost all our senior officials in Macao have been the same over the past 13 years—plenty of time beyond the one-year political myopia!
Now, let’s strip down the issues to a few key elements—in fact two—that have been guiding the roadmap of policy making in Macao for the past ten years and a bit more since Macao has moved from being a successful to an incredibly successful gambling haven after that particular industry had been liberalized in 2002. With success come change, fast change and the need to adapt. This is true both in terms of economic outlook—growth needs to be nurtured to endure—and social prospects—the more a community is impacted, the greater its needs. You can call it the necessity to establish “a more perfect union” or build “a harmonious society”; it always boils down to making the community stand as one, a community in which the whole is more than the sum of its parts. With success also come means—and the government in Macao is presently spending only a quarter of its fiscal revenues, mostly derived from gambling—and thus the capacity to enrich the quality of life of the community and prepare for the future. Now, does the solely redistributive approach of the Macao government correspond to these necessities? There is no doubt that the casinos in Macao have improved to an amazing extent (more and better services, higher salaries for the employees, greater job prospects, etc.). Can we say the same for these areas between the casinos that we call our city? Have public transportation, housing, healthcare, sport facilities, education at all levels, retirement homes, management of the flux of foreign and domestic workforce, the environment, etc. overall bettered at the same magnitude? Will it take Macao to become just one big casino for these changes to be on par quality wise? Is that sustainable? Then comes the second key element: the need for diversification—the Loch Ness monster of Macao! Ladies and gentlemen it is there: the Hengqin island development is a unique opportunity if properly embraced by the Macao government when it comes to clarifying the statutes under which the island is going to be developed with Macao money. A real touristic and recreational hub for China and, beyond, Asia, just like it is envisioned in article 118 of the Macao Basic Law! But then, just as courage and vision are needed, this requires competence (aka “scientific policy-making”, real one), and if competence is not met then accountability kicks in and provides for alternative solutions. 
There is a growing sense of frustration among the people of Macao, and it takes not much for that frustration to transmute into anger, and for that anger to lead to more explosive forms of social discontent. The very weak scope of the political reform that was adopted this year constitutes an incredible missed opportunity for courage, vision, competence and accountability to potentially become cornerstones of Macao politics: will more half-baked consultation processes do the trick? Is the glass ceiling of vested interests that unbreakable?

Published in Macau Daily Times on November 13 2012.

KAPOK: To go or not to go?

Culture as a concept is notorious for being both wide in scope and pretty vague in meaning. In most encyclopedic volumes, the first reference to it appears in Cicero’s writing as “cultura animi”, the cultivation of the soul or mind, thus an agricultural metaphor expressing the unique capability of a human being to enrich himself or herself, and therefore develop and realize their full and highest potential — philosophically speaking.
In the nineteenth century, romanticism gave culture a particular twist, less universal and more exclusive: culture became closely associated with nations and the ferment of national identities. Along with sweeping modernity arose the distinction between “high” or noble culture vs. “low” or popular culture, thus the reference to cultural specificities and a hierarchy of culture were the grammar of national exclusion and social division. The excess and brutality of the reign of ideologies in the twentieth century, among which nationalism fared on par with Communism and Nazism, led to a critical reappraisal of the notion.
In the words of the famous American anthropologist Clifford Geertz, culture is “a system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of which men communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and attitudes toward life.” The important idea here, contrary to what Samuel Huntington simplistically professed in his “Clash of Civilizations,” is that culture is not reified or solidified knowledge: it changes over time and transformations derive from outside borrowing, and thus acculturation and accommodation. Nevertheless, as Geertz puts it, “culture is simply the ensemble of stories we tell ourselves about ourselves.”
Then why on earth would the United Association of Food and Beverage Merchants of Macao (UAFBM), the association that organizes the Macao Food Festival, decide “not to feature any Japanese food stalls coming from Japan” because of the “relatively high tense political atmosphere between China and Japan” over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands? Isn’t the food festival supposed to be about culture? Didn’t the UAFBM receive close to MOP 10 million from the Macau Foundation for its “project in support of the preservation of eateries in Macao” in August alone? Isn’t Mr Chan Chak Mo, the president of the UAFBM, also a functional member of the Legislative Assembly representing, precisely, culture? What’s the story then?
First, UAFBM doesn’t really deal with culture: not once, in its statutes, is the word culture in Chinese mentioned. Worse, article 2 states that the purpose of the association is to “love the motherland, uphold the ‘one country, two systems’ principle” and of course defend the legitimate rights and interests of the members of that particular industry. Mr Chan: where is your cultural background and why is the Macau Foundation providing your association with funding? And why would “one country” understood narrowly prevail over the “second system”? Mr Chan Chak Mo is concurrently the managing director of Future Bright Holdings, one of the heavyweights of F&B in Macao (which also operates on the mainland…) listed on the Hong Kong stock exchange, that operates 24 restaurants and 10 food court counters, including quite a few Japanese ones: no wonder then that the Festival’s Japanese corner is going to be filled by over twenty restaurants run by Macau operators! 
If I were my usual self I would merely say: boycott the Macao Food festival! This meddling of politics into culture and especially food culture — remember I am French, almost as inquisitive and demanding for food as a Chinese person can be — is a disgrace, a shameful and insidious act of self-absorbed petty business interests draped in bloated half-baked patriotic disguise! But then, not all the food stalls participating in the event are responsible for the misguided verdicts of Mr Chan’s association, so I will be reasonable: boycott all Future Bright stalls at the festival! Shanghai 456, Cafe Lan, Madeira or Oishii Ichiban and Edo don’t need and certainly don’t deserve your Patacas!

Published in Macau Daily Times on October 26th 2012

KAPOK: The Blame Game

From a purely heuristic point of view, the Lau Si Lo resignation rumor has two virtues. On the one hand it allows us to reflect on the ins and outs of a rumor: who has an interest in spreading it? Why and how does it spread? Ultimately, that might be conducive to doing something about it. On the other hand, it entices a debate on responsibility, blame and citizen empowerment.
In his little book aptly entitled On Rumors, American law professor Cass Sunstein distinguishes between four main types of rumor propagators: the ‘narrowly self-interested’, the ‘generally interested’, the ‘altruistic’ and the ‘malicious’. The narrowly self-interested ones are in the game for personal gain, either for money or to get ahead in a competitive environment. The generally interested ones seek to attract attention and to raise eyebrows in public, for the benefit of a group interest. The altruistic have a different playing field: they vie to promote the public good and are often genuinely outraged by what they denounce through the spread of rumor. Finally, the malicious just want to inflict pain, to injure others for the sake of doing so. What all of these propagators have in common is that most of them are no way near knowing the truth, and can offer little or no evidence of what they profess. Also, a rumor will be spread by different propagators at the same time, and so the question remains: what makes a rumor “successful”, if by successful we mean spreading widely, even though it might very well be false?
Sunstein thus emphasizes the importance of what he calls ‘prior convictions’: “whether people believe a rumor depends on what they thought before they heard it.” Firstly, because our beliefs are ‘motivated’ by our hopes, goals and desires. Secondly, because the rumor adequately or less so fits what we already know. Thus “thresholds” for accepting rumors are different from one place to another. Then the transmission of the rumor comes into play, mainly as a result of ‘social cascades’: firstly ‘informational cascades’, imperfectly informed or totally ignorant, one finds it increasingly difficult to resist what one hears from others; as well as ‘conformity cascades’ - one does not want to be seen as socially inapt by escaping peer pressure in not believing. Of course, ‘group polarization’, and thus the strengthening of one’s own convictions through discussions with like-minded people also play a role.
As of now, while reading the newspapers and discussing with friends who know presumably little about the Lau Si Lo case, I would acknowledge that there are only three types of propagators, as I haven’t read or heard any purely malicious comments regarding Secretary Lau’s potential dismissal. What is striking though is how nobody has really challenged the rumor, except for the person concerned and his boss, who have offered up to now only a mere denial or muttered response — and rightly so as the pace of government cannot be the same as the media’s.
Extensive ‘prior convictions’ seem to be giving an additional momentum for this rumor to stick and amplify: starting with what we know for sure — a very critical CCAC report regarding the LRT and the nullification of all the La Scala land grants by the government in September — all the way to what society widely postulates since the unraveling of the Ao Man Long scandal in 2006 — that corruption, conflict of interests and clientelism are original sins in our policy.
What is to be done then? How can rumor be fought in an environment where the culture of irresponsibility is tolerated, the lack of responsiveness on the side of public authorities is putative, and extremely powerful individuals are completely unaccountable, either through elections or vivid grilling by a truly muckraking press? At the end of the day, responsibility has to be shared in a community and we all must assume part of the burden. Nothing new under the sun here: both Socrates and Confucius were advocates of this individual imperative! You and I are also to be blamed for not being demanding enough…

Published in Macau Daily Times on Friday 12 October

Kapok: Who’s the worst?

A survey conducted last week by the Association of Macao New Vision made the front page of the Chinese Daily Cheng Pou 正報 on September 27th revealing that the public rating of all twelve elected members of the Legislative Assembly had dropped compared to last year’s survey, even though Ng Kuok Cheong (a democrat) is still considered the best performer and Kwan Tsui Hang (traditional association, Macau Federation of Trade Unions’) remains the most well-known of the whole lot.

As far as the big picture is concerned, a bit more than 58% of the respondents consider that the Assembly has done an “OK job” (my free translation of “half-half”, 一半一半) in the past legislature, and the rest is highly polarized: only a bit more than 15% are satisfied, and a bit more than 17% dissatisfied. Strikingly, this third installation of the survey reveals that the proportion of “OK job” appraisals has risen constantly, some 8-percentage points more than in 2010, and that about half the respondents don’t believe there has been any improvement when compared to the previous legislature.

Now, looking at individual scores, the three best performers are two democrats, Ng Kuok Cheong and Au Kam San, and a vocal independent legislator cum-civil servant representative José Pereira Coutinho: surprise, surprise, together with Kwan Tsui Hang, these are the only four legislators scoring 60+ on a scale of 100. Then, in descending order, come Ho Ion Sang (traditional association, UGAMM known as Kai Fong), Chan Wai Chi (a democrat), Lee Chong Cheng (traditional association, Macau Federation of Trade Unions), Mak Soi Kun (business interests), Melinda Chan (gambling interests), Ung Choi Kun (business/ gambling interests), Chan Meng Kam (gambling interests) and last, but not least, Angela Leong (gambling interests).

From a purely subjective perspective — exactly what this survey is about, the public perception — it is stating the obvious to say that elected legislators representing gambling interests fail to impress the citizenry. Although multiple factors can explain this state of affairs, one can easily suspect that what wins the praises of the public has to do with the actual social engagement of individual legislators and of course with the capacity of these legislators to defend the general good of the community at large, rather than narrow and segmented interests. One cannot help but notice that all legislators representing business interests are in the lower half of the rankings.

If one connects these perceptions to facts (attendance in plenary sessions and permanent commissions; written and oral interpellations of the government) one can easily find causality relations: Ng Kuok Cheong attends all plenary sessions and permanent commission meetings and is for sure one of the most vocal legislators of the Assembly, both behind a microphone and in writing; whereas Angela Leong misses a lot of permanent commission meetings and writes four times less than Mr Ng. Interestingly enough, the fact that the overall rating of legislators (including the democrats) has continuously declined in the past two years despite the citizenry’s attested growing political awareness seems to indicate a rising disenchantment towards the political elite at large, probably induced by a lack of renewal of political personnel. And remember, this is just an indicative survey, with all its methodological shortcomings, dealing with elected members of the Assembly: Imagine what the appraisal of Vitor Cheung Lup Kwan or Fong Chi Keong would be, both of them indirectly elected and overall winners of the title for legislators least present in plenary sessions…

Published in Macau Daily Times on September 28th 2012

KAPOK: The magnificent seven

Every ten years, it has become a ritual that a change of leadership occurs in China, and a “new” team takes over and is expected to usher the country (now the second biggest economy in the world) into an era of rejuvenated economic vitality and reshuffled social cohesiveness.
This master narrative of a peaceful transition of power in a communist regime is all the more surprising that it can claim thirty years of existence – and this in spite of having been vehemently contested during the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989 at a time when, precisely, Communism was crumbling in Eastern Europe. Yet, what is also striking is the level of secrecy that still adorns this change of leadership, even today, in spite of China hosting the largest population of Internet users — officially 538 million as of last July!
Mix tantalizing and worldwide curiosity with secrecy, cloak and dagger behind-the-scenes factional strife, and flawed yet viral circulation of information and you get an explosive cocktail of wildly spinning rumors and crippled certainties. Yet, a bit of historical perspective and cool-headed analytical consideration can help defuse reporting stirs overloaded with anxiety.
One of the arguments oft cited as fuelling the rumors is the fact that, as of today, the dates of the 18th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) are still not disclosed, or more precisely, are merely scheduled for “the second half” of 2012. Rather imprecise one would agree, as if the game were still “open” and thus arrangements for the succession not yet carved in stone. In a recent posting, Qian Gang from the China Media Project reminded us that it was not until 1982 that the CCP Congress managed to make good on the once-every-five-years tempo. At the time when the Congress was supposed to be held annually or triennially, political turmoil led to staggering delays: 17 years between the 6th (1928) and the 7th (1945) congresses, 11 years between the 7th and 8th (1956) and 13 years between the 8th and 9th (1969)… On the contrary, the two held in the 1970s were convened one year in advance: the 10th Congress (1973) because of the suspicious death of Lin Biao and the 11th (1977) because of the downfall of the Gang of Four! Just for reference, the 17th Congress was held from 15th to 21st October 2007.
As to the recent spat of rumors regarding the disappearance of the Secretary General in waiting, Xi Jinping, for 11 days: The press, especially the international media, started noticing when Xi canceled meetings with Secretary of State Hillary R. Clinton and Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong. Now rumors have run havoc, ranging from a simple ailment due to a back problem to a heart attack, a car crash, and even a terrorist attack! Words like back injury 背伤 or crown prince 皇储, a netizen nickname for Xi, are banned from micro-blogging services in China. And things got even worse when it was reported that He Guoqiang, the No. 8 on the Standing Committee, had himself not been seen since August 28th! Let’s just remember that Premier Li Peng back in 1993 went missing for 7 long weeks! And let’s be honest, even in a democracy, from Roosevelt to François Mitterrand, health conditions and the exercise of power at the highest level have often had obscure relations.
Yes, the CCP and the regime it clings power to are still extremely secretive. Will all this hype change anything? Nope: it is now almost certain that Xi Jinping, Li Keqiang, Yu Zhengsheng, Zhang Dejiang, Li Yuanchao, Wang Qishan and Wang Yang will become the paramount leaders of China. What would really bring uncertainty though would be an announcement right after the Congress that intra-party democracy 党内民主 should be the guiding principle of political reform in the coming five years!

Published in Macau Daily Times on September 14th 2012

KAPOK: A Hell of a Bridge

I settled in Macao at the time when the Sai Wan Bridge was being built. The view was truly spectacular: colossal piles of concrete were being planted in the murky water on both sides of the channel between Eastern Taipa and the peninsula, and this cyclopean endeavor of 2,200 meters reflected the promise of a giant step forward if not for mankind at least for the future development of Macao. Symbolically, its “M” shape reminded us proudly of the initial letter of the SAR name in most Latin scripts, and let’s be honest, although the pressing need for a new passage to the islands seemed questionable when it opened in 2004, everybody felt it was indeed an elegant piece of suspended motorway. Moreover, for the first time ever, all districts of Macao would remain accessible thanks to its emergency lower deck tunnel even when hit by the worst typhoons. Beautiful, visionary, practical…
But integrity, unfortunately, does not only apply to territory. Later on, in the wake of the Ao Man Long scandal, the most valuable piece of infrastructure since the handover became known as the “corruption bridge”: in order to win the tender, the general manager of Chon Tit (Macau) Investment and Development, the contractor, had paid a kickback of 14 million Patacas to the former Secretary for Transport and Public Works. Since then, and especially because of the future construction of the light rapid-transit (LRT), several flaws in design have surfaced, most importantly regarding ventilation systems and emergency evacuation routes in the lower deck tunnel and of course the capacity (or more precisely the lack thereof) of the bridge's 96 supporting cables to meet loading requirements for the additional weight of the LRT. If we discard rust, potholes and cracks, only the surface of the bridge remained unscathed, but that was counting without the DSAT’s most recent resolve.
As it is often the case, everything started with a noble intention. Rightly concerned by a spate of serious road casualties involving motorcycles on the Sai Wan Bridge, the DSAT decided a few months ago to go ahead with a plan to create a dedicated lane for motorcycles on the bridge. Fair enough. Previous talks regarding exclusive two-wheelers lanes on that bridge had already occurred in 2007 when the use of the lower deck tunnel was justly considered, just to be dismissed because of lack of ventilation systems (remind you of something?). What came as a shock this time around is that the motorcycles-only lane would be placed on the right side of the road, thus contradicting a general rule that motorcycles should keep on their left and imposing an intricate scheme contrary to the most basic common sense — at least in four locations, the main gangway for cars is reduced to a single lane! 
This new scheme does belong to the generic category of absurd decision making as it persistently and fundamentally acts against its professed objective: security is far from being guaranteed, as the accident that occurred on August 27 just reminded us, just eight days after the supposedly provisional plan went into effect. It is doubly absurd as the new scheme has now created problems of its own pertaining to practicality and fluidity of traffic—I can predict monster traffic jams after school resumes on Monday September 3rd. DSAT, please check and act—amend or scrap! As we all very well know the road to hell is paved with good intentions!

Published in Macau Daily Times on August 31st 2012

KAPOK: On the Road Again

Traffic congestion is on the rise in Macao, a situation that every resident experiences on a daily basis, whether he or she is a driver or a simple pedestrian having to hop on a bus or just cross the street while humming a carbon dioxide enriched SAR air. Many culprits are of course to be blamed, but recent figures released by the DSEC on the number of new vehicles being put on the road every month has found a disturbing and overemphasized echo in the news, as if the end user — the car driver — was the chief culprit and therefore had to be disciplined by imposing more stringent taxes on the licensing of new vehicles.
Looking at the official figures, one first realizes that there are a lot of vehicles on the roads of Macao and that new registrations are on the rise, by 5% officially year-on-year for a total 210,580 vehicles (112,644 motorcycles, 91,326 light automobiles and 6,610 heavy automobiles) at the end of June 2012 — a journalist from the Portuguese press made the calculation that “some 21 new vehicles invade the streets of our little territory every day”. But then, how do we compare? If one looks at Hong Kong, there were 425,000 licensed private cars in June 2011, whereas the equivalent figure for Macao was 78,000: a ratio of about 1/5.5 whereas the population ratio between the two SARs is about 1/13.3. Not too bad for Macao.
A more common ratio however does not refer to the total population or even the number of drivers but to the number of kilometers of public roads. In Hong Kong, this figure is widely available — 293 vehicles (not counting motorcycles) per public road kilometer — whereas for Macao I had to reconstruct the ratio by looking at Chapter 13 of the Yearbook, where one can find two figures for the total number of kilometers of road: either 311 kilometers of roads and highways (this figure being also the one advertised in the cover page of the chapter) or 413 kilometers of roads and highways “for vehicles”. We therefore end up with respectively 315 or 237 vehicles per kilometer of public roads. In either case, that ratio is not that bad — hence my wonder as to why we have two figures and what they mean exactly, either in English or in Chinese — as we fare well in the range of Hong Kong or even Singapore and Tokyo, and far better than Taipei, for example, that stands at more than 1,000 vehicles per kilometer of roads.
Is the total number of vehicles really the main culprit then? Will increasing the taxes just like in Singapore where taxes on new car licensing amount to more than the price of the car really the solution? Is imposing quotas and selling new plates at public auctions as it has been the case in Shanghai since the 1990s the way to go (average price for a new plate standing at more than RMB50,000)? Luckily enough in Macao there is no contradiction between our aspiration to live a better and cleaner life and the necessity to boost our automobile industry, so it is high time to say that the real solution lies in having a far-reaching and meaningful urban development master plan coupled to an integrated public transportation service that makes private vehicles “unwelcome” in our streets, even though they comply by Euro VI standards (and not only Euro IV as it has just been decided). There is no more time for compromise!

Published in Macau Daily Times, August 3rd 2012

KAPOK: Carelessness, Ignorance or Intentional Absurdity?

Every now and then it sounds like an imperative to reflect with a bit of distance on the situation in Macao. Going away for my annual leave to Europe always gives me that opportunity to further the gap, getting to read with fresh eyes news and analysis coming from afar and being suddenly immersed in the joys and mores of a world that remains both familiar and yet imprecise because of presumed turmoil derived from what appears to be everlasting economic concerns.
A very common, not to say overwhelming perception in Asia is that Europe is going through a time of great upheavals and that Europeans are in much despair, Greece serving as the utmost repulsive example of failure as far as governance is concerned. If you add the fact that Greece is the birthplace of demos kratia, the power of the people, you very soon stumble upon very sloppy and yet highly pervasive lines of argument establishing some kind of causality between the least worse form of government and the inability to grow or nurture oneself economically.
The people who make that connection are usually the same who profess that democracy is anyway a product of importation that has little compatibility with the cultural values of Asia—never mind that Asia itself is not one, and that the political regimes of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan can without a doubt be characterized as democracy. Of course, capitalism, that is to say the accumulation of wealth held by private hands vying for profits, also originated in Europe, but for that accommodation and acculturation appear to be almost natural. Culture is selective, especially in the mind of those who wish to keep a monopoly on decision taking.
And yet, everybody seems to agree that one of the key sources of legitimacy for a government derives from its ability to take into account the wishes of the citizenry, the so-called public opinion, at least to a certain extent. Despite its incapacity in pushing the envelop of democratic reform to its rightful level, the government of the Macao SAR has not shun from that necessity, allowing for a proliferation of public consultations and a drastically increased receptivity to the public’ grievances. So much so in fact that legislator and member of the Executive Council Chan Meng Kam recently lamented that the government had gone too far in this respect, showing indecision, loosing its credibility and sapping its authority along the way. Taking recent examples of thwarted public regulations and policies such as the bus fare hike, the 3G upgrade or the Taipa Traffic Centre relocation, Mr Chan insisted that lack of proper planning systemically caused a huge embarrassment for the government, having but only one choice: to stop or diametrically change pronouncements when met with serious opposition from the public.
Reading recently a book authored by Christian Morel on absurd decisions and why we persist in committing fundamental and persistent errors, I was reminded that training manuals for pilots distinguish between four types of error: carelessness, transgression (breaking a rule), ignorance and representation—the latter being probably the most lethal as it has little chances to be spotted. Representation or perception is at the heart of human psychology: we all use heuristic methods, in which shortcuts based on our experience allow for greater velocity in taking a decision but also more abundant approximations. What is even more troubling is that this cognitive makeshift ends up on a decision that is seldom the responsibility of a single individual but of a group.
What is it going to be for this recent spate of senseless decisions taken in our SAR: carelessness, transgression, ignorance or representation? A mix of the four? And what is the remedy? Actual accountability, political one, would not have been a luxury.

Published in the Macau Daily Times, July 20th 2012

KAPOK: The More the Merrier

It has become a ritual since 2003: happen what may, every year on July 1st Hong Kong people march in the streets from Victoria Park to Central to defend and assert the fundamental meaning of the “one country, two systems” formula.

Hong Kong just like Macao enjoys “a high degree of autonomy” as a Special Administrative Region and is therefore run by Hong Kong people. The “high degree of autonomy” principle is etched in stone in the Basic Law and the indigenous ruling is the motto oft repeated by top officials as a consequence of that autonomy. As the autonomy is not “full”, then the demo is all about “how high is high,” and thus demands echo both defensive worries and offensive claims, ranging from condemnation of blatant interference by Beijing to the appeal for full democracy, the latter being conceived as the best guarantee against the former.
The year 2003 clearly marks the end of “political apathy” for the population of Hong Kong, although one could argue that political activism had already embroiled the British colony in the 1920s because of massive labor disputes, later on in the 1960s because of the Cultural Revolution, and of course in May 1989 when more than 1.5 million participants took part in a march of sympathy for the young people demonstrating on Tiananmen Square — a similar rally gathered more than 100,000 people in Macao at the time.
The 1989 protesters in Hong Kong were not only sympathetic to the democratic cause fought in the Chinese capital city but of course equally apprehensive about their own future under the “one country, two systems” scheme. The hardening of the Chinese communist regime and the massive rallies held in Hong Kong led to a more democratic-oriented Basic Law (1990) and widened the opportunity for political reform as pushed by the last British Governor, Chris Patten, nominated in July 1992.
The July 1st march is definitely more strictly Hong Kong-focused though, and rightly so as it coincides purposely with the anniversary of the handover. Commemorations of the Tiananmen Square massacre are being held on June 4th every year in Victoria Park, and because of a particularly degraded human rights context on the motherland the candlelight vigil attracted this year some 180,000 quiet but resolute grievers. More specifically, the July 1st 2003 rally was originally triggered by the clumsy attempt to enact stricter state security laws as provisioned by article 23 of the Basic Law in a context in which the many lies of the Chinese authorities had been exposed regarding the SARS crisis, a pandemic that originated in Guangdong but hit the hardest in Hong Kong. The whole situation had furthermore been aggravated by the lack of political astuteness of both the Chief Executive of the time, Tung Chee Hwa, and his reviled security secretary, Regina Ip, thus allowing for clumsiness to become malevolence — and for the streets of Central to be crowded by 500,000 protesters!
In 2012, worries about the allegedly tainted new Chief Executive, C.Y Leung, brought to the streets some 100,000 to 400,000 people, depending which counting institution you trust (I intentionally disregard figures given by the police as they are always beyond being conservative). Tainted politically because of his suspected coziness with the Chinese Communist Party heightened by his “strong leadership” style. Tainted morally because of the “illegality” of some renovations made at his home(s) on the Peak that obliterate his vigorous attacks regarding similar wrongdoings made against his former opponent in the Chief Executive race.
Vigilance is thus about the nature of the matter, but you cannot claim bargaining power unless you have the big numbers.

Published in Macau Daily Times, Friday 6th July 2012

KAPOK: The Ins and Outs of Expertise

More often than not unsolicited comments and suggestions are considered inappropriate. If we leave aside the deference aspect of the rule, and therefore the sheer respect for authority in a pyramidal organization, there are many reasons that can justify this widely shared custom, among which the “communication” dimension is for me the most important.
To put it simply, communication is about relating to individuals in society, and in order for the communicational transaction to take place, one individual must speak and the other one has to listen and understand, and usually alternatively speak or reply and be listened to and understood. When the word “communications” appeared in Europe at the end of the thirteenth century, it referred to “ways of being together.”
By that token, an unsolicited comment is deemed inappropriate because the interlocutor (in linguistics, the person to whom speech is directed) is not willing or simply ready to listen — and here, I am not even considering the answering back or amending process of one’s point of view.
Reading about recent comments made in June by “Mainland scholars,” as they are characterized in the press, I found myself in the very awkward position where everything was right and yet everything felt wrong. These two scholars, Zhu Shiha, from the Central Socialism Institute in Beijing, and Chen Xin, from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, were basically voicing the idea that the central authorities in Beijing were quite likely to allow more democracy in Macao in the future.
Chinese culture does put much emphasis on etiquette — “saving face” has become an everyday reference — and it is therefore not surprising that these comments were of course solicited ones, made at the invitation of a local institution, the Macau Polytechnic Institute, that has made a specialty of exploring the “one-country-two-systems” as a singular object of investigation, dedicating a whole research center with a fully-fledged academic journal to it.
What is less right though is that the Central Socialism Institute created in 1946 is a typical United Front institution that although staffed with non-communist members has a mission to bring unity under the leadership of the Communist Party of China. The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in itself seems a bit less political, but Mr Chen, despite his doctorate in law, is from the Institute of European Studies and speaks very good Hungarian, if his online bio is to trusted, but has indeed a very limited knowledge of the ins and outs of political reform in Macao under the “one country, two systems” formula. Mr Zhu, the expert, went as far as saying that the central government, being more satisfied with the political conditions in Macao, “would likely allow more room for democratic development in Macao than in Hong Kong.”
Is Mr Zhu aware that the political reform package has already been passed for Hong Kong, and that the Chief Executive and the Legco members in the former British colony will be returned through universal suffrage starting respectively in 2017 and 2020? Is he aware than the very discreet Bureau for Political Studies created by Chui Sai On in 2010 made it public in early April that an agenda for the implementation of universal suffrage was, as of now, not relevant to consider for Macao?
Ultimately, should we be mad at Mr Lao Pun Lap, coordinator of the above-mentioned bureau for not disclosing the “scientific rationale” behind his statement, contrary to the very foundation of his office? Should we be worried for Hong Kong considering that what really matters for the central authorities appears to be who is allowed to run for elections and not how the candidates are elected? And when does an unsolicited opinion cease to be inappropriate?

Published in Macau Daily Times, June 22 2012

KAPOK: Neither One Nor the Other

Being in France at the time of the legislative elections last week acted as a stark reminder of what is missing in our polity here in Macao: good reasons to hope for the best and not only dream of it. Allow me to clarify. In this first round to elect legislators held on June 10th, French citizens were basically being asked about the kind of politics they would like their government to engage into for the next five years, bearing in mind that France, like most countries in Europe, has been confronted with daunting economic difficulties over the past four years. These elections are taking place one month after a new President, François Hollande, a socialist, has been himself elected against the incumbent head of state, Nicolas Sarkozy, a right-winger, and they seem set on sending a left-wing majority to France’s lower assembly, although short of an unstoppable pink-and-red wave — confirmation of the new majority will be secured on the evening of the second round, on June 17th. Among the many reasons why Nicolas Sarkozy was defeated a month ago, his authoritarian, bling-bling and hectic style — or lack thereof— played for sure a crucial role, but it is no doubt his inability to restore economic growth while concurrently allowing for inequalities to reach unprecedented levels since the nineteenth century that brought about his downfall, and all the rhetoric about the risks of changing the captain in the midst of the storm was proven wrong. To my own eyes, and even though I am myself more left-leaning, Nicolas Sarkozy’s policies ultimately conflicted with the core values of his own political tradition: instead of strengthening the idea of an organic national community, division was brought to the fore; efficiency was constantly undermined by frantic changes of orientation that never accommodated appropriate time to bear fruits; and if change (“rupture” as we say in French, meaning breaking away from certain practices and customs) was to be at the center of all politics, it ultimately failed to find its raison d’être thus confirming the African proverb than “when you do not know where you are heading to, you should remember where you are coming from.” Looking now at the legislative elections, the republican right-wing party registered in last Sunday’s first round its lowest score ever (less than 35%) since 1958, therefore confirming the wish for change expressed one month ago. Yet, only 57% of the registered voters did go to polling stations, a turnout that is as well a record-low in the past fifty years and indicates the prevalence of a wait-and-see posture. Now, the National Front, a far-right authority-prone xenophobic political movement has managed to capture some 13.7% of the vote, running on a political platform in which advocacy of protectionism and fear of globalization play the key roles. In this context, the tasks ahead for the new socialist government are formidable: France is the second biggest economy in Europe, but if inflation runs at less than 2.3%, unemployment has now climbed to 10%, economic growth only reached 1.7% last year, public debt hit 85.8% of GDP and public deficit, although receding, 5.2% of GDP — a far cry from Europe’s golden rules. If austerity measures seem to be out of the question in the short run, it seems obvious that public action will only be made possible by increasing revenues (the tax-to-GDP ratio in France is already the 7th highest in Europe) as well as becoming more cost-effective. Economic efficiency, social fairness and overall sustainability of the whole system are at stake. To put it short, the requirement is to move away from quantitative growth to qualitative nurturing at a time of great upheavals. Being deprived of making that choice through an electoral process clearly would have run the risk of getting neither efficiency nor fairness, or at least, to be less idealistic, missing an opportunity to give a trustworthy try at both.

Published in Macau Daily Times, June 14 2012

KAPOK: Who’s luring the public?

The passing of the bill amending the formation of the next Legislative Assembly offers a sad and yet rather telling image of everything that is wrong with political debate in Macao.
By some accounts, we have, on the one hand, a tiny minority of elected lawmakers (four of them) who challenge the rightfulness of the whole political reform consultation process and thus the legitimacy of the adopted bill, and, on the other hand, a vast majority of lawmakers (a mix of appointed, selected and elected personalities) who have demonstrated relentless support for the government and considered it a “duty” to approve the bill proposed by an enlightened government — in 2008, Mr Fong Chi Keong (selected member of the AL) characterized the Macao government as “the best on the planet”…
During that same “endorsement” session on Wednesday, we heard low- and high-pitched condemnations of the political “stunt” carried by three young members of the New Macau Association wearing black T-shirts adorned with the Chinese characters for “Shameful” (可恥) who had interrupted Florinda Chan’s presentation on Tuesday by throwing paper planes and blowing whistles, openly denouncing the consultation process as a “democratic regression”.
Among the condemners, the emotional intervention of Kwan Tsui Hang (elected) can easily be understood: the Federation of Trade Unions that she represents mobilized some 400 volunteers and organized more than 100 meetings in order to collect some 30,000 public opinions supporting the government’s proposals. But if one can appreciate her genuine and heartfelt defense of the work accomplished by her organization, the democrats’ denunciation does raise indeed the question of the intention motivating this Sisyphean endeavor and the role that is assigned to these so-called grassroots organizations: is it one of debate or merely of mobilization?
What is really saddening though are the interventions of two other lawmakers who directly targeted the democrats for their irresponsibility, and even questioned the sanity of the young “manipulated” minds involved in Tuesday’s stunt. Mr. Fong Chi Keong was most certainly the most vocal and aggressive. Mr. Fong is also the president of the Real Estate Developers Association in Macao, and he predicted in 2008 that real estates prices would go back to the ones of 1994-95 and also expressed, on several occasions, deep concern for the rights of illegal workers in our territory (should I say especially the ones busted on construction sites at night?). Mrs. Kwan, who is relentlessly denouncing the government for not proposing a bill regarding illegal workers must have appreciated the irony of the situation.  Before that, Mr. Tsui Wai Kwan (appointed by the Chief Executive) had refrained from nominally lambasting the democrats, but mocked the New Macao Association for being a “drama club” hurting the interests of Macao citizens. Mr. Tsui is also the President of Macao Shippers’ Association and the Chairman of the board of the Importers and Exporters Association of Macao. What are the two main evils hurting the people of Macao: lodging and inflation!
The real questions remain: why is it that one third of the only legitimate legislators (the elected ones) voted against the government proposal, either with a bulletin or with their feet? Why is it that young people have to resort to eye-catching stunts when everything else has failed and channels of communication have irremediably been closed? Some say that lack of interest derives from lack of meaning: who are the ones deserving praises then?

Published in Macau Daily Times, May 11 2012

KAPOK: Democratic Access Denied

Consultations, like the one on political reform that just concluded its second phase on April 23rd, constitute great tools for governments and even greater opportunities for fruitful and vibrant state-society relations. They allow for people to directly voice their opinions and for “opinion shapers” (political parties, associations, newspaper editors, academics, etc.) to articulate their standpoints. They provide the government with a clearer picture of what the society might be vying for, and both majority views as well as minority options are being heard. They also give a chance to mutual understanding and innovative solutions to emerge, thus allowing for truth to drive out falsity and for entrenched assumptions to be dissipated — remember John Stuart Mill and the argument he made in his classic ‘On Liberty’ (1859) in favor of freedom of speech. Ultimately, consultations reinforce the legitimacy of a government by allowing democratic debate to flourish and for accountability to be pushed to the fore.

KAPOK: Green With Envy?

Whatever the time and context, every novel technology soon gets to be seen has having both advantages and downsides. Such is the case for the Internet and the development of what is termed “web 2.0”, that is user-centered usage of the World Wide Web for which the imperative to share, interact and collaborate is of utmost importance. This web 2.0 together with the spread of mobile communication has helped empowered citizens all around the world and renewed the channels of mediation between society and government. Citizen vigilance and journalism have acquired new meanings, and one cannot imagine a piece of online writing today that would not allow for readers to comment, add or amend.

KAPOK: Dysfunctional constituencies

Being right in the middle of a public consultation regarding political reform in Macao that will engage the polity’s future for decades and yet having two thirds of the population not being aware of the aforementioned consultation should franticly waken red-blinking signals as to why our community seems to be so oblivious of politics. To characterize the situation as “political apathy” borders euphemism!
But this result raises questions going beyond the supposed “ignorance” reflected by the opinion poll released by the Association of Macao New Vision. “Lack of interest” and “boredom” complement the diagnosis, and here the cure does not only relate to quantity (the government needs to step-up its communication campaign by having more posters and TV ads!) but also and more importantly so to quality: are the public consultation sessions really an exchange between the government and the population, or a revamped exercise in “you brag, we listen quietly and we decide unilaterally”? Are the proposed changes being perceived as meaningful by the citizenry? Are the numerous associations in Macao allowing for a significant mediation between government and society? And what about the press, and especially the Chinese press? What about the role that diversified op-eds are supposed to play in helping shape the different components of public opinion?
Among the many questions that require some kind of discussion regarding the ongoing political reform consultation is the permanence of “functional constituencies” in Macao’s legislature in the name of tradition, stability and prosperity.
If tradition is to guide us, what kind of tradition are we talking about? Functional constituencies were designed by colonial administrations to coopt local elites and relay colonial authority in places where a foreign administration was always the minority in distant lands. In Hong Kong, functional constituencies started in the nineteenth century and were of diverse usage until the mid-1980s when they regain their final footing. In Macao, traces of these functional constituencies can be found in the 1920s, and a direct reference to them appears in the 1963 Portuguese Overseas Organic Law, and of course again in the “freer” Organic Statute of 1976. The rationale of a colonial administration is based on a top-down approach that has very little respect for modern political thinking. Basically, “functional constituencies” are both unfair and the harbinger of inequality: just like rich people had more political say in nineteenth century Europe, these sectorial interests in society enjoy an additional say in law making in Macao and Hong Kong to this very day, in fact twice as much in Macao than in Hong Kong, as only 1 out of 32 and 1 out of 15 citizens, respectively, vote for these constituencies in both SARs. Isn’t it time for colonial inspiration to finally end?
And then come the consideration for sophistication and efficiency. How can one justify the longevity of just four functional constituencies for 10 seats out of 29 returned by less than 8,000 people? In Hong Kong, there are 30 such constituencies and 226,000 people get to vote: are four functional constituencies really mirroring contemporary Macao? And then, as far as efficiency is concerned, legislators returned by functional constituencies are reported every year as being the least present in the legislature’s working sessions and the least engaging with the government. What about good governance then? Functional constituencies legislators champion the issue of conflict of interests, as they are judge and party, lobby representatives made legislators and thus protect the interests of their sector first and foremost. Prosperity for whose benefit?
If one had to find a messenger to blame for political corruption, forget about universal suffrage: functional constituencies are your perfect culprits!

Published in Macau Daily Times, March 30th 2012

Democracy, as much an expectation as the ultimate horizon

As a political scientist, I sometimes have to refer to the Aristotelian conception of democracy as a deviant regime, a regime above which the dangers of demagogy and populism are constantly looming, and yet, as Aristotle made it clear in the Nicomachean Ethics, democracy is the “least worst” of all deviant regimes, all the more so because the ideal form of government, polity in the Greek philosopher lexicon, is midway between democracy and oligarchy, and unfortunately does not come into existence very often — at least it did not in Aristotle’s time. I would argue that representative democracy of today fits the description of that ideal and ancient polity. Ultimately, although potential deviances serve as a reminder that the best necessarily has the potential to engender the worst and thus prompt citizens as well as political parties to consider vigilance as a duty if not a virtue, the practice of modern representative democracy by humankind over the past two hundred plus years in all corners of the planet does seem to confirm Churchill’s now famous verdict that “democracy is the worst form of government except all the others that have been tried.”